THOMAS AQUINAS
Bibliographical note--Precociousness of Aquinas--Early
life according to Thomas of Cantimpré--Is Thomas of
Cantimpré reliable?--Ptolemy of Lucca on Aquinas’ early
life--Date and place of his studies with Albert--His closing
years--His success as a theologian--His commentaries on
Aristotle--The spheres of theology and science--Aquinas as
a scientist--Inferior to Albert--His theological approach
to the subject of magic--Miracle distinguished--Reality
of magic affirmed--Magic not a science but due to
demons--And is evil--But some regard magic as a human art
or science--Aquinas’ belief in witchcraft--Divination--Lot
casting--Occult virtues--Alchemy and fascination--Amulets
and incantations--Attitude to astrology--Extent of and
limits to the influence of the stars on man--Power of
astrological images denied--The Magi and the star--Is _De
fato_ spurious?--Fate and the stars--Contradictions between
_De fato_ and other works of Aquinas.
_Bibliographical Note._ A critical biography of Aquinas has
not yet appeared. D. Prümmer began in 1911 to publish the
sources, when he edited the hitherto unprinted biography by
Peter Calo who wrote about 1300: _Fontes Vitae S. Thomae
Aquinatis notis historicis et criticis illustrati_, Fasc. I,
Toulouse, 1911. Peter Calo seems to have admitted a great
deal of legendary material. D. J. Kennedy’s “Thomas Aquinas”
in CE profits by this publication and contains perhaps
as good a brief sketch of Aquinas’ career as there is in
English. It also has a good bibliography. It is, however,
at variance on some points with Thomas of Cantimpré’s
statements, as I have indicated in the text.
On the bibliography of Aquinas’ own works one may consult:
C. U. J. Chevalier, _Catalogue critique des œuvres de Saint
Thomas d’Aquin_, 1887; A. Miola, _Codices MSS operum S.
Thomae de Aquino et S. Bonaventurae in Regia Neapolitana
Bibliotheca_, 1874; P. Mandonnet, _Des Écrits Authentiques
de S. Thomas d’Aquin_, Fribourg, 1910. Latest and fullest,
but still leaving much to be desired despite its 252 pages,
is A. Michelitsch, _Thomasschriften_, 1913, vol. I; which
gives the sources for Aquinas’ biography but too briefly
with arbitrary omissions, the bare numbers of MSS containing
his works without indication of their date or contents,
the old lists of his writings, and a full analysis of the
printed editions. Fossi (1793-1795) II, 663-98, lists
such of Aquinas’ works printed before 1500 as are in the
Magliabechian library at Florence.
Since the edition of the works of Aquinas begun by order of
Pope Leo XIII at Rome, 1886-1906, has never been completed,
the most useful edition and that which I have employed
remains that by E. Fretté and P. Maré, _Opera omnia_, Paris,
1871-1880, in 34 volumes.
I have not been much impressed by the worth of such
secondary works on Aquinas and his science as I have
happened upon: for some bibliography see Paetow (1917),
pp. 406, 408-9. Paetow does not mention A. Farges, _Études
philosophiques pour vulgariser les théories d’Aristote et
de S. Thomas et montrer leur accord avec les sciences_,
1909; A. Fisichella, _S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Leone XIII e
la scienza_, 1880; T. Gaudenzi, _S. Tommaso d’Aquino e
la scienza_. 1874; Frohschammer, _Die Philosophie des
Thomas von Aquino_, Leipzig, 1889; nor G. M. Cornoldi
(1822-1892), _The Physical System of St. Thomas_, English
translation by E. H. Dering, London, 1893. The last is a
Roman Catholic defense of the natural philosophy of Aquinas
against modern science, which obscures the facts that Thomas
held fast to the theory of four elements and derived his
natural philosophy from Aristotle. Overworked as the words
“camouflage” and “propaganda” are, one is tempted to apply
them in the case of recent Aquinas literature. At the same
time it is remarkable how few libraries have a complete
and unexpurgated edition of his works. I have not seen
F. Tessen-Wesierski, _Die Grundlagen des Wunderbegriffes
nach Thomas von Aquino_, 1899, in _Jahrb. f. Philos, u.
Spekulative Theologie_.
The relation of Aquinas to Dante has been the theme of more
than one work; an example is N. Busetto, _Saggi di varia
Psicologia Dantesca contribute allo studio delle relazioni
di Dante con Alberto Magno e con San Tommaso_, 1905.
[Sidenote: Precociousness of Aquinas.]
Thomas Aquinas was perhaps not so precocious a genius as some of his
fellow-countrymen who were artists during the Italian Renaissance.
But if he did not die quite as young as Masaccio or Raphael, he
nevertheless produced a vast amount of learned writing within a
comparatively short time. Whether we believe that he was born in 1225
or 1227, he was not yet fifty when he died on the seventh of March,
1274. Ptolemy of Lucca, who states that he had often heard Aquinas’
confession and had attended his lectures and been his friend for a
long time,[1969] says that Thomas became a Dominican at sixteen and
“lived in pure innocence” for about thirty-two years thereafter.[1970]
A passage in the _Compendium studii philosophiae_ of Roger Bacon sneers
at the theological teaching of “the boys of the two Orders,” such as
Albert and Thomas and the others who enter the Orders when twenty
years or under.[1971] Perhaps the names of Albert and Thomas were not
in the passage as originally penned by Bacon; Albert at least had
probably come of age before the friar orders started, and Bacon would
scarcely look back upon a man who was his senior as a boy. But the fact
remains that Thomas at least became a Dominican at an early age.
[Sidenote: Early life according to Thomas of Cantimpré.]
Thomas of Cantimpré tells[1972] how Aquinas entered the Dominican order
at Bologna against the wishes of his family--he was the son of the
count of Aquino and the countess of Teano--who secured a summons to the
papal court where he was ordered to put off the friar’s dress and be
invested with ecclesiastical office. When he refused, his two brothers
secretly seized him and shut him up in prison where he suffered from
want, cold, and poverty, and further from women whom his brothers
introduced to tempt him. He remained thus imprisoned “for two or three
years” according to Thomas of Cantimpré, until master John of the
Dominicans complained to the emperor Frederick II who secured Aquinas’
release and would, according to Thomas of Cantimpré, have put his
brothers to death for their inhumanity but for master John’s further
intervention. Master John then shipped Aquinas off to Paris, but his
brothers and friends at the papal court had him again summoned thither,
and he was offered the post of abbot of Monte Cassino “under whom are
seven bishops and who himself exercises the pontifical office.” The
pope was ready to allow him to continue to wear the Dominican costume
in this position, but Aquinas fled a second time from the papal court
and came to Cologne and studied there until Albert was transferred
to Paris and given the chair of theology there for his incomparable
learning. “After whom,” continues Cantimpré, “also this same brother
Thomas gained a position and chair of similar importance.” The meaning
of this last sentence is somewhat doubtful. Is “after” used in the
sense of time or of precedence in dignity? Did Aquinas hold a position
at the same time with and second only to Albert, or did he obtain
the chair only after Albert had ceased to hold it? Chronological
considerations make the latter more probable. But was the chair in
question at Cologne or at Paris?
[Sidenote: Is Thomas of Cantimpré’s account reliable?]
This passage from Thomas of Cantimpré is at variance on a number of
points with the accounts usually given of Aquinas’ life. For instance,
it makes him join the Dominicans at Bologna, not at Naples, and
represents the pope as siding with his family in their efforts to keep
Aquinas out of the Dominican Order instead of delivering Aquinas from
the persecution of his family. But Thomas of Cantimpré apparently
penned his passage during Aquinas’ lifetime and it is probably a half
century nearer the events than the _Lives_ of Aquinas written in the
early fourteenth century and upon which most modern accounts are based.
At the same time it must be admitted that Cantimpré seems to write in
a loose and exaggerated manner which does not command much confidence.
But I suspect that he is the ultimate source of most of the later
accounts covering the same ground.
[Sidenote: Ptolemy of Lucca on his early life.]
Ptolemy of Lucca, who may be regarded as an independent witness in
view of his personal friendship with Aquinas, states that Thomas was
of noble origin and descended from great counts of the kingdom of
Apulia, that his family were faithful to the pope against the emperor
Frederick II, and that Thomas was educated as a boy in the monastery of
Monte Cassino. When he joined the Dominicans at sixteen, his relations
kidnapped him, but he escaped to Rome and from there went off to
Cologne to become Albert’s pupil. At the age of twenty-five he came to
Paris where before his thirtieth year he lectured on the _Sentences_
and received his degree in theology. Before receiving the degree he
had written a commentary on the _Sentences_ and a treatise against
William of St. Amour. As William of St. Amour was not condemned by the
pope until October, 1256, and as the friars were not admitted to the
doctorate in theology at Paris until 1257 or 1258, Ptolemy’s statements
would indicate that Thomas was not born until 1227.
[Sidenote: Date and place of his studies with Albert.]
On the other hand, the assertions of both Cantimpré and Ptolemy of
Lucca that Aquinas studied with Albert at Cologne before Albert was
called to Paris, do not fit in any too well with the usual dating
of Albert’s Paris residence as from 1245 to 1248, when he is again
supposed to have returned to Cologne. Consequently Peter of Prussia in
his fifteenth century life of Albertus Magnus held that Aquinas spent
two periods of study with Albert at Cologne, one before and the other
after Albert’s teaching at Paris.[1973] Similarly von Hertling[1974]
gives 1245-1252 as the duration of Aquinas’ studies with Albert, after
which he returned to Paris alone.
[Sidenote: His closing years.]
Only sixteen or seventeen years of life remained to Aquinas after
he received his degree in theology. Ptolemy of Lucca states that he
remained in Paris for only three years after receiving the degree,
when he returned to Italy, where during the pontificates of Urban IV
(1261-1264) and Clement IV (1265-1268) he resided at Viterbo, Orvieto,
and Rome, and was offered but declined the archbishopric of Naples.
During these same years Ptolemy places most of his chief works. In 1268
or 1269 he returned to Paris, but died in Italy in 1274.
[Sidenote: His success as a theologian.]
Aquinas rapidly attained great success as a teacher and authority as a
theologian during his lifetime and seems still to be regarded as the
greatest and most authoritative of the orthodox medieval theologians.
This success was probably due to the fact that he did just a little
better than anyone else what a great many had been and were trying to
do, and that was to combine all previous Christian thinking into one
systematic and consistent and moderate whole. Aquinas was probably not
the most brilliant or original mind of his generation, but probably
his teaching and writing were clearer to a greater number of students,
and seemed sounder to a greater number of the thinkers of the time
than the lectures or books of any other contemporary. He put matters
clearly, concisely, moderately, and convincingly; and struck the golden
mean as it were. We can see how he may have profited immensely by the
work of predecessors like William of Auvergne and Albertus Magnus, and
yet how his works would tend to supplant theirs. Moreover, the task
at which he had been working was not one which admitted of infinite
improvement. It was largely a problem of combining, classifying,
reconciling, and presenting the views of previous generations and
periods, and when this was once well done, there was no need of
doing it again. The attitude therefore of Aquinas toward magic and
witchcraft, astrology and divination, and other occult arts and
sciences, and also toward natural science is quite important for us to
note, since he summed up previous Christian thought so satisfactorily,
since he was both the most popular and the most moderate teacher of
his own time, and since his opinions upon these subjects remained
for centuries acceptable and authoritative to the Roman Catholic
Church.[1975] At the same time for these very reasons we must not
expect to find him putting forward any new and unusual views upon these
points.
[Sidenote: His commentaries on Aristotle.]
Aquinas was not merely a theologian in a narrow and restricted sense
of that word, but was also noted as a commentator on Aristotle.[1976]
Ptolemy of Lucca tells us that “he expounded practically all
philosophy, whether moral or natural, but especially ethics and
mathematics.” These lectures, however, were not all published. Thomas
did not comment on as many of the Aristotelian works as Albert did, and
several of his commentaries were left unfinished and were completed
by others such as Peter of Auvergne. Thomas has sometimes been given
credit for bringing about and using as the basis of his commentaries
a new translation of Aristotle, made directly from the Greek and
presumably executed by William of Moerbeke,[1977] although, as we have
already noted in the case of Peter of Prussia’s _Life of Albertus
Magnus_, some say by Thomas of Cantimpré. It is true that William
of Moerbeke translated some of the works of Aristotle, but I cannot
find that anyone has ever identified a signed translation by him with
the text used by Aquinas or otherwise adequately demonstrated that
they worked in concert.[1978] Even if Aquinas instigated William’s
translations from Aristotle, he could not have taken full advantage of
them, since some of William’s work of translation was executed after
Aquinas’ death.[1979]
[Sidenote: The spheres of theology and science.]
We must not think of Aquinas’ studies in secular philosophy and science
as simply aimed to render these subjects serviceable and innocuous to
Christian theology. He was too much a student of Albertus Magnus for
that, and his study of Greek thought and natural science broadened
his outlook beyond that of theology in a narrow sense. He believed,
moreover, that to a large extent the fields of theology and natural
science were distinct; that pure theologians should not try to settle
purely philosophical or scientific problems, of which they knew little.
Christians who deny as contrary to their faith the philosophical
solutions of problems which are really indifferent so far as the Faith
is concerned, simply bring Christianity, in Aquinas’ opinion, into
disrepute among the wise men of this world.[1980] Conversely every
theory of an ancient philosopher or hypothesis of science is not to be
accepted as of equal rank with religious dogmas. When John of Vercelli
submitted a list of questions upon which he desired, first, the
opinions of the saints, and secondly, the opinion of Aquinas himself,
Thomas protested at the start that some of the inquiries had nothing to
do with the Christian faith but were purely physical.[1981]
[Sidenote: Aquinas as a scientist.]
Furthermore we must keep in mind that Aquinas was something of a
scientist himself. It is interesting to note that after his death the
University of Paris wrote to the general chapter of the Dominicans,
not only lamenting his death as an irreparable loss and asking that
his bones might be sent to Paris for burial, but also requesting the
transmission of certain books begun by him while at the university
and not as yet completed upon his departure from Paris.[1982] What
were these writings: theological treatises, commentaries on the minor
prophets, or manuals of devotion? None of these. They were a commentary
on the philosopher Simplicius, another on the _De coelo et mundo_ of
Aristotle,[1983] a third on the _Timaeus_ of Plato, and finally a work
on irrigation and mechanical engineering.[1984]
[Sidenote: Inferior to Albert.]
Thomas, however, did no such important work in natural science as
Albert. His commentaries upon Aristotle follow the text closely
and do little more than expound it; they are not full of long
digressions and additions, as Albert’s are. Thomas did not found an
experimental school and had not himself devoted the long years of
personal experience and observation to nature that his master had.
And he seems to have had the less original and observant mind of
the two. But his wide reading, his clear thinking, his well-ordered
class-room presentation of material and arguments, and his broad yet
moderate views insured his instant and permanent success in the field
of theology, where the paths were already well trod, and it only
remained for someone to put everything into as perfect and final a
form as possible. In natural science, on the other hand, the labor
that awaited men was not merely the lucid combination of Aristotelian
and Arabic thinking with previous Christian thought, but the pioneer
work of personal observation and experiment and the far more difficult
combination of these with existing theories. Aquinas was a perfecter
according to the standards of his own age; Albert sometimes was a
pioneer in the spirit of the new age of science.
[Sidenote: Aquinas’ theological approach to the subject of magic.]
In view of this distinction between the two men it is perhaps not
surprising that what Aquinas has to say concerning magic, even in the
broad use of that term, occurs to a large extent in his theological
writings. Just as, although Albert was a distinguished theologian,
we viewed magic in his works largely as connected with science; so,
although Aquinas studied and wrote of secular philosophy and science,
we find in him a moderate, enlightened, and highly influential
statement of the attitude of Christian theological scholarship towards
magic, witchcraft, and astrology. In his account of magic so-called
in his _Summa_, _Contra Gentiles_, and _De potentia_, he seems to
follow Augustine a good deal, and like him he makes considerable use of
Porphyry’s _Letter to Anebo_. Aquinas accepts the essential features
of the previous theological definition of magic, as Albert did in his
_theological_ treatises.
[Sidenote: Miracle distinguished.]
Aquinas carefully distinguishes magic from miracle.[1985] A miracle
is contrary to the order of all created nature and can be performed by
God alone. Many things that seem marvelous to us or of which the cause
is hidden from us are not, strictly speaking, miraculous. An eclipse
seems a miracle to some ignorant people, but not to a philosopher who
understands its cause. Other seeming marvels which are not divine
miracles are the occult virtues of physical bodies “for which a
reason cannot be assigned by man,”[1986] and the effects produced in
our lower world by the influence of the constellations. Even more
difficult of human comprehension are the doings of demons, who, Aquinas
is convinced, can not only deceive the senses and affect the human
imagination, but also truly transform bodies. Yet even their feats are
not true miracles in violation of natural order; they simply add to the
marvelous virtues of physical objects and the potent influences of the
stars something of their own peculiar powers. After all, their feats
can be explained, they operate by means of art; God alone is a cause
absolutely hidden from every man.
[Sidenote: Reality of magic affirmed.]
As for magicians, in their feats they make use of herbs and other
physical bodies: of words, usually in the form of “invocations,
supplications, and adjurations”; they also employ figures and
characters, sacrifices and prostrations, images and rites, carefully
observed times, constellations, and other considerations.[1987] As a
result the whereabouts of stolen objects is disclosed, hidden treasure
is found, the future is revealed, closed doors mysteriously open,
men become invisible, inanimate bodies move and speak, apparitions
of rational beings are summoned and answer questions. Some contend
that such apparitions are imaginary, but Aquinas replies that on such
occasions third parties have been present whose senses were working
normally and who also witnessed the apparitions, and furthermore
that no phantom of our imagination could reveal things of which we
ourselves were ignorant. In the reality of such feats of magic, then,
Thomas firmly believes.
[Sidenote: Magic not a science but due to demons.]
But Aquinas will not admit that the magician and his materials are a
sufficient cause of the magic. He also denies that certain men are
especially endowed with magic power by the stars at their birth or
that the influence of the constellations can be controlled to perform
particular feats of magic. Demons in his opinion really perform the
magic. Words, figures, spells are mere signs to them; the poor magician
is their dupe. It looks, Thomas admits, as if spirits came only when
invoked, and as if they often came unwillingly, and sometimes performed
good deeds at the magician’s bidding which must be very distasteful
to them as evil beings. But in all this they are simply deceiving
mankind. “It is not true then,” says Aquinas, “that the magic arts are
sciences, but rather they are certain fallacies of the demons.”[1988]
In discussing the “notory art,” which professes to acquire knowledge by
fasting, prayers to God, figures, and strange words, he declares that
demons cannot illuminate the intellect, although they may express in
words some smattering of the sciences.[1989]
[Sidenote: And is evil.]
Aquinas further charges that the practitioners of magic are generally
criminals, perpetrating illicit deeds, adulteries, thefts, and
homicides, a fact which has gained for magicians the further name of
evil-doers, i. e. _malefici_ (sorcerers). At best magic does not aid
man in science or virtue, but in trivial matters such as the discovery
of stolen goods.[1990] Aquinas repeats the criticism of Porphyry in
_The Letter to Anebo_ that the methods of magic are immoral. Therefore
it is wrong to seek to learn “the magic sciences” in order to use them,
but permissible to study them in order to confute them. Aquinas then
makes haste to correct this phrase “magic sciences,” as we have already
noted above.
[Sidenote: Some regard magic as a human art or science.]
But by his own denial Aquinas makes it sufficiently evident that many
men of his time thought the magic arts sciences, and that magicians
believed themselves able by personal qualifications, by subtle use of
occult natural properties, by rites and ceremonies, and by the art of
astrology, either to work wonders directly and immediately or to coerce
demons to work wonders for them.
[Sidenote: Aquinas believes in witchcraft.]
In lending the authority of his name to an affirmation of the reality
of demon-magic, Aquinas must share together with many writers
before and after him responsibility for the witchcraft delusion and
executions. And yet he tells us that there were already some persons by
his time who denied that there was any such thing as witchcraft except
in men’s imaginations and fears. Such persons argued that where the
supposed sorcery was not entirely due to imaginary terror, it could
be explained as the natural effect of occult causes. But Aquinas, who
twice argues the question whether the consummation of marriage can be
prevented by sorcery,[1991] declares that the authority of the saints
and of the Catholic faith alike proclaim the reality of witchcraft
and its power to obstruct carnal union. Men who dispute this are the
same as denying the existence of the demons.[1992] Dear demons! What a
treasured legacy of theology from paganism!
[Sidenote: Divination.]
Aquinas also tends to follow ecclesiastical tradition in condemning
most arts of divination as the work of demons,[1993] and in carefully
distinguishing from them divine prophecy, which can speak with
certainty even of contingent matters.[1994] He grants, however,
that some arts of divination have a natural basis, and that natural
divination is permissible, if not extended to accidental occurrences
and to human acts due to the reason and will.[1995] It is possible to
forecast the future by interpretation of dreams which are produced
by natural causes either within or outside the sleeper’s body.[1996]
The commentary of Aquinas on Aristotle’s _De somno et vigilia_ is,
however, a perfunctory treatise, inferior to that by Albertus Magnus on
the same theme, and advances no ideas of Thomas’ own on the subject of
divination from dreams. Even augury may be natural divination, if the
acts of the animals under observation are governed by the positions and
movements of the stars.[1997] Aquinas also mentions chiromancy without
disapproval, but will not admit that geomancy comes under the head
of natural divination, since the figures upon which its predictions
are based are the outcome either of chance or of voluntary human
action.[1998] He condemns as superstitious the regarding as signs of
the future such trivial occurrences as a sneeze or a dog’s running
between two persons who are walking together.[1999]
[Sidenote: Lot casting.]
Lot casting of whatever sort is not natural divination. The Bible
tells us, however, that God often rules the casting of lots, and “if
practices which have a natural or human cause are blameless, much more
so are those which depend on divine aid.”[2000] But Aquinas cautions
against an appeal to God to decide the casting of lots unless there is
real necessity, or without due reverence and devotion, or for purely
human and worldly purposes, or in cases where direct divine inspiration
should be sought, as in ecclesiastical elections. As Bede pointed out,
it is true that Matthias was selected by lot before Pentecost, but
after the reception of the Holy Ghost the seven deacons were elected
by the disciples. And when men pry into hidden things more than they
should, whether by lot casting or other methods, it is Aquinas’ opinion
that demons are involved.[2001]
[Sidenote: Occult virtues.]
As Aquinas differentiated between natural divination and that due to
demons, so he distinguishes from illicit magic “the occult works of
nature.” On this theme he addressed a brief treatise to “a certain
knight.”[2002] Besides those properties of natural objects which
accord with the properties of their component elements and so have a
manifest origin, there are occult virtues for which men can give no
reason,[2003] as in the stock illustration of the magnet, as great a
favorite with medieval writers as electricity is with modern preachers
to inspire faith in the invisible and imperfectly known. Aquinas
accounts for the existence of such occult virtues by the influence of
the heavenly bodies upon the world of nature. In his _Meteorology_,
too, he attributes the wonderful powers of precious stones to “a
certain celestial and occult virtue.”[2004] In this he probably shows
the influence of his master Albertus Magnus.
[Sidenote: Alchemy and fascination.]
Aquinas declares that alchemy is a true, although difficult art, and
accounts for the efficacy of its operations by its utilization of
occult forces of celestial virtue.[2005] Pico della Mirandola noted
that while Thomas seemed to deny the art in his _Commentary on the
Sentences_, he approved it in his theological _Summa_, which Pico
accepted as his last word on the subject.[2006] Spurious works of
alchemy were, however, subsequently ascribed to Aquinas in manuscripts
of the fifteenth century. Fascination Aquinas also regards as a fact,
and practically explains it as due to the power of the evil eye. The
eye is affected by the strong imagination of the soul and then corrupts
and poisons the atmosphere so that tender bodies coming within its
range may be injuriously affected. It is thus that malicious old women
injure children,[2007]--another faggot added by Aquinas to the pyres of
the witchcraft delusion.
[Sidenote: Amulets and incantations.]
We have hitherto found the practices of wearing amulets and repeating
incantations apt to accompany the belief in occult virtues. Aquinas,
in discussing “the suspension of sacred words about the neck” cautions
that “in all incantations and suspensions of writings” what is written
should be seemly, should not be an invocation of demons, should contain
no unknown words which may have an evil meaning, and should contain no
characters other than the sign of the cross. He quotes the decretal
forbidding other observances in collecting medicinal herbs than the
sign of the cross and repetition of the Lord’s prayer. And he concludes
that “suspending divine words about the neck, assuming that they
contain nothing false or doubtful, is certainly permissible, but it
would be more laudable to abstain from such practices.”[2008]
[Sidenote: Attitude to astrology.]
Already a number of passages have shown incidentally that Thomas, like
his master Albert, ascribed an important place in natural science to
astrological theory. Although he refused to explain magic as worked
by the stars, he accounted for the occult works of nature and for
natural divination by astral influence. He grants the nobility and
incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies but, although aware that Plato
and Aristotle attributed souls and intelligences to them, insists
that they are material substances. But he regards the stars as
_media_ between “the separate intelligences” and our material world
and is inclined to answer affirmatively a question which was more
than once put to him, namely, Do the angels move the stars?[2009] He
also frequently affirms, both in the course of his chief works and in
briefer answers to special inquiries that God rules inferior through
superior creatures and earthly bodies by the stars.[2010] No wise man
doubts that all natural motions of inferior bodies are caused by the
movement of the celestial bodies.[2011] Reason and experience, saints
and philosophers, have proved it over and over again. Aquinas then
cites two passages from Augustine[2012] and Dionysius[2013] which do
not seem so sweeping as his own assertion: Augustine affirming merely
that “grosser and inferior bodies are ruled by subtler and superior
ones according to a certain order,” and Dionysius saying simply that
the rays of the sun aid in the generation of life and nourish and
increase and perfect it. Indeed, throughout his arguments for astrology
Aquinas, like Albert, seems to stretch authorities upon a Procrustean
bed of citation and to make church fathers who are famed for their
attacks on astrologers seem to favor the limited rule of the stars
over all nature. Aquinas further deems an art of judicial astrology
possible, asserting that, besides the crude prognostications which
sailors and farmers make from the sky, it is feasible “by some other
more occult observations of the stars to employ judicial astrology
concerning corporeal effects.”[2014]
[Sidenote: Extent of and limits to the influence of the stars upon man.]
But Aquinas declares that the human will is free and that the soul as
an intellectual substance cannot be coerced by corporeal substances,
however superior. He also opines that many occurrences are accidental
rather than due to the stars, “as when a man digging a grave finds
buried treasure.”[2015] And “no natural agent can incline one to
that which happens accidentally.” Aquinas like Albert is also aware,
however, that the astrologers themselves agree that the wise man rules
the stars, and conversely he himself recognizes that man is not purely
an intellectual being, that he often obeys sensual appetite, and that
even the mind derives its knowledge from the senses and consequently
in a condition disturbed by phantasy. Thus the stars may indirectly
affect the human intellect to a considerable extent.[2016] Aquinas is
also ready to admit that astrologers often make true predictions in
events where large numbers of men are concerned and the passions of the
majority override the wisdom and will of the few who are able to resist
such impulses. On the other hand, he holds that astrologers often err
in their predictions concerning individuals.[2017] This perhaps refers
only to prediction of nativities, for Peter of Prussia, in defending
Albertus Magnus against the charge of indulgence in too curious arts,
asserted that Aquinas “nowhere in his writings” reproved or attacked
astrological interrogations.[2018]
[Sidenote: Power of astrological images denied.]
The question remains, to what extent can men voluntarily avail
themselves of the celestial virtues? Aquinas takes the position that
men can make use of such virtues only as they find them already
existing in nature and that works of human art, as distinct from
natural objects, receive no new virtue from the stars but only from the
human operator,--“from the conception of the artificer.” It is for this
reason that Aquinas refuses to explain many operations of magicians
as produced by the aid of the constellations. In particular he denies
that gems engraved with astronomical figures receive any more virtue
from the stars than other gems of the same species without the carving.
Figures and characters and human words are immaterial and do not
exert force upon matter. If, therefore, astronomical or necromantic
or magic images and characters seem to produce marvelous effects, it
must be because they are illicitly employed as secret signs to demons
who really achieve the results.[2019] In short, Aquinas’ position
concerning images and characters is that of William of Auvergne rather
than that of Albertus Magnus.
[Sidenote: The Magi and the star.]
Aquinas discusses the problem of the star of Bethlehem both in his
_Commentary on Matthew_[2020] and in the _Summa_,[2021] and the
interest which such subjects had for his contemporaries is further
shown by these questions which were put to him, “Did the little hands
of the infant Jesus create stars?” and “Did the star which appeared
to the Magi have the shape of a cross or human form?”[2022] The
first question was probably suggested by the apocryphal gospels, the
second by the homily of the Pseudo-Chrysostom which we have already
considered. Aquinas’ discussion of the star and Magi is somewhat
fuller than that by Abelard but equally drawn from the fathers,
especially Chrysostom and Augustine.[2023] Like them he contends
that the incident lends no support to the doctrine of nativities. He
saves the Magi, however, from the imputation of being workers of magic
and dupes of the demons, adopting Jerome’s oft-repeated explanation
that while in common speech _magi_ are the same as enchanters, in the
Persian language the word designates philosophers and sages. In this
case Aquinas does not force his authorities at all; on the contrary
he makes no attempt to improve upon their captious, sophistical, and
unconvincing arguments.
[Sidenote: Is the _De fato_ spurious?]
The earliest bibliography of Aquinas’ works seems to be that which
Ptolemy of Lucca, who had known him personally, gives in his
_Ecclesiastical History_.[2024] Among the _Opuscula_, which Ptolemy
lists with considerable care, giving their _Incipits_ as well as their
titles, appears the treatise _De fato_.[2025] It also appears in the
_Table of writings of the Order of Preachers_, a bibliography completed
in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.[2026] It is not,
however, in the official list of Thomas’ works drawn up preliminary
to his canonization in 1323, and which Father Mandonnet would accept
as an absolute criterion of the authentic writings of Aquinas. Other
early catalogues of Aquinas’ writings are all derived from one of these
three prototypes.[2027] Our treatise has also been attributed to
Albertus Magnus,[2028] and much of its attitude toward astrology and
other occult arts is just the opposite of Thomas’ position elsewhere as
we have already noted it. I have therefore reserved the _De fato_ for
separate consideration. This problem of “fate” also sometimes formed
the subject of a section of theological _Summae_ or other long works,
as we have seen in the case of Albertus Magnus, and the manuscripts
contain other separate discussions of it[2029] than this one associated
with Aquinas. As might be expected there is a general resemblance
between the aspects of the problem considered and the authorities cited
in all these treatises. No doubt it was a common topic of scholastic
disputation.
[Sidenote: Fate and the stars.]
Fate is defined in our treatise as the power of the stars exercised
through their movements and relations to one another. After citing
in typical scholastic fashion a number of authorities _pro_ and
_con_,--Aristotle and Boethius are made to supply many arguments for
astrology; and after agreeing with most of the favoring arguments and
answering some of the opposing ones, the author finally concludes
that fate in this sense does prevail. But he distinguishes between
fate and fatal necessity, holding that the stars do not impose fatal
necessity upon inferiors. While their own motion is “necessary,
inevitable, and inalterable, ... in things generated it is received
mutably and contingently because of their changeable natures.” Like
Aquinas and other authors, he then approvingly quotes Ptolemy’s
familiar qualification that the stars exert their influence _per aliud
et per accidens_ and that “the wise man rules the stars.” Properties
of inferior objects may be used by man to counteract the effects of
the constellations, or imaginations of the mind may operate to weaken
their force. The author then argues that fate as he has defined it is
knowable, in other words that the art of astrology is practicable, that
the influence of the stars can be discerned and measured. He goes so
far as to defend the assertion of Ptolemy that “when the luminaries are
in the head of Algon, that is, of the Gorgon, if Mars shines in hostile
aspect, the child then born will be mutilated of hands and feet, and
crucified.”
[Sidenote: Contradictions between _De fato_ and other works of Aquinas.]
The _De fato_ seems at variance with the opinions of Aquinas as
expressed elsewhere upon the following points. It correctly cites
Boethius’ _De consolatione philosophiae_ that the incident of finding
hidden treasure while digging a grave is an example of “the inevitable
connection of causes which proceeds from the fount of the knowledge
of God,” whereas Aquinas incorrectly cited it as an illustration of
an accidental event. Again, the author of _De fato_ regards the story
of the Magi and the star of Bethlehem as an evidence of the truth of
astrology. He also seems to believe that “intelligence through the
motion of the sky rules and causes the intellectual operations of
the soul,” which Aquinas refused to concede. _De fato_ also explains
fascination somewhat differently from Aquinas. It appears to agree with
him that the soul of the person exercising the power of fascination
affects the person fascinated through the sense of sight; but it
suggests that the soul of the fascinator has been endowed by the stars
with power over the soul of the fascinated, whereas Aquinas denied
that certain men were made magicians by their nativities. Finally
_De fato_ does not, like Aquinas, reject astrological images, but
declares that celestial influence is received by artificial as well
as by natural objects, “and therefore the figures of magic images are
engraved according to the constellations.”
FOOTNOTES:
[1969] Ptolemy of Lucca, _Hist. Eccles._, XXIII, 7 (_Muratori_, XI,
1169), recounting the death of Aquinas remarks, “Unde cum multa
devotione et mentis puritate et corporis qua semper floruit et in
Ordine viguit, quemque ego probavi inter homines quos umquam novi qui
suam saepe confessionem audivi et cum ipso multo tempore conversatus
sum familiari ministerio ac ipsius auditor fui, ex hac luce transiit ad
Christum....”
[1970] _Ibid._, XXII, 20 (_Muratori_, XI, 1152).
[1971] Brewer (1859), p. 426.
[1972] _Bonum universale de apibus_, I, 20, xi.
[1973] Peter of Prussia (1621), pp. 90-104.
[1974] v. Hertling (1914), p. 9, note, where, however, he says,
“Albert’s Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität Paris schloss sich
unmittelbar an jene von Strassburg,” which leaves no time for Aquinas
to come to Albert in the first instance at Cologne.
[1975] Some measure of Aquinas’ hold upon the later middle ages may be
had from the list of his works printed before 1500 and contained in the
Magliabechian library at Florence: F. Fossi, _Catalogus codicum saeculo
XV impressorum qui in publica Bibliotheca Magliabechiana Florentiae
adservantur_, 1793-1795, II, 663-98.
[1976] I have not had access to M. Grabmann, _Les Commentaires de Saint
Thomas d’Aquin sur les ouvrages d’Aristote_, in _Annales de l’Institut
Supérieur de Philosophie_, Louvain, III (1914), 229-82, nor to R.
Simiterre, _Sur les condemnations d’Aristote et de Saint Thomas d’Aquin
au XIIIe siècle_, in _Revue pratique d’Apologétique_, V (1907), 502-15.
[1977] Thus Rashdall, _The Universities of Europe in the Middle
Ages_, 1895, I, 361, says, “Thomas Aquinas endeavored to procure
better translations from the original Greek, and his efforts were
seconded by Pope Urban IV. Special translations or special revisions
of the existing Graeco-Latin translations were prepared for his use
by a Dominican Friar of Greek birth, variously known as Wilhelmus
de Brabantia or Wilhelmus de Moerbeka. To him at least the common
tradition of the Middle Ages ascribes the _translatio nova_ of the
books of Natural and Moral Philosophy, which, in spite of many
imperfections, held its place in the schools as a kind of authorized
version of Aristotle till the dawn of the New Learning.” Citing
Jourdain, _Recherches_, p. 67, _et seq._; Denifle, _Archiv_, II, 226-7.
William the Fleming, as he is also called, was scarcely of Greek birth,
but of course finally became archbishop of Corinth.
[1978] In the 14th century bibliography of writings by Dominicans,
Denifle (1886), p. 237, it is stated that William of Brabant,
archbishop of Corinth (he became so in 1277 after Aquinas’ death),
“translated all the books of natural and moral philosophy from Greek
into Latin at the instance of brother Thomas.” But of the numerous
signed translations by William extant very few are of works by
Aristotle. Moreover, is the Thomas here mentioned Aquinas? The very
next name in the bibliography in question to follow this Wilhelmus
Brabantinus is Thomas Brabantinus or Thomas of Cantimpré, who may have
been the person to suggest the translation to his fellow Fleming.
However, Aquinas and William were both connected with the popes in
Italy in the 1260’s, and Aquinas would seem to have had more interest
in a translation of Aristotle than Albert’s other “auditor,” Thomas of
Cantimpré.
The following extracts from medieval chronicles specifically mention
Aquinas, but as their dates are obviously incorrect not much reliance
is to be placed upon them.
_In Chronico Slavicorum apud Lindenbrogium ad annum 1249._ “Wilhelmus
de Brabantia Ordinis Praedicatorum transtulit omnes libros Aristotelis
de graeco in Latinum verbum a verbo (qua translatione scholares adhuc
hodierna die utuntur in scholis) ad instantiam sancti Thomae de Aquino
Doctoris.”
_In Chronico Susati, quod MS servat Veneta SS. Ioannis et Pauli
bibliotheca._ “Anno Domini 1267 fr. Wilhelmus Brabantinus,
corinthiensis de Ordine fratrum Praedicatorum, rebus excessit humanis,
baccalarius in theologia. Hic transtulit omnes libros Aristotelis
Rationalis Naturalis et Moralis Philosophiae et Metaphysicae de graeco
in latinum, verbum a verbo, quibus nunc utimur in scholis ad instantiam
sancti Thomae de Aquino. Nam temporibus domini Alberti translatione
vetere omnes communiter utebantur.” “Albert’s day” was of course no
different from Aquinas’ whom he outlived by six years.
In 1847 the _Histoire Littéraire_, XXI, 147, said, “Guillaume de
Meerbeke passe pour avoir traduit tous les livres d’Aristote, à la
prière de saint Thomas. Nous n’oserions affirmer ni cette intervention
du docteur angélique, ni cette immensité des travaux du traducteur
brabançon. Il s’en faut qu’on ait de lui une série si volumineuse de
versions latines.”
[1979] As has been pointed out by HL XXI, 147, in the case of the “new
translation” of the Ethics, dated in the colophon in 1282, whereas
Aquinas died in 1274. Quetif and Echard (1719), I, 390, had argued,
however, that this date was when the MS was copied and not when the
translation was made; but this is far-fetched as most of William’s
translations are similarly dated. Certainly William’s labors as a
translator did not cease with his elevation to the archbishopric of
Corinth, since he translated Galen _De alimentis_ in 1277 and works by
Proclus in 1281.
Quetif and Echard, in order to maintain the cooperation supposed to
exist between William and Aquinas, also hold that William’s translation
of the _Elementatio theologica_ of Proclus made at Viterbo in 1268
was from the Arabic and not from the Greek, since Aquinas says in his
commentary on that work that the Greek text had not yet been found.
This conclusion is also drawn by HL XXI, 148.
[1980] See Duhem II (1914), 394, for a like opinion expressed by
Augustine.
[1981] _Opera_, 27, 248.
[1982] _Chartularium univ. Paris._ (1889-1891), I, 504-5, dated May 2,
1274, “... humiliter supplicamus ut cum quaedam scripta ad phylosophiam
spectantia, Parisius inchoata ab eo, quae in suo recessu reliquerit
imperfecta, et ipsum credamus, ubi translatus fuerit, complevisse,
nobis benevolentia vestra cito communicari procuret, et specialiter
super librum Simplicii, super librum de celo et mundo; et expositionem
Tymei Platonis, ac librum de aquarum conductibus et ingeniis erigendis;
de quibus nobis mittendis speciali promissione fecerat mentionem.”
[1983] Of this commentary the third and fourth books were finished by
Peter of Auvergne.
[1984] Aquinas is even credited with an abridgement of the Almagest
in CLM 56, 1436 A. D., “Almagesti abbreviatum per magistrum Thomam
de Aquino”; cited by Björnbo (1911), p. 129. But this, I take it, is
the same as the abridgement of the Almagest which Averroes is said to
have made and which was translated by the order of Alfonso the Great:
see Digby 236, 14th century, fol. 190, where the writer of a prologue
to another work of Averroes remarks, “Scivit enim Averoys optime
Almagestum. Nam vidi per eum Almagesti abbreviatum, quem librum fecit
transferri Rex Alfonsus Magnus, et habetur Bononie et in Hispania.”
[1985] _Summa_, Prima pars, Quaest. 110, Art. 4, and Quaest. 111, Art.
3; _Contra Gentiles_, III, 101-3; _De potentia_, VI, 5; _Sententiae_,
II, Dist. 7, Quaest. 2-3.
[1986] _Summa_, Secundae secunda, Quaest. 96, Art. 2.
[1987] _Contra Gentiles_, III, 101-5; _De potentia_, VI, 10; _Summa_,
Prima pars, Quaest. 115, Art. 5; _De substantiis separatis_, cap. 2.
[1988] _Quodlibet_, IV, 16.
[1989] _Summa_, Secundae secunda, Quest. 96, Art. 1.
[1990] _Contra Gentiles_, III, 106.
[1991] For the opinions of Hincmar, Gratian, Peter Lombard, and other
ecclesiastical authorities on this question of witchcraft and impotency
see Hansen (1900), p. 153.
[1992] _Quodlibet_, XI, 10; _Comment. in Lib. IV Sententiarum_, Dist.
34, Art. 3.
[1993] _In Isaiam_, cap. 3; _Summa_, II, ii, 95; _De sortibus_,
_passim_.
[1994] _Contra Gentiles_, III, 154.
[1995] _Summa_, II, ii, 95, art. 5.
[1996] _Ibid._, art. 6.
[1997] _Summa_, II, ii, 95, art. 7.
[1998] _De sortibus_, caps. 3-4.
[1999] _Summa_, II, ii, 95, art. 8, and 96.
[2000] For the _Lots of the Saints or Apostles_ see: CLM 14846, 10th
century, fols. 106-21, “Sortilegia per literas et sacros libros
quorum meminit Gregorius Turonensis” (see _Historia Francorum_,
IV, 16); Egerton 821, fols. 54v-56r; BN nouv. acq. 4227, 13th
century, in Provençal (consult Felix Rocquain, _Bibl. d. l’École des
Chartes_, 1880, pp. 457-74; ed. by C. Chabaneau, with Latin original,
Montpellier, 1881, and _Revue des langues romanes_, XVIII-XIX); Vienna
2155, 14th century, fols. 54-56, _Sortes apostolorum_.
[2001] Aquinas’ discussion occurs in his _De sortibus_, caps. 4-5. This
treatise, which he wrote for the duchess of Brabant, is apt to precede
or follow his equally brief _De occultis operibus_ in the MSS: as in
Corpus Christi 225, 14th century, fol. 232; Brussels (Library of Dukes
of Burgundy) 2471, 15th century; CLM 3754, 14-15th century, fol. 51.
In Bologna University Library 1158, fols. 49v-52v, is a different _De
Sortibus_ from that of Aquinas. It has six or seven sections: the first
inquiring what lots are; the second whether they are good or bad,
permitted or prohibited; third, if prohibited, when, and if not always,
why not; fourth, whether to cast lots is to tempt God; fifth, whether
they were permissible before Christ but not since; sixth, why women are
often better at lot-casting than men. The last question, which appears
to have been whether the subjects of lot casting could be evil, seems
to be left unfinished.
[2002] _Opera_, 27, 504-7, _De occultis operibus naturae ad quemdam
militem_. Other forms of the title found in the MSS are, _De
actionibus occultis naturae_, _De occultis actionibus rerum_, and _De
operationibus occultis_. MSS are numerous: for instance, at Paris
alone, BN 3899, 6738A, 6786, 16195; an anonymous _De operibus occultis_
in BN 16096, 13th century, fols. 120v-122r, I find on examination to be
that of Aquinas. MSS of it at Munich are: CLM 402, 3754, 6942.
[2003] _Summa_, II, ii, 96, art. 2, “Res autem naturales habent quasdam
virtutes occultas quarum ratio ab homine assignari non potest.”
[2004] _Meteor._, III, 9.
[2005] _Ibid._, “Unde etiam ipsi Alchimistae per veram artem
alchimiae sed tamen difficilem, propter occultas operationes virtutis
coelestis....”
[2006] _Pico della Mirandola_ (1586), II. 6. p. 51.
[2007] _Contra Gentiles_, III, 103; _Summa_ I, 117, 3.
[2008] _Summa_, II, ii, 96, art. 4.
[2009] _Responsio ad Magistrum Joannem de Vercellis. Responsio ad
lectorem Venetum_, Artic. 1-2. _De substantiis separatis._, cap. 1
(_Opera_, 27, 275), “Ipsae etiam animae coelestium corporum si tamen
sint animata, inter Angelos sint connumerandae, ut Augustinus definit
in _Enchyridione_.”
[2010] Besides the treatises mentioned in the preceding note, see the
_Summa_, _Tractatus de fide_, _Meteorologicorum libri IV_, _De judiciis
astrorum ad fratrem Reginaldum_, _Commentary on Matthew_.
[2011] _Opera_, 27, 249, _Ad J. de Vercellis_.
[2012] _De trinitate_, III.
[2013] _De divinis nominibus_, IV.
[2014] _De judiciis astrorum, Opera_ 27, 449. MSS of this treatise,
too, are numerous: for instance, at Paris BN 6786, 3109, 3899, 6512,
15690; and at Munich CLM 402, 5594, 27001, 3754, 6942.
[2015] _De sortibus_, cap. 4.
[2016] _Summa_ I, 115. 4. _De fide_, cap. 129.
[2017] _Ibid._, and _De sortibus_, cap. 4.
[2018] Peter of Prussia (1621), cap. 15.
[2019] _Contra Gentiles_, III, 105; _Summa_, II, ii, 96, _artic._ 2;
_De occultis operibus._
[2020] _Comment. in Math._, cap. 2.
[2021] _Summa_, III, 36.
[2022] _Responsio de vi articulis ad lectorem Bisuntinum._
[2023] As we have already been over their arguments, Aquinas’
presentation thereof may perhaps be better summarized here than in the
text. The Gospel account led the Priscillianists to subject all human
acts to fate and the Manicheans to repudiate the Book of Matthew as
inculcating a belief in fate. Against them are rehearsed the following
arguments. First, as Augustine says (_Contra Faustum_, II, 5), no
astrologer asserts that a star will leave its usual position at a
man’s birth and go to him, as the Gospel narrative asserts that the
star in the east did, and hence Matthew confounds rather than defends
the error of astrology. Aquinas then quotes with apparent approval
the erroneous assertion of Chrysostom (_Homily 6 in Matth._) that “it
is not astronomy’s task to tell from the stars who are being born,
but to predict the future from the hour of nativity.” He also notes
Chrysostom’s objection that it took the Magi over two years to travel
to Bethlehem so that the star must have appeared two years before
Christ’s birth. This, by the way, would make the date 4 B. C., usually
given for the birth of Christ, fit nicely into Münter’s date of 6 B.
C. for the constellation which portended it. Aquinas also repeats the
argument that the star was probably a new creation of God.
But all these criticisms are really quite beside the point, since even
according to the Bible story, the Magi, who were evidently astronomers,
knew perfectly well what the star meant. Indeed, Aquinas himself
repeats the statement that the birth of Christ was announced to them
by a star, although to Simon and Anna and to the shepherds by other
methods, because they were used to stars. If it was a very unusual kind
of star and had a very unusual meaning, all that simply goes to show
that a good astrologer is equal to any emergency. Aquinas, indeed, or
rather, his authorities, sees the need of stating some other method
than astrological skill by which the Magi comprehended the significance
of the star. He adduces two explanations from Augustine (_Sermo 374
de Epiphania_, and _De quaest. vet. et nov. test., Quaest. 63_); one
that they were admonished by angels, which makes us wonder why there
was any star at all; the other, that Balaam had left them a prediction
concerning the coming of the star.
Aquinas also repeats something of what the fathers have said on the
allegorical significance of the Magi. But on the whole he, like
his authorities, fails signally to explain away the astrological
significance of the Magi.
[2024] _Hist. eccles._ XXIII, 13 (Muratori XI, 1170). Michelitsch
_Thomasschriften_, I (1913), p. 126, dates Ptolemy’s list between 1312
and 1317, but I do not know why.
[2025] It is included in Fretté and Maré, _Opera_, 27, 454-64.
[2026] Denifle (1886), p. 237.
[2027] Pierre Mandonnet, O. P. _Des Écrits Authentiques de S. Thomas
d’Aquin_, Fribourg, 1910.
[2028] See the list of writings ascribed to Albert in Borgnet’s edition
of his works, I, lxii. I have also seen the treatise ascribed to Albert
in the Explicit of Sloane 2156, 15th century, fols. 154-9.
In Bologna University Library, 1158, 14th century, where the first
treatise in the MS at fols. 1-39 is the treatise of Aquinas against
William of St. Amour, our treatise together with another _De fato_
which follows it and brief treatises on divination and lots are
catalogued together as fols. 41-52, “Magistri Alberti theotonici de
fato, de divinatione, de sortibus.” In the MS itself, however, the
only statements as to authorship are headings in the margin. That
at the beginning of our _De fato_ seems to be “Magri” (Magistri)
“Alrti” (or Alxri, rather than Alberti) and a third word which looks
like “Theotonici.” The second _De fato_ is headed “Magri (Magistri)
Alexandri” in the upper margin of fol. 45r, and the next treatise is
headed, fol. 47r, “Questio de divinatione Alexandri.” The anonymous _De
sortibus_ which follows it is also not Aquinas’. The second treatise on
fate considers six questions, of which the last is whether Christ was
physically subject to the influence of the constellations like other
men.
[2029] In BN 16096, 13th century, fol. 138r-, is another which seems
different from either of the _De fato’s_ mentioned in the preceding
note. The catalogue questioningly assigns it to Alexander, but is
probably misled by a rubric at fol. 139v which seems to be simply
a citation (“in sic inscripto libro”) and which reads, “Alexandri
affridisei ad imperatores antoninum et severinum liber de fato.” In
this same MS at fols. 120v-122r occurs Aquinas’ _De occultis operibus_.