After the battle of Tel-el-Kebir Great Britain stood undoubtedly in the

position of the savior of the Khedive if not of Egypt. Her soldiers had

crushed the rebellion, and as she had sent her Only General and one of

the royal family and many thousands of good men to do it, and as she had

lost not only men, but money, she thought she deserved something in

return. The something she has taken in return has been taken gradually,

and is the control of Egypt at the present day. It is possible that had

the English not lost many more men and much more money in the campaign

in the Soudan, which followed immediately after the suppression of

Arabi, they might not have gone so far as they have gone in settling

themselves in Egypt. But there was a not unnatural feeling that the

Soudan campaign, which had cost so much, and which was a failure in all

but in showing the bravery of the British troops, ought to be paid for,

or made up to the English in some way. I should like to go into the

story of this most picturesque and heroic of campaigns, but it would

require a book by itself. Its history is briefly this: The religious

and military chieftain known as "the Mahdi," shortly after the defeat of

Arabi, threatened all Egypt from the Soudan, which rose under his

leadership. General Hicks, an Englishman, with ten thousand men, in the

service of the Khedive, was sent against him. He was killed, and most of

the troops with him. The English, who were at that time the only power

in Egypt with authority of any sort back of it, and who were virtually

in control, felt that they should take the responsibilities of their

position as well as its benefits, and avenge the massacre, drive back

the Mahdi's forces, and, if possible, crush him and them for all time.

The campaign was later further complicated by the presence at Khartoom

of Major-General C. G. Gordon, who had gone there to lead back in safety

the Egyptian troops still remaining in the Soudan. He was, after his

arrival at Khartoom, virtually a prisoner at that place, which is a mud

city on the banks of the Nile far above the fifth cataract. The attempts

to rescue him and to suppress the Mahdi were equally unsuccessful.

This is, in a few words, the story of a campaign which has been

unequalled within the last twenty years in picturesqueness, heroism, and

dramatic surprises. It had been said that the old days of personal

bravery, of hand-to-hand slaughter, and of the attack and defence of man

against man, were at an end; that owing to the new weapons of war, by

which an enemy can be attacked when several miles distant from the

attacking party, when the pressing of an electric button destroys an

army corps, and when turning a handle will send three hundred bullets a

minute into a mass of infantry, the necessity for personal courage was

over. But seldom in history has there been as fierce personal encounters

as in the Soudan, or as unusual methods of warfare. On the one hand were

the naked supporters of the Mahdi, armed with their spears and knives,

and protected only by bull-hide shields, but actuated by a religious

fanaticism that drove them exulting at their enemies, and with no fear

of death, but with the belief that through it they would gain joyous and

proud immortality. Against them were the British troops, outnumbered ten

to one, with hundreds of miles of sandy desert before, behind, and on

every side of them, cut off from communication with the outside world,

in a country barren and unfamiliar, and attacked by tens of thousands,

who came when they pleased and where they pleased, rising as swiftly as

a sand-storm rises, and disappearing again as suddenly into the desert.

When I was in Cairo I was told of one of the Mahdi's men who continually

rushed at a British square during an engagement holding his shield clear

of his body as he advanced to throw a spear, and then retreated again.

This looked like the worst form of foolhardiness to the English, until

they saw that he was protecting with his shield his little boy, who was

hiding behind it, and that when the chance offered, this child, who

could not have been more than seven, and who was as naked of protection

as his father, would throw a spear of his own. The father was wounded

four times, but each time the bullet struck him he only shook himself,

as a dog shakes off water, and once more rushed forward. When he fell

for the last time the boy tumbled across him, unconscious from a wound

in his thigh. The surgeons dressed this wound and bandaged it; but when

the child came to and saw what they had done, he leaped up and tore the

clothes from around him, and then, as the blood from the reopened wound

ran out, fell over backwards dead. The English officer who told this

story asked if fighting such men could be considered agreeable work from

any point of view.

[Illustration: H. H. ABBAS II.

Khedive of Egypt]

But the Soudan is only of interest here as showing how, having lost so

much through it, the British did not feel more inclined than before to

evacuate Egypt, although there were many who thought, as a few still

think, that Egypt has cost them too much already, and more than they can

ever get back. The loss of Gordon was perhaps the disaster of all the

most keenly felt. How keenly is shown partly by the statue the English

have placed to him in Trafalgar Square, surrounded by their kings and

greatest generals. It shows him with one foot placed on the battlement

of Khartoom, with his arms folded, and with the head thrown slightly

forward, looking out, as he had done for so many weary months, for the

relief that came too late. This monument is a reproach to those whose

uncertainty of mind and purpose cost Gordon his life. It was doing a

brave thing to put it up in a public place, being, as it is, a standing

reminder of the neglect and half-heartedness that lost a valuable life,

and one that had been risked again and again for his country. It is not

only a monument to General Gordon, but to the English people, who have

had the courage to admit in bronze and stone that they were wrong.

For the last ten years the English have been as tardy in getting out of

Egypt as they were in going after Gordon into the Soudan. They have

repeatedly declared their intention of evacuating the country, not only

in answer to questions in the House, but in answer to the inquiries of

foreign powers. But they are still there. They have not been idle while

there, and they have accomplished much good, and have brought benefits

innumerable to Egypt. They have improved her systems of irrigation, upon

which the prosperity of the land depends, have strengthened her army,

have done away with the corvee, or tax paid on labor, and with the

kurbash, or whip used in punishment, and, what is much the most

wonderful, they have brought her out of ruin into such a condition of

prosperity that she not only pays the interest on her enormous debt, but

has a little left over for internal improvements. There has also been a

marked change for the better in the condition of the courts of justice,

and there has been an extension of a railroad up the Nile as far as

Sirgeh.

But the English to-day not only want credit for having done all this,

but they want credit for having done it unselfishly and without hope or

thought of reward, and solely for the good of mankind and of Egypt in

particular. They remind me of those of the G. A. R. who not only want

pensions and medals, but to be considered unselfish saviors of their

country in her hour of need. There is no reason why a man should not be

held in honor for risking his life for his country's sake, and honors,

if he wants them, should be heaped upon him, but not money too. He

either served his country because he was loyal and brave, or because he

wanted money in return for taking certain risks. Let him have either the

honors or the money, but he should not be so greedy as to want both.

England has made a very good thing out of Egypt, and she has not yet got

all she will get, but she wants the world to forget that and look upon

her as an unselfish and enlightened nation that is helping a less

prosperous and less powerful people to get upon their feet again. Of

course it is none of our business (at least it is our policy to say so)

when England stalks forth like a roaring lion seeking what she may

devour all over the world. Americans travel chiefly upon the Continent,

and unless they go into out-of-the-way corners of the world they have no

idea how little there is left of it that has not been seized by the

people of Great Britain. For my own part I find one grows a little tired

of getting down and sailing forth and landing again always under the

shadow of the British flag. If the United States should begin with

Hawaii and continue to annex other people's property, we should find

that almost all of the best corner lots and post-office sites of the

world have been already pre-empted. Senator Wolcott once said to Senator

Quay: "I understand, Quay, you want the chairmanship of the Library

Committee. You seem to want the earth; if you don't look out you will

interfere with my plans."

If the United States had taken away the little princess's island from

her and continued to plunder weaker nations, she would have found that

England wants the earth too, and that she is in a fair way of getting it

if some one does not stop her very soon. There are a number of good

people in England who believe that for the last ten years their

countrymen have spent their time and money in redeeming Egypt as a form

of missionary work, and there are others quite as naive who put the

whole thing in a word by saying, "What would we do with our younger sons

if it was not for Egypt?"

[Illustration: THE GUN MULE OF THE MULE BATTERY]

Three-fourths of the officers in the army of the Khedive are English

boys, who rank as second lieutenants at home and as majors in Egypt.

They are paid just twice what they are paid in the English army, and it

is the Khedive who pays them and not the English. In this way England

obtains three things: she is saved the cost of supporting that number of

officers; she gets the benefit of their experience in Egypt, which is an

excellent training-school, at the expense of the Egyptians; and she at

the same time controls the Egyptian army by these same officers, and

guards her own interests at Egypt's cost. And as if this were not

enough, she plants an Army of Occupation upon the country, and with it

menaces the native authority. The irrigation of Egypt has of late been

carried on by Englishmen entirely and paid for by Egypt; her railroads

are built by the English; her big contracts are given out to English

firms and to English manufacturers; and the railroad which will be built

to Kosseir on the Red Sea may have been designed in Egypt's interest to

carry wheat, or it may have been planned to carry troops to the Red Sea

in the event of the seizure of the Suez Canal or of any other impediment

to the shortest route to India. We may not believe that the Egyptians

are capable of governing themselves, we may believe that it is written

that others than themselves shall always rule them and their country,

but we must prefer that whoever do this should declare themselves

openly, and act as conquerors who come and remain as conquerors, and not

as "advisers" and restorers of order. Napoleon came to Cairo with flags

flying and drums beating openly as an enemy; he did not come in the

disguise of a missionary or an irrigation expert.

And there is always the question whether if left alone the Egyptians of

the present day could not govern themselves. Those of the Egyptians I

met who were in authority are not men who are likely to return to the

debauchery and misrule of Ismail. They would be big men in any country;

they are cultivated, educated gentlemen, who have served in different

courts or on many important diplomatic missions, and whose tastes and

ambitions are as creditable and as broad as are those of their English

contemporaries.

The two most prominent advisers of the Khedive at present are his

Prime-minister, Riaz Pasha, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tigrane

Pasha. The first of these is a Turk, the second an Armenian and a

Christian. It is told of Riaz that he was brought to Egypt when a boy as

a slave. A man who can rise from such a beginning to be Prime-minister

must have something in him. He showed his spirit and his desire for his

country's good in the time of Ismail, whose extravagances both he and

Nubar Pasha strenuously opposed, and his aid to the English in

establishing Egyptian finance on a firmer footing was ready and

invaluable. He has held almost every position in the cabinet of Egypt,

and is not too old a man to learn new methods, and if left alone is

experienced and accomplished enough as a statesman to manage for

himself.

[Illustration: LORD CROMER,

The English Diplomatic Agent in Egypt]

Tigrane Pasha struck me as being more of a diplomat than a statesman,

but he showed his strength by the fact that he understood the weak

points of the Egyptians as well as their virtues. It is not the

enthusiast who believes that all in his country is perfect who is the

best patriot. To say that such a man as this--a man who has a better

knowledge of many different governments than half of the English cabinet

have of their own, and who wishes the best for his Khedive and his

country--needs the advice or support of an English resident minister, is

as absurd as to say that the French cabinet should govern themselves by

the manifestoes of the Comte de Paris. These men are not barbarians nor

despots; they have not gained their place in the world by favor or

inheritance. Their homes are as rich in treasures of art and history and

literature as are the homes of Lord Rosebery or Sir Henry Drummond

Wolff, and if they care for their country and the authority of their

Khedive, it is certainly hard that they may not have the right of

serving both undisturbed.

The Khedive himself has been very generally represented through the

English press as a "sulky boy" who does not know what is best for him.

It is just as easy to describe him as a plucky boy who wishes to govern

his own country and his own people in his own way. And not only is he

not allowed to do this, but he is treated with a lack of consideration

by his protectors which adds insult to injury, and makes him appear as

having less authority than is really his. He might very well say to Lord

Cromer, "It was all very well to dissemble your love, but why did you

kick me down-stairs?"

Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer, and the ruling figure in Egypt, has

served his country as faithfully and as successfully as any man in her

debt to-day. He has been in Egypt from the beginning of these ten years,

and he has been given almost unlimited power and authority by his own

country, of which his nominal position of Consul-General and Diplomatic

Agent is no criterion. He is a typical Englishman in appearance,

broad-shouldered and big all over, with a smooth-shaven face, and the

look of having just come fresh from a bath. In conversation he thinks

much more of what he has to say than of how he says it; by that I mean

that he is direct, and even abrupt; the Egyptians found him most

unpleasantly so. But were he more tactful, he would probably have been

better liked personally, but would not have succeeded in doing what he

has done so well.

I do not like what he has done, but I want to be fair in showing that

for the work he was sent to do he is probably the best man England could

have selected. A man less self-reliant might have feared to compromise

himself with home authorities, and would have temporized and lost where

Lord Cromer bullied and browbeat and won. He is a very remarkable man.

He studies for a half-hour every day after breakfast, and plays tennis

in the afternoon. When he is in his own room, with a pipe in his mouth,

he can talk more interestingly and with more exact knowledge of Egypt

than any man in the world, and your admiration for him is unbounded. In

the rooms of the legation, on the contrary, or, again, when advising a

minister of the Khedive or the Khedive himself, he can be as intensely

disagreeable in his manner and as powerfully aggressive as a polar-bear.

During the last so-called "crisis" he gave the Khedive twenty-four hours

in which to dismiss his Prime-minister. He did this with the assurance

from the English Foreign Office that the home government would support

him. He then cabled with one hand to Malta for troops and with the other

stopped the Black Watch at Aden on their way to India, and called them

back to Cairo, after which he went out in full sight of the public and

banged tennis balls about until sunset. A man who can call out "forty,

love!" "forty, fifteen!" in a calm voice two hours after sending an

ultimatum to a Khedive and disarranging the movements of six thousand of

her Majesty's troops will get what he wants in the end, and a boy of

eighteen is hardly a fair match for him.

As I have said, the English press have misrepresented the young Khedive

in many ways. He is, in the first place, much older both in appearance

and manner and thought than his age would suggest, and if he is sulky to

Englishmen it is not to be wondered at. They could hardly expect his

Highness to regard them as seriously as his friends as they regard

themselves. The Khedive gave me a private audience at the Abdine Palace

while I was in Cairo, and from what he said then and from what others

who are close to him told me of him, I obtained a very different idea of

his personality than I had received from the English.

[Illustration: A GUN OF THE MULE BATTERY IN ACTION]

He struck me as being distinctly obstinate--a characteristic which is so

marked in our President that it can only be considered one of the

qualifications for success, and is probably the quality in the Khedive

which the English describe as sulkiness. What I liked in him most was

his pride in his army and in the Egyptian people as Egyptians. It is

always well that a ruler should be so enthusiastic over what is his own

that he shows it even to the casual stranger, for if he exhibits it to

him, how much more will he show it to his people! The Khedive has

gentle tastes, and is said to find his amusement in his garden and among

flowers and on the farm lands of his estates; he speaks several

languages very well, and dresses and looks--except for the fez and his

attendants--like any other young man of twenty-three or twenty-four in

Paris or New York. His ministers, who know him best, describe him as

having a high spirit, and one that, as he grows older and will be guided

by greater experience, will lead him to firmer authority for his own

good and for the good of his people.

One remark of the Khedive's which is of interest to Americans was to the

effect that the officers in his army who had been trained by Stone Bey,

and those other American officers who entered the Egyptian army after

the end of our Civil War, were, in his opinion, the best-trained men in

their particular department in his army. This is the topographical work,

and the making of maps and drawings; but those Americans who are in

charge of Egyptian troops on the frontier are also well esteemed. It is

the English, however, who have made the fighting part of the army what

it is. Before they came the troops were unpaid, and badly treated by

their officers, but now the infantry and the camel corps and artillery

have no trouble in getting recruits.

The Egyptian is not a natural fighter, as is the Soudanese, who fights

for love of it, but he has shown lately that when properly officered and

trained and well treated, he can defend a position or attack boldly if

led boldly. I suggested to the Khedive that he should borrow some of our

officers, those who have succeeded so well with the negroes of the Ninth

Cavalry and with the Indians, for it seemed to me that this would be of

benefit to both the officers and the Egyptian soldier. It was this

suggestion that called forth the Khedive's admiration for the Americans

of his army; but, as a matter of fact, the English would never allow

officers of any other nationality than their own to control even a

company of the Egyptian army. They cannot turn out those foreigners who

are already in, but they can dictate as to who shall come hereafter, and

they fill all the good billets with their own people; and if there is

one thing an Englishman apparently holds above all else, it is a "good

billet." I know a good many English officers who would rather be

stationed where there was a chance of their taking part in what they

call a "show," and what we would grandly call a "battle," than dwell at

ease on the staff of General Wolseley himself; but, on the other hand,

if I were to give a list of all the subalterns who have applied to me

for "good billets in America," where they seem to think fortunes grow on

hedges, half the regimental colors from London to Malta would fade with

shame.

And Egypt is full of "good billets." It is true the English have made

them good, and they were not worth much before the English restored

order; but because you have humanely stopped a runaway coach from going

over a precipice, that is no reason why you should take possession of it

and fill it both inside and out with your own friends and relations.

That is what England has done with the Egyptian coach which Ismail drove

to the brink of bankruptcy.

It is true the Khedive still sits on the box and holds the reins, but

Lord Cromer sits beside him and holds the whip.

VI

MODERN ATHENS

Perhaps the greatest charm of Athens and of the islands and mountains

round about it lies in their power to lure back your belief in a great

many fine people of whose remarkable deeds you had grown sceptical--of

whose existence even you had begun to doubt. It is something very

serious when one loses faith in so delightful a young man as Theseus,

and it is worth while sailing under the lee shores of Crete, where he

killed the Minotaur, if for no other purpose than to have your

admiration for him restored. If we could only be as sure of restoring by

travel all of those other people of whom our elders ceased telling us

when we left the nursery, I would head an expedition to the north pole,

not to discover open seas and altitudes and eclipses and such weighty

things, but to locate that nice and kindly old gentleman, and his toy

store and his reindeer, who used to come at Christmas-time, and who has

stopped coming since I left school. It is certainly worth while going

all the way to Greece to see the Hill of the Nymphs, and the very cave

where Pan used to sleep in the hot midday, and to thrill over the four

crossroads and the high, gloomy pass where the Sphinx lay in wait for

OEdipus with her cruel claws and inscrutable smile.

[Illustration: GREEK SOLDIER IN THE NATIONAL (ALBANIAN) UNIFORM]

The story that must always strike every child as most sad and

unsatisfactory is the one which tells us how the father of Theseus

killed himself when his son came sailing back triumphant, and so

gallantly engaged in entertaining the beautiful Athenian maidens whose

lives he had saved that he forgot to hoist the white sails, and caused

his father to throw himself off the high rocks in despair.

This used to appeal to me as one of the most pathetic incidents in

history; but as time wore on my sympathy for the father and indignation

against Theseus passed away, and I forgot about them both. But when they

point out where the black sails were first seen entering the bay, and

you stand on the rock from which the people watched for Theseus, and

from which his father threw himself down, you feel just as sorry, and

you rebel just as strongly against that morbid anticlimax, as you did

when you first read the story in knickerbockers. It seems almost too sad

to be true.

The Rulers of the Mediterranean · 第 7 / 9 段