of after the peace? Thermopylae and the Phocian state. Well, and how
used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of
Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by
ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace,
quiet, or justice, he saw plainly, that to a people of our character and
principles nothing could he offer or give, that would induce you for
self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you,
having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and
exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as
much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events
prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him
in every thing else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or
impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same
persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the
highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these
proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the
national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any
obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of
the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view
of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds
and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of
Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal,
when Alexander, [Footnote: Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was
sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable
terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks.
The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their
duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is
related by Herodotus. The Thebans submitted to Xerxes, and fought
against the Greeks at the battle of Plataea. The Argives were neutral,
chiefly from jealousy of Sparta. They demanded half the command of the
allied army, as a condition of their assistance, but this could not be
complied with.] this man's ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but
preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and
thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention,
though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore I must be
silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered [Footnote: The
simple [Greek: _eipein_] in the original is more forcible than if
it had been [Greek: _epainein_], or the like. Compare Shakspeare,
Coriolanus, Act ii. sc. 2.
I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
Should not be uttered feebly----
For this last
Before and in Corioli, let me say,
I can not speak him home.]
in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either
joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he
knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without
considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought then, if he
chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached
himself to them he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the
reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he
does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an
inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he
forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.
Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from
ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the
Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the
least open to him. He that bids the Lacedaemonians resign Messene, how
can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans,
to have acted on a conviction of justice?
But, forsooth, he was compelled,--this plea remains--he made concessions
against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban
infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust
the Thebans; and some carry news about, that he will fortify Elatea. All
this he intends and will intend I dare say; but to attack the
Lacedaemonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he
actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected
himself with a great force. The Lacedaemonians, who are enemies of
Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed,
will he now preserve?
And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip, either if he was
forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the
Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct
rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove
to a correct observer, that his whole plan of action is against our
state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He
desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been
for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him,
since, by retaining what belongs to you, he secures the rest of his
dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he deemed himself
unsafe at home. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against
you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have
intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some
disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you.
Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain
people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from
cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from
dullness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet
men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had
occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is
better they should be repeated to you.
Ye, men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have
brooked to hear any thing against Philip at those times, when he
surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia
claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidaea,
taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think
ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it
if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a
short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of
their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one
another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are
not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when
he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicaea and Magnesia, they
expected to have the decemvirate [Footnote: Thessaly was anciently
divided into four districts, each called a _tetras_, and this, as
we learn from the third Philippic, was restored soon after the
termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this
arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great
Thessalian families by a division of power; otherwise the Pheraean
tyranny might have been exchanged for an oligarchy powerful enough to be
independent of Macedonia. The decemvirate here spoken of (if the text be
correct) was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we
adopt Leland's opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of
ten, or Schaefer's, that each city was placed under ten governors.
Jacobs understands the word _decemvirate_ not to refer to any
positive form of government, but generally to designate a
_tyranny_, such as that which the Lacedaemonians used to introduce
into conquered cities. So, for example, the Romans might have spoken of
a decemvirate after the time of Appius. However this be, Philip seems to
have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the
decadarchy, should be his own creatures. Two of them, Eudicus and Simus,
are particularly mentioned by Demosthenes as traitors.] which is now
established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylae [Footnote:
_Pylae_, which signifies _gates_, was a name applied by the
Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of
_Thermopylae_, which opened through the ridges of Mount Oeta into
the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot
sulphureous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountain.] would
take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have
occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a
dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may
never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are
manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as
ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands,
and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of
prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for
democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold
to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye
desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at
variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an
antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking
deliverance from war, you find a master?
They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they
heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none
the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship
and promises. And no wonder, that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians
should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who
understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted
against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion,
will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's case and
indulgence prevail over distant advantage.
As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter
by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the
assembly to decide upon.
[_Here the proposed answer was read_]
[Footnote: Whether this was moved by the orator himself, or formally
read as his motion by the officer of the assembly, does not appear.]
It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those
promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never
have submitted to go as ambassador, and you would certainly not have
discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace,
would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay,
and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared--after the peace,
when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when,
perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the
abandonment of Thermopylae and the Phocians--that I, being a
water-drinker, [Footnote: It was Philocrates who said this. There were
many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.] was naturally a
churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would
do just as you desired, fortify Thespiae and Plataea, humble the
Thebans, cut through the Chersonese [Footnote: This peninsula being
exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting
through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce-Acte, to protect the Athenian
settlements. See the Appendix to this volume, on the Thracian
Chersonese.] at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Euboea in
exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am
sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries.
And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence,
that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely
were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be
called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without
reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination
before you, [Footnote: Similarly Auger: "Ce n'est pas pour m'attirer les
invectives de mes anciens adversaires en les invectivant moi-meme."
Jacobs otherwise: _Nicht um durch Schmahungen mir auf gleiche Weise
Gehor bei Euch zu verschaffen_. But I do not think that [Greek:
_emauto logon poiaeso_] can bear the sense of [Greek: _logon
tuchoimi_], "get a hearing for myself." And the orator's object is,
not so much to sneer at the people by hinting that they are ready to
hear abuse, as to deter his opponents from retaliation, or weaken its
effect, by denouncing their opposition as corrupt. Leland saw the
meaning: "Not that, by breaking out into invectives, I may expose myself
to the like treatment."] and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext
for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But
I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than
it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises
were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no
longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others
that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and
know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I
fear then, as your embassadors have concealed the purpose for which they
know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others
have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a
practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on
persons most in their power. While therefore the mischief is only coming
and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though
he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was [Footnote: He means
Aeschines.] persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylae, by the
command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus,
and has brought it to this, that your deliberation must be, not about
claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defense of your home and
a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and
indeed it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived,
there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly
never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would
he have marched with a land-force by Phocis and Thermopylae: he must
either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or
been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the
peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it
be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death
he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
This speech was delivered about three months after the last,
while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both
the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had
happened, which called for any special consultation; but
Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip's
enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity
of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance
the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the
Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the
disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy
and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and
noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip
he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the
difference between Philip's new method of warfare and that
adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of
corresponding measures for defense. The peaceful professions
of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous
than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most
powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendency
were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian
city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment,
before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice
of Demosthenes now is, to dispatch reinforcements to the
Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit
the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than
themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.
The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the
Propontine cities, fully justified the warning of Demosthenes.
And the extraordinary activity, which the Athenians displayed
in resisting him, shows that the exertions of the orator had
their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the
operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an
able and effective minister.
Many speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about
the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of
peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of
the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear
to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his
humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been
brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to
say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass
resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not
methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstances may have
brought us to this state; our affairs have not declined from one or two
causes only; but, if you rightly examine, you will find it chiefly owing
to the orators, who study to please you rather than advise for the best.
Some of whom, Athenians, seeking to maintain the basis of their own
power and repute, have no forethought for the future, and therefore
think you also ought to have none; others, accusing and calumniating
practical statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in
such occupations to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and
do what he pleases. Politics of this kind are common here, but are the
causes of your failures and embarrassment. I beg, Athenians, that you
will not resent my plain speaking of the truth. Only consider. You hold
liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of all
residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure of it even to
foreigners and slaves, and many servants may be seen among you speaking
their thoughts more freely than citizens in some other states; and yet
you have altogether banished it from your councils. The result has been,
that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at
hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you
are brought to the utmost peril. If such be your disposition now, I must
be silent: if you will listen to good advice without flattery, I am
ready to speak. For though our affairs are in a deplorable condition,
though many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to
perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox, and yet a
truth, am I about to state. That which is the most lamentable in the
past is best for the future. How is this? Because you performed no part
of your duty, great or small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done
all that became you, and your situation were the same, there would be no
hope of amendment. Philip has indeed prevailed over your sloth and
negligence, but not over the country: you have not been worsted; you
have not even bestirred yourselves.
If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and
infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but
the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time
when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions
and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to
repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war,
one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or
advises a measure of defense, is in danger of being accused afterward as
author of the war.
I will first then examine and determine this point, whether it be in our
power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if
it depends on us, (to begin with this,) I say we ought to maintain
peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some
measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his
hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace,
while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend
yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I
quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which
will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a
madman, or he talks of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward
you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the
privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.