A COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS
In one of Lord Elgin's letters we are told that, when he had as
visitors to government house in 1850, Sir Henry Bulwer, the elder
brother of Lord Lytton, and British minister to the United States, as
well as Sir Edmund Head, his successor in the governorship of Canada,
he availed himself of so favourable an opportunity of reassuring them
on many points of the internal policy of the province on which they
were previously doubtful, and gave them some insight into the position
of men and things on which Englishmen in those days were too ignorant
as a rule. One important point which he impressed upon them--as he
hoped successfully--was this:
"That the faithful carrying out of the principles of
constitutional government is a departure from the American
model, not an approximation to it, and, therefore, a
departure from republicanism in its only workable shape."
The fact was: "The American system is our old colonial system, with,
in certain cases, the principle of popular election substituted for
that of nomination by the Crown." He was convinced "that the
concession of constitutional government has a tendency to draw the
colonists" towards England and not towards republicanism; "firstly,
because it slakes that thirst for self-government which seizes on all
British communities when they approach maturity; and secondly because
it habituates the colonists to the working of a political mechanism
which is both intrinsically superior to that of the Americans, and
more unlike it than our old colonial system." In short, he felt very
strongly that "when a people have been once thoroughly accustomed to
the working of such a parliamentary system as ours they never will
consent to resort to this irresponsible mechanism."
Since these significant words were written half a century ago,
Canadians have been steadily working out the principles of
parliamentary government as understood and explained by Lord Elgin,
and have had abundant opportunities of contrasting their experiences
with those of their neighbours under a system in many respects the
very reverse of that which has enabled Canada to attain so large a
measure of political freedom and build up such prosperous communities
to the north of the republic, while still remaining in the closest
possible touch with the imperial state. I propose now to close this
book with some comparisons between the respective systems of the two
countries, and to show that in this respect as in others Lord Elgin
proved how deep was his insight into the working of political
institutions, and how thoroughly he had mastered the problem of the
best methods of administering the government of a great colonial
dependency, not solely with a regard to its own domestic interests but
with a view of maintaining the connection with the British Crown, of
which he was so discreet and able a servant.
It is especially important to Canadians to study the development of
the institutions of the United States, with the view of deriving
benefit from their useful experiences, and avoiding the defects that
have grown up under their system. All institutions are more or less on
trial in a country like Canada, which is working out great problems of
political science under decided advantages, since the ground is
relatively new, and the people have before them all the experiences of
the world, especially of England and the United States, in whose
systems Canadians have naturally the deepest interest. The history of
responsible government affords another illustration of a truth which
stands out clear in the history of nations, that those constitutions
which are of a flexible character, the natural growth of the
experiences of centuries, and which have been created by the
necessities and conditions of the times, possess the elements of real
stability, and best ensure the prosperity of a people. The great
source of the strength of the institutions of the United States lies
in the fact that they have worked out their government in accordance
with certain principles, which are essentially English in their
origin, and have been naturally developed since their foundation as
colonial settlements, and whatever weaknesses their system shows have
chiefly arisen from new methods, and from the rigidity of their
constitutional rules of law, which separate too sharply the executive
and the legislative branches of government. Like their neighbours the
Canadian people have based their system on English principles, but
they have at the same time been able to keep pace with the progress of
the unwritten constitution of England, to adapt it to their own
political conditions, and to bring the executive and legislative
authorities to assist and harmonize with one another.
Each country has its "cabinet council," but the one is essentially
different from the other in its character and functions. This term,
the historical student will remember, was first used in the days of
the Stuarts as one of derision and obloquy. It was frequently called
"junto" or "cabal," and during the days of conflict between the
commons and the king it was regarded with great disfavour by the
parliament of England. Its unpopularity arose from the fact that it
did not consist of men in whom parliament had confidence, and its
proceedings were conducted with so much secrecy that it was impossible
to decide upon whom to fix responsibility for any obnoxious measure.
When the constitution of England was brought back to its original
principles, and harmony was restored between the Crown and the
parliament, the cabinet became no longer a term of reproach, but a
position therein was regarded as the highest honour in the country,
and was associated with the efficient administration of public
affairs, since it meant a body of men responsible to parliament for
every act of government.[29] The old executive councils of Canada were
obnoxious to the people for the same reason that the councils of the
Stuarts, and even of George III, with the exception of the régime of
the two Pitts, became unpopular. Not only do we in Canada, in
accordance with our desire to perpetuate the names of English
institutions use the name "cabinet" which was applied to an
institution that gradually grew out of the old privy council of
England, but we have even incorporated in our fundamental law the
older name of "privy council," which itself sprang from the original
"permanent" or "continual" council of the Norman kings. Following
English precedent, the Canadian cabinet or ministry is formed out of
the privy councillors, chosen under the law by the governor-general,
and when they retire from office they still retain the purely honorary
distinction. In the United States the use of the term "cabinet" has
none of the significance it has with us, and if it can be compared at
all to any English institutions it might be to the old cabinets who
acknowledged responsibility to the king, and were only so many heads
of departments in the king's government. As a matter of fact the
comparison would be closer if we said that the administration
resembles the cabinets of the old French kings, or to quote Professor
Bryce, "the group of ministers who surround the Czar or the Sultan, or
who executed the bidding of a Roman emperor like Constantine or
Justinian." Such ministers like the old executive councils of Canada,
"are severally responsible to their master, and are severally called
in to counsel him, but they have not necessarily any relations with
one another, nor any duty or collective action." Not only is the
administration conducted on the principle of responsibility to the
president alone, in this respect the English king in old irresponsible
days, but the legislative department is itself constructed after the
English model as it existed a century ago, and a general system of
government is established, lacking in that unity and elasticity which
are essential to its effective working. On the other hand the Canadian
cabinet is the cabinet of the English system of modern times and is
formed so as to work in harmony with the legislative department, which
is a copy, so far as possible, of the English legislature.
The special advantages of the Canadian or English system of
parliamentary government, compared with congressional government, may
be briefly summed up as follows:--
(1) The governor-general, his cabinet, and the popular branch of the
legislature are governed in Canada, as in England, by a system of
rules, conventions and understandings which enable them to work in
harmony with one another. The Crown, the cabinet, the legislature, and
the people, have respectively certain rights and powers which, when
properly and constitutionally brought into operation, give strength
and elasticity to our system of government. Dismissal of a ministry by
the Crown under conditions of gravity, or resignation of a ministry
defeated in the popular House, bring into play the prerogatives of the
Crown. In all cases there must be a ministry to advise the Crown,
assume responsibility for its acts, and obtain the support of the
people and their representatives in parliament. As a last resort to
bring into harmony the people, the legislature, and the Crown, there
is the exercise of the supreme prerogative of dissolution. A governor,
acting always under the advice of responsible ministers, may, at any
time, generally speaking, grant an appeal to the people to test their
opinion on vital public questions and bring the legislature into
accord with the public mind. In short, the fundamental principle of
popular sovereignty lies at the very basis of the Canadian system.
On the other hand, in the United States, the president and his cabinet
may be in constant conflict with the two Houses of Congress during the
four years of his term of office. His cabinet has no direct influence
with the legislative bodies, inasmuch as they have no seats therein.
The political complexion of Congress does not affect their tenure of
office, since they depend only on the favour and approval of the
executive; dissolution, which is the safety valve of the English or
Canadian system--"in its essence an appeal from the legal to the
political sovereign"--is not practicable under the United States
constitution. In a political crisis the constitution provides no
adequate solution of the difficulty during the presidential term. In
this respect the people of the United States are not sovereign as they
are in Canada under the conditions just briefly stated.
(2) The governor-general is not personally brought into collision with
the legislature by the direct exercise of a veto of its legislative
acts, since the ministry is responsible for all legislation and must
stand or fall by its important measures. The passage of a measure of
which it disapproved as a ministry would mean in the majority of cases
a resignation, and it is not possible to suppose that the governor
would be asked to exercise a prerogative of the Crown which has been
in disuse since the establishment of responsible government and would
now be a revolutionary measure even in Canada.
In the United States there is danger of frequent collision between the
president and the two legislative branches, should a very critical
exercise of the veto, as in President Johnson's time, occur at a time
when the public mind was deeply agitated. The chief magistrate loses
in dignity and influence whenever the legislature overrides the veto,
and congress becomes a despotic master for the time being.
(3) The Canadian minister, having control of the finances and taxes
and of all matters of administration, is directly responsible to
parliament and sooner or later to the people for the manner in which
public functions have been discharged. All important measures are
initiated by the cabinet, and on every question of public interest the
ministers are bound to have a definite policy if they wish to retain
the confidence of the legislature. Even in the case of private
legislation they are also the guardians of the public interests and
are responsible to the parliament and the people for any neglect in
particular.
On the other hand in the United States the financial and general
legislation of congress is left to the control of committees, over
which the president and his cabinet have no direct influence, and the
chairman of which may have ambitious objects in direct antagonism to
the men in office.
(4) In the Canadian system the speaker is a functionary who certainly
has his party proclivities, but it is felt that as long as he occupies
the chair all political parties can depend on his justice and
impartiality. Responsible government makes the premier and his
ministers responsible for the constitution of the committees and for
the opinions and decisions that may emanate from them. A government
that would constantly endeavour to shift its responsibilities on
committees, even of its own selection, would soon disappear from the
treasury benches. Responsibility in legislation is accordingly
ensured, financial measures prevented from being made the footballs of
ambitious and irresponsible politicians, and the impartiality and
dignity of the speakership guaranteed by the presence in parliament of
a cabinet having the direction and supervision of business.
On the other hand, in the United States, the speaker of the House of
Representatives becomes, from the very force of circumstances, a
political leader, and the spectacle is presented--in fact from the
time of Henry Clay--so strange to us familiar with English methods, of
decisions given by him with clearly party objects, and of committees
formed by him with purely political aims, as likely as not with a view
to thwart the ambition either of a president who is looking to a
second term or of some prominent member of the cabinet who has
presidential aspirations. And all this lowering of the dignity of the
chair is due to the absence of a responsible minister to lead the
House. The very position which the speaker is forced to take from time
to time--notably in the case of Mr. Reed[30]--is clearly the result of
the defects in the constitutional system of the United States, and is
so much evidence that a responsible party leader is an absolute
necessity in congress. A legislature must be led, and congress has
been attempting to get out of a crucial difficulty by all sorts of
questionable shifts which only show the inherent weakness of the
existing system.
In the absence of any provision for the unity of policy between the
executive and legislative authorities of the United States, it is
impossible for any nation to have a positive guarantee that a treaty
it may negotiate with the former can be ratified. The sovereign of
Great Britain enters into treaties with foreign powers with the advice
and assistance of his constitutional advisers, who are immediately
responsible to parliament for their counsel in such matters. In theory
it is the prerogative of the Crown to make a treaty; in practice it is
that of the ministry. It is not constitutionally imperative to refer
such treaties to parliament for its approval--the consent of the Crown
is sufficient; but it is sometimes done under exceptional
circumstances, as in the case of the cession of Heligoland. In any
event the action of the ministry in the matter is invariably open to
the review of parliament, and the ministry may be censured by an
adverse vote for the advice given to the sovereign, and forced to
retire from office. In the United States the senate must ratify all
treaties by a two-thirds vote, but unless there is a majority in that
House of the same political complexion as the president the treaty may
be refused. No cabinet minister is present, to lead the House, as in
England, and assume all the responsibility of the president's action.
It is almost impossible to suppose that an English ministry would
consent to a treaty that would be unpopular in parliament and the
country. The existence of the government would depend on its action.
In the United States both president and senate have divided
responsibilities. The constitution makes no provision for unity in
such important matters of national obligation.
The great advantages of the English, or Canadian, system lie in the
interest created among all classes of the people by the discussions of
the different legislative bodies. Parliamentary debate involves the
fate of cabinets, and the public mind is consequently led to study all
issues of importance. The people know and feel that they must be
called upon sooner or later to decide between the parties contending
on the floor of the legislature, and consequently are obliged to give
an intelligent consideration to public affairs. Let us see what
Bagehot, ablest of critics, says on this point:--
"At present there is business in their attention (that is to
say, of the English or Canadian people). They assist at the
determining crisis; they assist or help it. Whether the
government will go out or remain is determined by the debate
and by the division in parliament And the opinion out of
doors, the secret pervading disposition of society, has a
great influence on that division. The nation feels that its
judgment is important, and it strives to judge. It succeeds
in deciding because the debates and the discussions give it
the facts and arguments. But under the presidential
government the nation has, except at the electing moment, no
influence; it has not the ballot-box before it; its virtue
is gone and it must wait till its instant of despotism again
returns. There are doubtless debates in the legislature, but
they are prologues without a play. The prize of power is not
in the gift of the legislature. No presidential country
needs to form daily delicate opinions, or is helped in
forming them."
Then when the people do go to the ballot-box, they cannot
intelligently influence the policy of the government. If they vote for
a president, then congress may have a policy quite different from his;
if they vote for members of congress, they cannot change the opinions
of the president. If the president changes his cabinet at any time,
they have nothing to say about it, for its members are not important
as wheels in the legislative machinery. Congress may pass a bill of
which the people express their disapproval at the first opportunity
when they choose a new congress, but still it may remain on the
statute-book because the senate holds views different from the newly
elected House, and cannot be politically changed until after a long
series of legislative elections. As Professor Woodrow Wilson well puts
it in an able essay:--[31]
"Public opinion has no easy vehicle for its judgments, no
quick channels for its action. Nothing about the system is
direct and simple. Authority is perplexingly subdivided and
distributed, and responsibility has to be hunted down in
out-of-the-way corners. So that the sum of the whole matter
is that the means of working for the fruits of good
government are not readily to be found. The average citizen
may be excused for esteeming government at best but a
haphazard affair upon which his vote and all his influence
can have but little effect. How is his choice of
representative in congress to affect the policy of the
country as regards the questions in which he is most
interested if the man for whom he votes has no chance of
getting on the standing committee which has virtual charge
of those questions? How is it to make any difference who is
chosen president? Has the president any great authority in
matters of vital policy? It seems a thing of despair to get
any assurance that any vote he may cast will even in an
infinitesimal degree affect the essential courses of
administration. There are so many cooks mixing their
ingredients in the national broth that it seems hopeless,
this thing of changing one cook at a time."
Under such a system it cannot be expected that the people will take
the same deep interest in elections and feel as directly responsible
for the character of the government as when they can at one election
and by one verdict decide the fate of a government, whose policy on
great issues must be thoroughly explained to them at the polls. This
method of popular government is more real and substantial than a
system which does not allow the people to influence congressional
legislation and administrative action through a set of men sitting in
congress and having a common policy.
I think it does not require any very elaborate argument to show that
when men feel and know that the ability they show in parliament may be
sooner or later rewarded by a seat on the treasury benches, and that
they will then have a determining voice in the government of the
country, be it dominion or province, they must be stimulated by a
keener interest in public life, a closer watchfulness over legislation
and administration, a greater readiness for discussing all public
questions, and a more studied appreciation of public opinion outside
the legislative halls. Every man in parliament is a premier _in
posse_. While asking my readers to recall what I have already said as
to the effect of responsible government on the public men and people
of Canada, I shall also here refer them to some authorities worthy of
all respect.
Mr. Bagehot says with his usual clearness:--[32]
"To belong to a debating society adhering to an executive
(and this is no inapt description of a congress under a
presidential constitution) is not an object to stir a noble
ambition, and is a position to encourage idleness. The
members of a parliament excluded from office can never be
comparable, much less equal, to those of a parliament not
excluded from office. The presidential government by its
nature divides political life into two halves, an executive
half and a legislative half, and by so dividing it, makes
neither half worth a man's having--worth his making it a
continuous career--worthy to absorb, as cabinet government
absorbs, his whole soul. The statesmen from whom a nation
chooses under a presidential system are much inferior to
those from whom it chooses under a cabinet system, while the
selecting apparatus is also far less discerning."
An American writer, Prof. Denslow,[33] does not hesitate to express
the opinion very emphatically that "as it is, in no country do the
people feel such an overwhelming sense of the littleness of the men in
charge of public affairs" as in the United States. And in another
place he dwells on the fact that "responsible government educates
office-holders into a high and honourable sense of their
accountability to the people," and makes "statesmanship a permanent
pursuit followed by a skilled class of men."
Prof. Woodrow Wilson says that,[34] so far from men being trained to
legislation by congressional government, "independence and ability are
repressed under the tyranny of the rules, and practically the favour
of the popular branch of congress is concentrated in the speaker and a
few--very few--expert parliamentarians." Elsewhere he shows that
"responsibility is spread thin, and no vote or debate can gather it."
As a matter of fact and experience, he comes to the conclusion "the
more power is divided the more irresponsible it becomes and the petty
character of the leadership of each committee contributes towards
making its despotism sure by making its duties interesting."
Professor James Bryee, it will be admitted, is one of the fairest of
critics in his review of the institutions of the United States; but
he, too, comes to the conclusion[35] that the system of congressional
government destroys the unity of the House (of representatives) as a
legislative body; prevents the capacity of the best members from being
brought to bear upon any one piece of legislation, however important;
cramps debate; lessens the cohesion and harmony of legislation; gives
facilities for the exercise of underhand and even corrupt influence;
reduces responsibility; lowers the interest of the nation in the
proceedings of congress.
In another place,[36] after considering the relations between the
executive and the legislature, he expresses his opinion that the
framers of the constitution have "so narrowed the sphere of the
executive as to prevent it from leading the country, or even its own
party in the country." They endeavoured "to make members of congress
independent, but in doing so they deprived them of some of the means
which European legislators enjoy of learning how to administer, of
learning even how to legislate in administrative topics. They
condemned them to be architects without science, critics without
experience, censors without responsibility."
And further on, when discussing the faults of democratic government in
the United States--and Professor Bryce, we must remember, is on the
whole most hopeful of its future--he detects as amongst its
characteristics "a certain commonness of mind and tone, a want of
dignity and elevation in and about the conduct of public affairs, and
insensibility to the nobler aspects and finer responsibilities of
national life." Then he goes on to say[37] that representative and
parliamentary system "provides the means of mitigating the evils to be
feared from ignorance or haste, for it vests the actual conduct of
affairs in a body of specially chosen and presumably qualified men,
who may themselves intrust such of their functions as need peculiar
knowledge or skill to a smaller governing body or bodies selected in
respect of their more eminent fitness. By this method the defects of
democracy are remedied while its strength is retained." The members of
American legislatures, being disjoined from the administrative
offices, "are not chosen for their ability or experience; they are not
much respected or trusted, and finding nothing exceptional expected
from them, they behave as ordinary men."
"If corruption," wrote Judge Story, that astute political student,
"ever silently eats its way into the vitals of this Republic, it will
be because the people are unable to bring responsibility home to the
executive through his chosen ministers."[38]
As I have already stated in the first pages of this chapter, long
before the inherent weaknesses of the American system were pointed out
by the eminent authorities just quoted, Lord Elgin was able, with that
intuitive sagacity which he applied to the study of political
institutions, to see the unsatisfactory working of the clumsy,
irresponsible mechanism of our republican neighbours.
"Mr. Fillmore," he is writing in November, 1850, "stands to his
congress very much in the same relation in which I stood to my
assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective
responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of
concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The
whole business of legislation in the American congress, as well as in
the state legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway
business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to
be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the
British parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance,
our reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session
just as a railway bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in
parliament There was no government to deal with. The interests of the
union as a whole, distinct from local and sectional interests, had no
organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of
canvassing this member of congress or the other. It is easy to
perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the
exception but the rule,"--remarks as true in 1901 as in 1850.
It is important also to dwell on the fact that in Canada the
permanency of the tenure of public officials and the introduction of
the secret ballot have been among the results of responsible
government. Through the influence and agency of the same system,
valuable reforms have been made in Canada in the election laws, and
the trial of controverted elections has been taken away from partisan
election committees and given to a judiciary independent of political
influences. In these matters the irresponsible system of the United
States has not been able to effect any needful reforms. Such measures
can be best carried by ministers having the initiation and direction
of legislation and must necessarily be retarded when power is divided
among several authorities having no unity of policy on any question.
Party government undoubtedly has its dangers arising from personal
ambition and unscrupulous partisanship, but as long as men must range
themselves in opposing camps on every subject, there is no other
system practicable by which great questions can be carried and the
working of representative government efficiently conducted. The
framers of the constitution of the United States no doubt thought they
had succeeded in placing the president and his officers above party
when they instituted the method of electing the former by a body of
select electors chosen for that purpose in each state, who were
expected to act irrespective of all political considerations. A
president so selected would probably choose his officers also on the
same basis. The practical results, however, have been to prove that in
every country of popular and representative institutions party
government must prevail. Party elects men to the presidency and to the
floor of the Senate and House of Representatives, and the election to
those important positions is directed and controlled by a political
machinery far exceeding in its completeness any party organization in
England or in Canada. The party convention is now the all important
portion of the machinery for the election of the president, and the
safeguard provided by the constitution for the choice of the best man
is a mere nullity. One thing is quite certain, that party government
under the direction of a responsible ministry, responsible to
parliament and the people for every act of administration and
legislation, can have far less dangerous tendencies than a party
system which elects an executive not amenable to public opinion for
four years, divides the responsibilities of government among several
authorities, prevents harmony among party leaders, does not give the
executive that control over legislation necessary to efficient
administration of public affairs, and in short offers a direct premium
to conflict among all the authorities of the state--a conflict, not so
much avoided by the checks and balances of the constitution as by the
patience, common sense, prudence, and respect for law which presidents
and their cabinets have as a rule shown at national crises. But we can
clearly see that, while the executive has lost in influence, congress
has gained steadily to an extent never contemplated by the founders of
the constitution, and there are thoughtful men who say that the true
interests of the country have not always been promoted by the change.
Party government in Canada ensures unity of policy, since the premier
of the cabinet becomes the controlling part of the political machinery
of the state; no such thing as unity of policy is possible under a
system which gives the president neither the dignity of a
governor-general, nor the strength of a premier, and splits up
political power among any number of would-be party leaders, who adopt
or defeat measures by private intrigues, make irresponsible
recommendations, and form political combinations for purely selfish
ends.[39]
It seems quite clear then that the system of responsible ministers
makes the people more immediately responsible for the efficient
administration of public affairs than is possible in the United
States. The fact of having the president and the members of congress
elected for different terms, and of dividing the responsibilities of
government among these authorities does not allow the people to
exercise that direct influence which is ensured, as the experience of
Canada and of England proves, by making one body of men immediately
responsible to the electors for the conduct of public affairs at
frequently recurring periods, arranged by well understood rules, so as
to ensure a correct expression of public opinion on all important
issues. The committees which assist in governing this country are the
choice of the people's representatives assembled in parliament, and
every four or five years and sometimes even sooner in case of a
crisis, the people have to decide on the wisdom of the choice.
The system has assuredly its drawbacks like all systems of government
that have been devised and worked out by the brain of man. In all
frankness I confess that this review would be incomplete were I not to
refer to certain features of the Canadian system of government which
seem to me on the surface fraught with inherent danger at some time or
other to independent legislative judgment. Any one who has closely
watched the evolution of this system for years past must admit that
there is a dangerous tendency in the Dominion to give the executive--I
mean the ministry as a body--too superior a control over the
legislative authority. When a ministry has in its gift the appointment
not only of the heads of the executive government in the provinces,
that is to say, of the lieutenant-governors, who can be dismissed by
the same power at any moment, but also of the members of the Upper
House of Parliament itself, besides the judiciary and numerous
collectorships and other valuable offices, it is quite obvious that
the element of human ambition and selfishness has abundant room for
operation on the floor of the legislature, and a bold and skilful
cabinet is also able to wield a machinery very potent under a system
of party government. In this respect the House of Representatives may
be less liable to insidious influences than a House of Commons at
critical junctures when individual conscience or independent judgment
appears on the point of asserting itself. The House of Commons may be
made by skilful party management a mere recording or registering body
of an able and determined cabinet. I see less liability to such silent
though potent influences in a system which makes the president and a
house of representatives to a large degree independent of each other,
and leaves his important nominations to office under the control of
the senate, a body which has no analogy whatever with the relatively
weak branch of the Canadian parliament, essentially weak while its
membership depends on the government itself. I admit at once that in
the financial dependence of the provinces on the central federal
authority, in the tenure of the office of the chief magistrates of the
provinces, in the control exercised by the ministry over the highest
legislative body of Canada, that is, highest in point of dignity and
precedence, there are elements of weakness; but at the same time it
must be remembered that, while the influence and power of the Canadian
government may be largely increased by the exercise of its great
patronage in the hypothetical cases I have suggested, its action is
always open to the approval or disapproval of parliament and it has to
meet an opposition face to face. Its acts are open to legislative
criticism, and it may at any moment be forced to retire by public
opinion operating upon the House of Commons.
On the other hand the executive in the United States for four years
may be dominant over congress by skilful management. A strong
executive by means of party wields a power which may be used for
purposes of mere personal ambition, and may by clever management of
the party machine and with the aid of an unscrupulous majority retain
power for a time even when it is not in accord with the true sentiment
of the country; but under a system like that of Canada, where every
defect in the body politic is probed to the bottom in the debates of
parliament, which are given by the public press more fully than is the
practice in the neighbouring republic, the people have a better
opportunity of forming a correct judgment on every matter and giving
an immediate verdict when the proper time comes for an appeal to them,
the sovereign power. Sometimes this judgment is too often influenced
by party prejudices and the real issue is too often obscured by
skilful party management, but this is inevitable under every system of
popular government; and happily, should it come to the worst, there is
always in the country that saving remnant of intelligent, independent
men of whom Matthew Arnold has written, who can come forward and by
their fearless and bold criticism help the people in any crisis when
truth, honour and justice are at stake and the great mass of electors
fail to appreciate the true situation of affairs. But we may have
confidence in the good sense and judgment of the people as a whole
when time is given them to consider the situation of affairs. Should
men in power be unfaithful to their public obligations, they will
eventually be forced by the conditions of public life to yield their
positions to those who merit public confidence. If it should ever
happen in Canada that public opinion has become so low that public men
feel that they can, whenever they choose, divert it to their own
selfish ends by the unscrupulous use of partisan agencies and corrupt
methods, and that the highest motives of public life are forgotten in
a mere scramble for office and power, then thoughtful Canadians might
well despair of the future of their country; but, whatever may be the
blots at times on the surface of the body politic, there is yet no
reason to believe that the public conscience of Canada is weak or
indifferent to character and integrity in active politics. The
instincts of an English people are always in the direction of the pure
administration of justice and the efficient and honest government of
the country, and though it may sometimes happen that unscrupulous
politicians and demagogues will for a while dominate in the party
arena, the time of retribution and purification must come sooner or
later. English methods must prevail in countries governed by an
English people and English institutions.
It is sometimes said that it is vain to expect a high ideal in public
life, that the same principles that apply to social and private life
cannot always be applied to the political arena if party government is
to succeed; but this is the doctrine of the mere party manager, who is
already too influential in Canada as in the United States, and not of
a true patriotic statesman. It is wiser to believe that the nobler the
object the greater the inspiration, and at all events, it is better to
aim high than to sink low. It is all important that the body politic
should be kept pure and that public life should be considered a public
trust. Canada is still young in her political development, and the
fact that her population has been as a rule a steady, fixed
population, free from those dangerous elements which have come into
the United States with such rapidity of late years, has kept her
relatively free from any serious social and political dangers which
have afflicted her neighbours, and to which I believe they themselves,
having inherited English institutions and being imbued with the spirit
of English law, will always in the end rise superior. Great
responsibility, therefore, rests in the first instance upon the people
of Canada, who must select the best and purest among them to serve the
country, and, secondly, upon the men whom the legislature chooses to
discharge the trust of carrying on the government. No system of
government or of laws can of itself make a people virtuous and happy
unless their rulers recognize in the fullest sense their obligations
to the state and exercise their powers with prudence and
unselfishness, and endeavour to elevate and not degrade public opinion
by the insidious acts and methods of the lowest political ethics. A
constitution may be as perfect as human agencies can make it, and yet
be relatively worthless while the large responsibilities and powers
entrusted to the governing body--responsibilities and powers not
embodied in acts of parliament--are forgotten in view of party
triumph, personal ambition, or pecuniary gain. "The laws," says Burke,
"reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please,
infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the
powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of
ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depend
upon them. Without them your commonwealth is no better than a scheme
upon paper, and not a living, active, effective organization."
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
For accounts of the whole career of Lord Elgin see _Letters and
Journals of James, Eighth, Earl of Elgin_, etc., edited by Theodore
Walrond, C.B., with a preface by his brother-in-law, Dean Stanley
(London 2nd. ed., 1873); for China mission, _Narrative of the Earl of
Elgin's Mission to China and Japan_ by Lawrence Oliphant, his private
secretary (Edinburgh, 1869); for the brief Indian administration, _The
Friend of India_ for 1862-63. Consult also article in vol. 8 of
_Encyclopædia Britannica_, 9th ed.; John Charles Dent's _Canadian
Portrait Gallery_ (Toronto, 1880), vol. 2, which also contains a
portrait; W.J. Rattray's _The Scot in British North America_ (Toronto,
1880) vol. 2, pp. 608-641.
For an historical review of Lord Elgin's administration in Canada, see
J.C. Dent's _The Last Forty Years, or Canada since the Union of 1841_
(Toronto, 1881), chapters XXIII-XXXIV inclusive, with a portrait;
Louis P. Turcotte's _Le Canada Sous l'Union_ (Quebec, 1871), chapters
I-IV, inclusive; Sir Francis Hincks's _Reminiscences of His Public
Life_ (Montreal, 1884) with a portrait of the author; Joseph Pope's
_Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald, G.C.B._ (Ottawa and
London, 1894), with portraits of the great statesman, vol. 1, chapters
IV-VI inclusive; Lord Grey's _Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's
Administration_ (London, 2nd ed., 1853), vol. 1; Sir C.B. Adderley's
_Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration,
by Earl Grey, and Subsequent Colonial History_ (London, 1869).
For accounts of the evolution of responsible government in Canada
consult the works by Dent, Turcotte, Rattray, Hincks, Grey and
Adderley, just mentioned; Lord Durham's _Report on the Affairs of
British North America_, submitted to parliament, 1839; Dr. Alpheus
Todd's _Parliamentary Government in The British Colonies_ (2nd ed.
London, 1894); Bourinot's _Manual of the Constitutional History of
Canada_ (Toronto, 1901); his _Canada under British Rule_ (London and
Toronto, 1901), chapters VI-VIII inclusive; _Memoir of the Life of the
Rt. Hon. Lord Sydenham, etc._, by his brother G. Poulett Scrope, M.P.,
(London, 1843), with a portrait of that nobleman; _Life and
Correspondence of Charles Lord Metcalfe_, by J.W. Kaye (London, new
ed., 1858).
For comparisons between the parliamentary government of Great Britain
or Canada, and the congressional system of the United States, see
Walter Bagehot's _English Constitution_ and other political essays
(New York, 1889); Woodrow Wilson's _Congressional Government_ (Boston,
1885); Dr. James Bryce's _American Commonwealth_ (London, 1888);
Bourinot's _Canadian Studies in Comparative Politics_, in _Trans. Roy.
Soc. Can._, vol. VIII, sec. 2 (old ser.), and in separate form
(Montreal, 1891). Other books and essays on the same subject are noted
in a bibliography given in _Trans. Roy. Soc. Can._, vol. XI, old ser.,
sec. 2, as an appendix to an article by Sir J.G. Bourinot on
Parliamentary Government in Canada.
The reader may also profitably consult the interesting series of
sketches (with excellent portraits) of the lives of Sir Francis
Hincks, Sir A. MacNab, Sir L.H. LaFontaine, R. Baldwin, Bishop
Strachan, L.J. Papineau, John Sandfield Macdonald, Antoine A. Dorion,
Sir John A. Macdonald, George Brown, Sir E.P. Taché, P.J.O. Chauveau,
and of other men notable from 1847-1854, in the _Portraits of British
Americans_ (Montreal 1865-67), by J. Fennings Taylor, who was deputy
clerk of the old legislative council, and later of the senate of
Canada, and a contemporary of the eminent men whose careers he briefly
and graphically describes. Consult also Dent's _Canadian Portrait
Gallery_, which has numerous portraits.
INDEX
A
Amnesty Act, 91.
Annexation manifesto, 80, 81.
Annexation sentiment, the, caused by lack of prosperity and political
grievances, 191 f.
Archambault, L., 186.
Aylwin, Hon. I.C., 45, 50, 53, 187.
B
Badgley, Judge, 187.
Bagehot,
on public interest in politics, 250, 251;
on the disadvantage of the presidential system, 253, 254.
Bagot, Sir Charles, favourable to French Canadians, 30; 31.
Baldwin, Hon. Robert, 28;
aims of, 31, 45, 50, 51;
forms a government with LaFontaine, 52;
his measure to create the university of Toronto, 93, 94;
resigns office, 103;
death of, 104;
views on the clergy reserves, 160, 162.
Blake, Hon. W.H., 50, 53, 69.
Boulton, John, 123.
Bowen, Judge, 187.
Brown, Hon. George, 110;
editor of _Globe_, 111;
raises the cry of French domination, leads the clear Grits, 112;
enters parliament, 113;
his power, 114;
urges representation by population, 117; 125, 137, 138;
his part in confederation, 225.
Bryce, Rt. Hon. James, on the disadvantages of congressional
government, 255-257.
Buchanan, Mr., his tribute to Lord Elgin, 123, 124.
C
Cameron, John Hillyard, 50, 112.
Cameron, Malcolm, 50, 53, 110, 113, 117, 126, 134, 163.
Canada Company, 145.
Canada,
early political conditions in, 17-40;
difficulties connected with responsible government in, 26;
the principles of responsible government, 228;
a comparison of her political system with that of the United States,
241 f.
Canning, Earl, 217.
Caron, Hon. R.E., 43, 53, 109, 113, 126, 187.
Cartier, Georges Étienne, 135, 136, 226.
Cathcart, Lord, succeeds Lord Metcalfe as governor-general, 38.
Cauchon, 126, 164.
Cayley, Hon. W., 140, 163.
Chabot, Hon. J., 126, 141, 164, 186.
Chaderton, 48.
Chauveau, P.J.O., 46, 50, 109, 113, 126, 141, 164.
Christie, David, 110.
Church of England, its claims under the Constitutional Act., 145, 150
f.
Church Presbyterian, its successful contention, 153.
Clergy Reserves, 101, 102, 103, 119, 127;
secularization of, 142;
the history of, 143, f.;
report of select committee on, 147;
Imperial act passed, 158, 159;
its repeal urged, 161;
value of the reserves, 161-162;
full powers granted the provincial legislature to vary or repeal the
act of 1840, 167;
important bill introduced by Sir John A. Macdonald, 168.
Colborne, Sir John,
his action on the land question, 154;
the Colborne patents attacked and upheld, 155, 156.
Company of the West Indies, 175.
Craig, Sir James, 1, 19.
D
Daly, Dominick, 35.
Day, Judge, 187.
Delagrave, C., 187.
Denslow, Prof., 254.
Derby, Lord, his views of colonial development, 121.
Dessaules, 108.
Dorchester, Lord, 1.
Dorion, A.A., 108, 134.
Dorion, J.B.E., 108.
Doutre, R., 108.
Draper, Hon. Mr.,
forms a ministry, 35;
retires from the ministry, 43.
Draper-Viger ministry,
its weakness 44,
some important measures, 45;
commission appointed by, 64.
Drummond, L.P., 109, 113, 126, 141;
his action on the question of seigniorial tenure, 186.
Dumas, N., 186.
Durham, Lord, 2, 14;
his report, 15, 23, 25;
compared with Elgin, 15;
his views on the land question, 144, 145, 148, 154, 155;
his views on Canada after the rebellion, 191;
his suggestions of remedy, 192, 193.
Duval, Judge, 187.
E
Educational Reform, 87-89.
Elgin, Lord,
his qualities, 3-4;
conditions in Canada on his arrival, on his departure, birth and
family descent, 5;
his parentage, 6;
his contemporaries at Eton and Oxford, estimate of,
by Gladstone, 7;
by his brother, 7-8;
enters parliament, his political views, 8;
appointed governor of Jamaica, death of his wife, 9;
mediates between the colonial office and the Jamaica legislature,
12;
resigns governorship of Jamaica, returns to England, 13;
accepts governor-generalship of Canada, marriage with Lady Mary
Louisa Lambton, 14;
compared with Lord Durham, 15;
creates a favourable impression, recognizes the principle of
responsible government, 41;
appeals for reimbursement of plague expenses, 48;
visits Upper Canada, 49;
comments on LaFontaine-Baldwin ministry, 52-53;
correspondence with Lord Grey, 55;
hostility to Papinean, 56;
on the rights of French Canadians, 55-56;
his commercial views, 57-60;
his course on Rebellion Losses bill, 71-78;
attacked by mob, 74;
his course sustained by the imperial parliament, 78;
visits Upper Canada, 79;
raised to the British peerage, 80;
his condemnation of annexation manifesto, 81;
refers to causes of depressions and irritations, 82;
urges reciprocity with United States, urges repeal of navigation
laws, 82;
his views on education, 88-89;
his views on increased representation, 118-119;
his views on the Upper House, 120;
visits England, 123;
tribute from United States minister, 123-124;
visits Washington and negotiates reciprocity treaty, 124;
advises repeal of the imperial act of 1840, 164, 165;
his efforts against annexation, 189-190, 194, 195;
his labours for reciprocity, 196;
visits the United States, 197;
receives an address on the eve of his departure, 203;
his reply, 204-205;
his last speech in Quebec, 205-208;
returns to England, 209;
his views on self-defence, 209-212;
accepts a mission to China, 212;
his action during the Indian mutiny, 213;
negotiates the treaty of Tientsin, 214;
visits Japan officially, 214;
negotiates the treaty of Yeddo, 214;
returns to England, 215;
becomes postmaster-general under Palmerston, 215;
becomes Lord Rector of Glasgow University, 215;
returns to China as Ambassador Extraordinary, 215;
becomes governor-general of India, 216;
tour in northern India, 218;
holds Durbar at Agra, 218;
Uahabee outbreak, 218;
illness and death, 219;
views on imperial honours, 222;
on British connection, 229, 231;
views on the power of his office, 231-232;
beneficial results of his policy, 233, 235;
on the disadvantages of the United States political system, 257,
258.
F
Feudal System, the, in Canada, 172, f.
Free Trade,
protest against, from Canada, 39, 45;
effects of, on Canada, 57-58.
French Canadians,
resent the Union Act, 23, 24;
resent portions of Lord Durham's report, 23;
increase of their influence, 31.
G
Garneau, 123.
Gavazzi Riots, the, 125.
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W.E., his opinion of Lord Elgin, 7; 78.
Gore, Lieut.-Governor, 146.
Gourlay, Robert, 147.
Grey, Lord, colonial secretary, 13; 36, 77;
views on clergy reserves, 165.
H
Haldimand, Governor, 97.
Head, Sir Francis Bond, 1, 22.
Hincks, Sir Francis, appointed inspector-general, 31; 38, 50, 53, 100,
101;
views and qualities of 107,
forms a ministry, 107; 112, 113, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 135, 136;
becomes a member of the Liberal--Conservative ministry, 140, 141;
views on the clergy reserves, 163, 165, 166, 196;
appointed governor of Barbadoes and Windward Isles, appointed
governor of British Guiana, 220, 222;
receives Commandership of the Bath, 222;
retirement, 222;
receives knighthood 222;
becomes finance minister, 223;
final retirement, 223;
his character and closing years, 223-224.
Hincks-Morin, ministry formed, 108;
its members, 113;
its chief measures, 114-120;
reconstructed, 125-126;
dissolves, 131;
resigns, 136.
Holmes, 50.
Holton, L.H., 108, 134.
Hopkins, Caleb, 110.
Howe, Joseph,
his assertion of loyalty, 22, 51, 92, 101;
on imperial honours and offices, 221;
appointed lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, 221.
Hudon, Vicar-General, 48.
Hundred Associates, 175.
I
Immigrants, Irish,
measures to relieve, 46-47;
bring plague to Canada, 47-48.
Imperial Act, authorizes increased representation, 122.
J
Jamaica, Lord Elgin, governor of, 9-13.
Jameson, Mrs., her comparison of Canada and the United States,
191-192.
Judah, H., 186.
L
Labrèche, 108.
LaTerrière, 164.
Laflamme, 108.
LaFontaine-Baldwin cabinet, 1842, 31;
resignation of, 35;
the second government, its members, 53;
its importance, 54;
dissolved, 85;
some of its important measures, 85-103.
LaFontaine, Hon. Hippolyte,
and the Union Act, 24;
aims of, 32, 44, 45, 50;
forms a government with Baldwin, 52;
his resolutions, 67-68;
attack upon his house, 76;
resigns office, 104;
becomes chief justice, receives baronetcy, his qualities, 105;
views on the clergy reserves, 162, 164;
conservative views on seigniorial tenure, 185; 187.
Lebel, J.G., 187.
Lelièvre, S., 186.
Leslie, Hon. James, 53.
Leslie, John, 110.
Liberal-Conservative Party, the, formed, 137.
Lytton, Lord, his ideal of a governor, 4.
M
MacDonald, Rt. Hon. Sir John Alexander,
reveals his great political qualities, 43, 44, 50, 110, 114, 118,
127;
his argument on the Representation Bill, 132, 137, 139,140,163;
views on the clergy reserves, 163;
takes charge of the bill for secularization of the reserves, 168;
monuments to his memory, 225-226.
Macdonald, John Sandfield, 50;
his rebuff to Lord Elgin, 127-129, 135.
Mackenzie, William Lyon, 17;
leader of the radicals, 21; 22, 51;
returns to Canada, 91;
his qualities, 91-92; 103, 112, 127.
MacNab, Sir Allan, 31, 50, 51, 68;
attitude on Rebellion Losses Bill, 75; 110, 137, 139;
becomes a member of the Liberal-Conservative ministry, 140;
his coalition ministry, 140; 141, 224.
McDougall, Hon. William, 110.
McGill, 45.
Meredith, Judge, 187.
Merritt, William Hamilton, 50, 97.
Metcalf, Sir Charles,
succeeds Bagot as governor-general, 32;
his defects, 32, 33, 37;
breach with LaFontaine-Baldwin ministry, 34, 35;
created baron, death of, 37.
Mills, Mayor, dies of plague, 48.
Mondelet, Judge, 187.
Montreal, ceases to be the seat of government, 78.
Morin, A.N., 32, 43, 50, 51, 109, 113, 126, 127, 133, 140, 141;
favours secularization of the clergy reserves, 166; 187
Morris, Hon. James, 113, 126.
Morrison, Joseph C., 126.
N
Navigation laws, 38, 45;
repealed, 83.
Nelson, Wolfred, 22, 50, 91.
Newcastle, Duke of, secretary of state for the colonies, 167.
O
Ottawa, selected as the seat of government, later as the capital of
the Dominion, 79.
P
Pakington, Sir John, adverse to the colonial contention on the clergy
reserve question, 165, 167.
Palmerston, Lord, 212, 213.
Papineau, Denis B., 35, 44, 66.
Papineau, Louis Joseph, 17;
aims of, 20, 21; 22;
influence of, 50, 51; 56, 66, 90, 91, 117;
his final defeat, 134.
Peel, Sir Robert, 78.
Price, Hon. J.H., 50, 53, 160, 161.
Postal Reform, 85, 86.
Power, Dr., 48.
R
Railway development,
under Baldwin and LaFontaine, 99-101;
under Hincks and Morin, 114-117.
Rebellion Losses Bill,
history of, 63-78;
commission appointed by Draper-Viger ministry, 64;
report of commissioners, 65;
LaFontaine's resolutions, 67, 68;
new commission appointed, attacks on the measure, 68;
passage of measure, 70;
Lord Elgin's course, 71 f.;
serious results of, 73, 74; 203.
Reciprocity treaty with United States,
urged by Lord Elgin, 82;
treaty ratified, 142;
signed, 198;
its provisions, 198-200;
beneficial results, 201;
repealed by the United States, 201;
results of the repeal, 202.
Richards, Hon. W.B., 50, 113, 128.
Richelieu, introduces feudal system into Canada, 175.
Richmond, Duke of, 2.
Robinson, Sir John Beverley, 105.
Rolph, Dr. John, 110, 112, 113, 126, 136.
Ross, Mr. Dunbar, 126, 141.
Ross, Hon. John, 113, 126, 141.
Roy, Mr. 48.
Russell, Lord John, 26;
supports Metcalfe, 37; 78.
Ryerson, Rev. Egerton,
defends Sir Charles Metcalfe, 36;
his educational services, 89, 90;
opposes Sydenham's measure, 157.
S
Saint Réal M. Vallières de, 31.
Seigniorial Tenure, 101, 102, 119, 126, 142;
history of, 171 f.;
originates in the old feudal system, 171-174;
introduced by Richelieu into Canada, 175;
description of the system of tenure, 175 f;
judicial investigation by commission, 186, 187.
Sherwood, Henry,
becomes head of ministry, 43;
defeat of Sherwood cabinet, 50, 68, 159.
Short, Judge, 187.
Sicotte, 126;
elected speaker, 135, 136.
Simcoe, Lieutenant-Governor, 18.
Smith, Henry, 141, 187.
Spence, Hon. R., 140.
Stanley, Lord, 9;
supports Metcalfe, 37.
Strachan, Bishop,
established Trinity college, 95;
refuses compromise on land question, 150, 154, 159;
meets with defeat, 169.
Sullivan, Hon. R.B., 53.
Sydenham, Lord,
appointed governor-general to complete the union and establish
responsible government, 26-29;
qualities of, 29;
death of, 30;
his canal policy, 96-99;
his action on the land question, 156, 157.
T
Taché, Hon. E.P., 53, 109, 113, 126.
Trinity College, established, 95.
Turcotte, J.G., 186.
U
Union Act of 1840,
its provisions, 22, 23;
restrictions concerning use of French language removed, 61, 117;
clauses respecting the Upper House repealed, 120.
United States, comparison of their political system with that of
Canada, 241, ff.
University of Toronto, created from King's College, 94.
V
Vanfelson, Judge, 187.
Varin, J.B., 187.
Viger, Hon. L.M., forms a ministry, 35, 53, 66, 108.
W
Waldron, Mr., 215.
White, Thos., 139.
Winter, P., 187.
Woodrow, Wilson, on the United States system, 252;
on political irresponsibility, 254, 255.
Y
Young, Hon. John, 113, 126.
NOTES
[1: He was bitten by a tame fox and died of hydrophobia at Richmond,
in the present county of Carleton, Ontario.]
[2: "Letters and Journals of James, eighth Earl of Elgin, etc." Edited
by Theodore Waldron, C.B. For fuller references to works consulted in
the writing of this short history, see _Bibliographical Notes_ at the
end of this book.]
[3: Lady Elma, who married, in 1864, Thomas John
Howell-Thurlow-Camming Bruce, who was attached to the staff of Lord
Elgin in his later career in China and India, etc., and became Baron
Thurlow on the death of his brother in 1874. See "Debrett's Peerage."]
[4: "The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration," by
Earl Grey, London, 1857. See Vol. I, p. 205.]
[5: The "Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe," by John
W. Kaye, London, 1858.]
[6: "Reminiscences of his public life," by Sir Francis Hincks,
K.C.M.G., C.B., Montreal, 1884]
[7: See "McMullen's History of Canada," Vol. II (2nd Ed.), p. 201.]
[8: These concluding words of Lord Elgin recall a similar expression
of feeling by Sir Étienne Pascal Taché, "That the last gun that would
be fired for British supremacy in America would be fired by a French
Canadian."]
[9: Fifty years after these words were written, debates have taken
place in the House of Commons of the Canadian federation in favour of
an imperial Zollverein, which would give preferential treatment to
Canada's products in British markets. The Conservative party, when led
by Sir Charles Tupper, emphatically declared that "no measure of
preference, which falls short of the complete realization of such a
policy, should be considered final or satisfactory." England, however,
still clings to free trade.]
[10: The father of the Hon. Edward Blake, the eminent constitutional
lawyer, who occupied for many years a notable place in Canadian
politics, and is now (1902) a member of the British House of Commons.]
[11: See her "Winter Studies and Summer Rambles in Canada."
London, 1838.]
[12: "I am inclined," wrote Lord Durham, "to view the insurrectionary
movements which did take place as indicative of no deep-rooted
disaffection, and to believe that almost the entire body of the
reformers of this province sought only by constitutional means to
attain those objects for which they had so long peaceably struggled
before the unhappy troubles occasioned by the violence of a few
unprincipled adventurers and heated enthusiasts."]
[13: For a succinct history of this road see "Eighty Years' Progress
or British North America," Toronto, 1863.]
[14: "Portraits of British Americans," Montreal, 1865, vol. 1., pp.
99-100. See Bourinot's "Parliamentary Procedure," p. 573_n_. The last
occasion on which a Canadian speaker exercised this old privilege was
in 1869, and then Mr. Cockburn made only a very brief reference to the
measures of the session.]
[15: It was not until 1874 when Mr. Alexander Mackenzie was first
minister of a Liberal government that simultaneous polling at a
general election was required by law, but it had existed some years
previously in Nova Scotia.]
[16: See "The Last Forty Years, or Canada Since the Union of 1841," by
John Charles Dent, Toronto, 1881, vol. II., p. 309. Mr. White became
Minister of the Interior in Sir John Macdonald's government (1885-88)
but died suddenly in the midst of a most active and useful
administrative career.]
[17: See remarks of Dr. Kingsford in his "History of Canada" (vol.
VII., pp. 266-273), showing how unjust was the clamour raised by the
enemies of the church in New England when a movement was in progress
for the establishment of a colonial episcopate simply for purposes of
ordination and church government.]
[18: A clause of the act of 1791 provided that the sovereign might, if
he thought fit, annex hereditary titles of honour to the right of
being summoned to the legislative council in either province, but no
titles were ever conferred under the authority of this imperial
statute.]
[19: Thirteen other patents were left unsigned by the
lieutenant-governor and consequently had no legal force.]
[20: "Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honourable Charles Lord
Sydenham, G.C.B.," edited by his brother G. Poulett-Scrope, M.P.;
London, 1843.]
[21: Sir Francis Hincks's "Reminiscences of his Public Life," p. 283.]
[22: See on these points an excellent article on the feudal system of
Canada in the _Queen's Quarterly_ (Kingston, January, 1899) by Dr. W.
Bennett Munro. Also _Droit de banalité_, by the same, in the report of
the Am. Hist Ass., Washington, for 1899, Vol. I.]
[23: "Spencerwood," the governor's private residence.]
[24: See article on Lord Elgin in "Encyclopædia Britannica" (9th ed.),
Vol. VIII., p. 132.]
[25: In the "North British Review," quoted by Waldron, pp. 458-461.]
[26: Lord Elgin's eldest son (9th Earl) Victor Alexander Brace, who
was born in 1849, at Monklands, near Montreal, was Viceroy of India
1894-9. See Debrett's Peerage, arts. Elgin and Thurton for particulars
of Lord Elgin's family.]
[27: See Mr. Howe's eloquent speeches on the organization of the
empire, in his "Speeches and Public Letters," (Boston, 1859), vol.
II., pp. 175-207.]
[28: See on this subject Todd's "Parliamentary Government in the
British Colonies," pp. 313-329.]
[29: See Todd's "Parliamentary Government in England," vol. II., p.
101.]
[30: He was speaker of the House of Representatives from 1895 to
1899.]
[31: "Congressional Government," pp. 301, 332.]
[32:"The English Constitution," pp. 95, 96.]
[33: In the _International Review_, March, 1877.]
[34: "Congressional Government," p. 94.]
[35: "The American Commonwealth," I., 210 et seq.]
[36: Ibid., pp. 304, 305]
[37: ibid., Chap. 95, vol. III.]
[38: "Commentaries," sec. 869.]
[39: See Story's "Commentaries," sec. 869.]