CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
In a long letter which he wrote to Earl Grey in August, 1850, Lord
Elgin used these significant words: "To render annexation by violence
impossible, or by any other means improbable as may be, is, as I have
often ventured to repeat, the polar star of my policy." To understand
the full significance of this language it is only necessary to refer
to the history of the difficulties with which the governor-general had
to contend from the first hour he came to the province and began his
efforts to allay the feeling of disaffection then too prevalent
throughout the country--especially among the commercial classes--and
to give encouragement to that loyal sentiment which had been severely
shaken by the indifference or ignorance shown by British statesmen and
people with respect to the conditions and interests of the Canadas. He
was quite conscious that, if the province was to remain a contented
portion of the British empire, it could be best done by giving full
play to the principles of self-government among both nationalities who
had been so long struggling to obtain the application of the
parliamentary system of England in the fullest sense to the operation
of their own internal affairs, and by giving to the industrial and
commercial classes adequate compensation for the great losses which
they had sustained by the sudden abolition of the privileges which
England had so long extended to Canadian products--notably, flour,
wheat and lumber--in the British market.
Lord Elgin knew perfectly well that, while this discontent existed,
the party which favoured annexation would not fail to find sympathy
and encouragement in the neighbouring republic. He recalled the fact
that both Papineau and Mackenzie, after the outbreak of their abortive
rebellion, had many abettors across the border, as the infamous raids
into Canada clearly proved. Many people in the United States, no
doubt, saw some analogy between the grievances of Canadians and those
which had led to the American revolution. "The mass of the American
people," said Lord Durham, "had judged of the quarrel from a distance;
they had been obliged to form their judgment on the apparent grounds
of the controversy; and were thus deceived, as all those are apt to be
who judge under such circumstances, and on such grounds. The contest
bore some resemblance to that great struggle of their own forefathers,
which they regard with the highest pride. Like that, they believed it
to be the contest of a colony against the empire, whose misconduct
alienated their own country; they considered it to be a contest
undertaken by a people professing to seek independence of distant
control, and extension of popular privileges." More than that, the
striking contrast which was presented between Canada and the United
States "in respect to every sign of productive industry, increasing
wealth, and progressive civilization" was considered by the people of
the latter country to be among the results of the absence of a
political system which would give expansion to the energies of the
colonists and make them self-reliant in every sense. Lord Durham's
picture of the condition of things in 1838-9 was very painful to
Canadians, although it was truthful in every particular. "On the
British side of the line," he wrote, "with the exception of a few
favoured spots, where some approach to American prosperity is
apparent, all seems waste and desolate." But it was not only "in the
difference between the larger towns on the two sides" that we could
see "the best evidence of our own inferiority." That "painful and
undeniable truth was most manifest in the country districts through
which the line of national separation passes for one thousand miles."
Mrs. Jameson in her "Winter Studies and Summer Rambles," written only
a year or two before Lord Durham's report, gives an equally
unfavourable comparison between the Canadian and United States sides
of the western country. As she floated on the Detroit river in a
little canoe made of a hollow tree, and saw on one side "a city with
its towers, and spires, and animated population," and on the other "a
little straggling hamlet with all the symptoms of apathy, indolence,
mistrust, hopelessness," she could not help wondering at this
"incredible difference between the two shores," and hoping that some
of the colonial officials across the Atlantic would be soon sent "to
behold and solve the difficulty."
But while Lord Durham was bound to emphasize this unsatisfactory state
of things he had not lost his confidence in the loyalty of the mass of
the Canadian people, notwithstanding the severe strain to which they
had been subject on account of the supineness of the British
government to deal vigorously and promptly with grievances of which
they had so long complained as seriously affecting their connection
with the parent state and the development of their material resources.
It was only necessary, he felt, to remove the causes of discontent to
bring out to the fullest extent the latent affection which the mass of
French and English Canadians had been feeling for British connection
ever since the days when the former obtained guarantees for the
protection of their dearest institutions and the Loyalists of the
American Revolution crossed the frontier for the sake of Crown and
empire. "We must not take every rash expression of disappointment,"
wrote Lord Durham, "as an indication of a settled aversion to the
existing constitution; and my own observation convinces me that the
predominant feeling of all the British population of the North
American colonies is that of devoted attachment to the mother country.
I believe that neither the interests nor the feelings of the people
are incompatible with a colonial government, wisely and popularly
administered." His strong conviction then was that if connection with
Great Britain was to be continuous, if every cause of discontent was
to be removed, if every excuse for interference "by violence on the
part of the United States" was to be taken away, if Canadian
annexationists were no longer to look for sympathy and aid among their
republican neighbours, the Canadian people must be given the full
control of their own internal affairs, while the British government on
their part should cease that constant interference which only
irritated and offended the colony. "It is not by weakening," he said,
"but strengthening the influence of the people on the government; by
confining within much narrower bounds than those hitherto allotted to
it, and not by extending the interference of the imperial authorities
in the details of colonial affairs, that I believe that harmony is to
be restored, where dissension has so long prevailed; and a regularity
and vigour hitherto unknown, introduced into the administration of
these provinces." And he added that if the internal struggle for
complete self-government were renewed "the sympathy from without would
at some time or other re-assume its former strength."
Lord Elgin appeared on the scene at the very time when there was some
reason for a repetition of that very struggle, and a renewal of that
very "sympathy from without" which Lord Durham imagined. The political
irritation, which had been smouldering among the great mass of
Reformers since the days of Lord Metcalfe, was seriously aggravated by
the discontent created by commercial ruin and industrial paralysis
throughout Canada as a natural result of Great Britain's ruthless
fiscal policy. The annexation party once more came to the surface, and
contrasts were again made between Canada and the United States
seriously to the discredit of the imperial state. "The plea of
self-interest," wrote Lord Elgin in 1849, "the most powerful weapon,
perhaps, which the friends of British connection have wielded in times
past, has not only been wrested from my hands but transferred since
1846 to those of the adversary." He then proceeded to contrast the
condition of things on the two sides of the Niagara, only "spanned by
a narrow bridge, which it takes a foot passenger about three minutes
to cross." The inhabitants on the Canadian side were "for the most
part United Empire Loyalists" and differed little in habits or modes
of thought and expression from their neighbours. Wheat, their staple
product, grown on the Canadian side of the line, "fetched at that time
in the market from 9d. to 1s. less than the same article grown on the
other." These people had protested against the Montreal annexation
movement, but Lord Elgin was nevertheless confident that the large
majority firmly believed "that their annexation to the United States
would add one-fourth to the value of the produce of their farms." In
dealing with the causes of discontent Lord Elgin came to exactly the
same conclusion which, as I have just shown, was accepted by Lord
Durham after a close study of the political and material conditions of
the country. He completed the work of which his eminent predecessor
had been able only to formulate the plan. By giving adequate scope to
the practice of responsible government, he was able to remove all
causes for irritation against the British government, and prevent
annexationists from obtaining any sympathy from that body of American
people who were always looking for an excuse for a movement--such a
violent movement as suggested by Lord Elgin in the paragraph given
above--which would force Canada into the states of the union. Having
laid this foundation for a firm and popular government, he proceeded
to remove the commercial embarrassment by giving a stimulus to
Canadian trade by the repeal of the navigation laws, and the adoption
of reciprocity with the United States. The results of his efforts were
soon seen in the confidence which all nationalities and classes of the
Canadian people felt in the working of their system of government, in
the strengthening of the ties between the imperial state and the
dependency, and in the decided stimulus given to the shipping and
trade throughout the provinces of British North America.
I have already in the previous chapters of this book dwelt on the
methods which Lord Elgin so successfully adopted to establish
responsible government in accordance with the wishes of the Canadian
people, and it is now only necessary to refer to his strenuous efforts
during six years to obtain reciprocal trade between Canada and the
United States. It was impossible at the outset of his negotiations to
arouse any active interest among the politicians of the republic as
long as they were unable to see that the proposed treaty would be to
the advantage of their particular party or of the nation at large. No
party in congress was ready to take it up as a political question and
give it that impulse which could be best given by a strong partisan
organization. The Canadian and British governments could not get up a
"lobby" to press the matter in the ways peculiar to professional
politicians, party managers, and great commercial or financial
corporations. Mr. Hincks brought the powers of his persuasive tongue
and ingenious intellect to bear on the politicians at Washington, but
even he with all his commercial acuteness and financial knowledge was
unable to accomplish anything. It was not until Lord Elgin himself
went to the national capital and made use of his diplomatic tact and
amenity of demeanour that a successful result was reached. No
governor-general who ever visited the United States made so deep an
impression on its statesmen and people as was made by Lord Elgin
during this mission to Washington, and also in the course of the
visits he paid to Boston and Portland where he spoke with great effect
on several occasions. He won the confidence and esteem of statesmen
and politicians by his urbanity, dignity, and capacity for business.
He carried away his audiences by his exhibition of a high order of
eloquence, which evoked the admiration of those who had been
accustomed to hear Webster, Everett, Wendell, Philipps, Choate, and
other noted masters of oratory in America.
He spoke at Portland after his success in negotiating the treaty, and
was able to congratulate both Canada and the United States on the
settlement of many questions which had too long alienated peoples who
ought to be on the most friendly terms with each other. He was now
near the close of his Canadian administration and was able to sum up
the results of his labours. The discontent with which the people of
the United States so often sympathized had been brought to an end "by
granting to Canadians what they desired--the great principle of
self-government" "The inhabitants of Canada at this moment," he went
on to say, "exercise as much influence over their own destinies and
government as do the people of the United States. This is the only
cause of misunderstanding that ever existed; and this cannot arise
when the circumstances which made them at variance have ceased to
exist."
The treaty was signed on June 5th, 1854, by Lord Elgin on the part of
Great Britain, and by the Honourable W.L. Marcy, secretary of state,
on behalf of the United States, but it did not legally come into force
until it had been formally ratified by the parliament of Great
Britain, the congress of the United States, and the several
legislatures of the British provinces. It exempted from customs duties
on both sides of the line certain articles which were the growth and
produce of the British colonies and of the United States--the
principal being grain, flour, breadstuffs, animals, fresh, smoked, and
salted meats, fish, lumber of all kinds, poultry, cotton, wool, hides,
ores of metal, pitch, tar, ashes, flax, hemp, rice, and unmanufactured
tobacco. The people of the United States and of the British provinces
were given an equal right to navigate the St. Lawrence river, the
Canadian canals and Lake Michigan. No export duty could be levied on
lumber cut in Maine and passing down the St. John or other streams in
New Brunswick. The most important question temporarily settled by the
treaty was the fishery dispute which had been assuming a troublesome
aspect for some years previously. The government at Washington then
began to raise the issue that the three mile limit to which their
fishermen could be confined should follow the sinuosities of the
coasts, including bays; the object being to obtain access to the
valuable mackerel fisheries of the Bay of Chaleurs and other waters
claimed to be exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of the
maritime provinces. The imperial government generally sustained the
contention of the provinces--a contention practically supported by the
American authorities in the case of Delaware, Chesapeake, and other
bays on the coasts of the United States--that the three mile limit
should be measured from a line drawn from headland to headland of all
bays, harbours, and creeks. In the case of the Bay of Fundy, however,
the imperial government allowed a departure from this general
principle when it was urged by the Washington government that one of
its headlands was in the territory of the United States, and that it
was an arm of the sea rather than a bay. The result was that foreign
fishing vessels were shut out only from the bays on the coasts of Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick within the Bay of Fundy. All these questions
were, however, placed in abeyance, for twelve years, by the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854, which provided that the inhabitants of the United
States could take fish of any kind, except shell fish, on the sea
coasts, and shores, in the bays, harbours, and creeks of any British
province, without any restriction as to distance, and had also
permission to land on these coasts and shores for the purpose of
drying their nets and curing their fish. The same privileges
were extended to British citizens on the eastern sea coasts and
shores of the United States, north of the 36th parallel of north
latitude--privileges of no practical value to the people of British
North America compared with those they gave up in their own prolific
waters. The farmers of the agricultural west accepted with great
satisfaction a treaty which gave their products free access to
their natural market, but the fishermen and seamen of the maritime
provinces, especially of Nova Scotia, were for some time dissatisfied
with provisions which gave away their most valuable fisheries without
adequate compensation, and at the same time refused them the
privilege--a great advantage to a ship-building, ship-owning
province--of the coasting trade of the United States on the same terms
which were allowed to American and British vessels on the coasts of
British North America. On the whole, however, the treaty eventually
proved of benefit to all the provinces at a time when trade required
just such a stimulus as it gave in the markets of the United States.
The aggregate interchange of commodities between the two countries
rose from an annual average of $14,230,763 in the years previous to
1854 to $33,492,754 gold currency, in the first year of its existence;
to $42,944,754 gold currency, in the second year; to $50,339,770 gold
currency in the third year; and to no less a sum than $84,070,955 at
war prices, in the thirteenth year when it was terminated by the
United States in accordance with the provision, which allowed either
party to bring it to an end after a due notice of twelve months at the
expiration of ten years or of any longer time it might remain in
force. Not only was a large and remunerative trade secured between the
United States and the provinces, but the social and friendly
intercourse of the two countries necessarily increased with the
expansion of commercial relations and the creation of common interests
between them. Old antipathies and misunderstandings disappeared under
the influence of conditions which brought these communities together
and made each of them place a higher estimate on the other's good
qualities. In short, the treaty in all respects fully realized the
expectations of Lord Elgin in working so earnestly to bring it to a
successful conclusion.
However, it pleased the politicians of the United States, in a moment
of temper, to repeal a treaty which, during its existence, gave a
balance in favour of the commercial and industrial interests of the
republic, to the value of over $95,000,000 without taking into account
the value of the provincial fisheries from which the fishermen of New
England annually derived so large a profit. Temper, no doubt, had much
to do with the action of the United States government at a time when
it was irritated by the sympathy extended to the Confederate States by
many persons in the provinces as well as in Great Britain--notably by
Mr. Gladstone himself. No doubt it was thought that the repeal of the
treaty would be a sort of punishment to the people of British North
America. It was even felt--as much was actually said in congress--that
the result of the sudden repeal of the treaty would be the growth of
discontent among those classes in Canada who had begun to depend upon
its continuance, and that sooner or later there would arise a cry for
annexation with a country from which they could derive such large
commercial advantages. Canadians now know that the results have been
very different from those anticipated by statesmen and journalists on
the other side of the border. Instead of starving Canada and forcing
her into annexation, they have, by the repeal of the Reciprocity
Treaty, and by their commercial policy ever since, materially helped
to stimulate her self-reliance, increase her commerce with other
countries, and make her largely a self-sustaining, independent
country. Canadians depend on themselves--on a self-reliant,
enterprising policy of trade--not on the favour or caprice of any
particular nation. They are always quite prepared to have the most
liberal commercial relations with the United States, but at the same
time feel that a reciprocity treaty is no longer absolutely essential
to their prosperity, and cannot under any circumstances have any
particular effect on the political destiny of the Canadian
confederation whose strength and unity are at length so well assured.