POLITICAL CONDITION IN CANADA
To understand clearly the political state of Canada at the time Lord
Elgin was appointed governor-general, it is necessary to go back for a
number of years. The unfortunate rebellions which were precipitated by
Louis Joseph Papineau and William Lyon Mackenzie during 1837 in the
two Canadas were the results of racial and political difficulties
which had gradually arisen since the organization of the two provinces
of Upper and Lower Canada under the Constitutional Act of 1791. In the
French section, the French and English Canadians--the latter always an
insignificant minority as respects number--had in the course of time
formed distinct parties. As in the courts of law and in the
legislature, so it was in social and everyday life, the French
Canadian was in direct antagonism to the English Canadian. Many
members of the official and governing class, composed almost
exclusively of English, were still too ready to consider French
Canadians as inferior beings, and not entitled to the same rights and
privileges in the government of the country. It was a time of passion
and declamation, when men of fervent eloquence, like Papineau, might
have aroused the French as one man, and brought about a general
rebellion had they not been ultimately thwarted by the efforts of the
moderate leaders of public opinion, especially of the priests who, in
all national crises in Canada, have happily intervened on the side of
reason and moderation, and in the interests of British connection,
which they have always felt to be favourable to the continuance and
security of their religious institutions. Lord Durham, in his
memorable report on the condition of Canada, has summed up very
expressively the nature of the conflict in the French province. "I
expected," he said, "to find a contest between a government and a
people; I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state; I
found a struggle, not of principles, but of races."
While racial antagonisms intensified the difficulties in French
Canada, there existed in all the provinces political conditions which
arose from the imperfect nature of the constitutional system conceded
by England in 1791, and which kept the country in a constant ferment.
It was a mockery to tell British subjects conversant with British
institutions, as Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe told the Upper Canadians
in 1792, that their new system of government was "an image and
transcript of the British constitution." While it gave to the people
representative institutions, it left out the very principle which was
necessary to make them work harmoniously--a government responsible to
the legislature, and to the people in the last resort, for the conduct
of legislation and the administration of affairs. In consequence of
the absence of this vital principle, the machinery of government
became clogged, and political strife convulsed the country from one
end to the other. An "irrepressible conflict" arose between the
government and the governed classes, especially in Lower Canada. The
people who in the days of the French régime were without influence and
power, had gained under their new system, defective as it was in
essential respects, an insight into the operation of representative
government, as understood in England. They found they were governed,
not by men responsible to the legislature and the people, but by
governors and officials who controlled both the executive and
legislative councils. If there had always been wise and patient
governors at the head of affairs, or if the imperial authorities could
always have been made aware of the importance of the grievances laid
before them, or had understood their exact character, the differences
between the government and the majority of the people's
representatives might have been arranged satisfactorily. But,
unhappily, military governors like Sir James Craig only aggravated the
dangers of the situation, and gave demagogues new opportunities for
exciting the people. The imperial authorities, as a rule, were
sincerely desirous of meeting the wishes of the people in a reasonable
and fair spirit, but unfortunately for the country, they were too
often ill-advised and ill-informed in those days of slow
communication, and the fire of public discontent was allowed to
smoulder until it burst forth in a dangerous form.
In all the provinces, but especially in Lower Canada, the people saw
their representatives practically ignored by the governing body, their
money expended without the authority of the legislature, and the
country governed by irresponsible officials. A system which gave
little or no weight to public opinion as represented in the House of
Assembly, was necessarily imperfect and unstable, and the natural
result was a deadlock between the legislative council, controlled by
the official and governing class, and the house elected by the people.
The governors necessarily took the side of the men whom they had
themselves appointed, and with whom they were acting. In the maritime
provinces in the course of time, the governors made an attempt now and
then to conciliate the popular element by bringing in men who had
influence in the assembly, but this was a matter entirely within their
own discretion. The system of government as a whole was worked in
direct contravention of the principle of responsibility to the
majority in the popular house. Political agitators had abundant
opportunities for exciting popular passion. In Lower Canada, Papineau,
an eloquent but impulsive man, having rather the qualities of an
agitator than those of a statesman, led the majority of his
compatriots.
For years he contended for a legislative council elected by the
people: and it is curious to note that none of the men who were at the
head of the popular party in Lower Canada ever recognized the fact, as
did their contemporaries in Upper Canada, that the difficulty would be
best solved, not by electing an upper house, but by obtaining an
executive which would only hold office while supported by a majority
of the representatives in the people's house. In Upper Canada the
radical section of the Liberal party was led by Mr. William Lyon
Mackenzie, who fought vigorously against what was generally known as
the "Family Compact," which occupied all the public offices and
controlled the government.
In the two provinces these two men at last precipitated a rebellion,
in which blood was shed and much property destroyed, but which never
reached any very extensive proportions. In the maritime provinces,
however, where the public grievances were of less magnitude, the
people showed no sympathy whatever with the rebellious elements of the
upper provinces.
Amid the gloom that overhung Canada in those times there was one gleam
of sunshine for England. Although discontent and dissatisfaction
prevailed among the people on account of the manner in which the
government was administered, and of the attempts of the minority to
engross all power and influence, there was still a sentiment in favour
of British connection, and the annexationists were relatively few in
number. Even Sir Francis Bond Head--in no respect a man of
sagacity--understood this well when he depended on the militia to
crush the outbreak in the upper province; and Joseph Howe, the eminent
leader of the popular party, uniformly asserted that the people of
Nova Scotia were determined to preserve the integrity of the empire at
all hazards. As a matter of fact, the majority of leading men, outside
of the minority led by Papineau, Nelson and Mackenzie, had a
conviction that England was animated by a desire to act considerately
with the provinces and that little good would come from precipitating
a conflict which could only add to the public misfortunes, and that
the true remedy was to be found in constitutional methods of redress
for the political grievances which undoubtedly existed throughout
British North America.
The most important clauses of the Union Act, which was passed by the
imperial parliament in 1840 but did not come into effect until
February of the following year, made provision for a legislative
assembly in which each section of the united provinces was represented
by an equal number of members--forty-two for each and eighty-four for
both; for the use of the English language alone in the written or
printed proceedings of the legislature; for the placing of the public
indebtedness of the two provinces at the union as a first charge on
the revenues of the united provinces; for a two-thirds vote of the
members of each House before any change could be made in the
representation. These enactments, excepting the last which proved
eventually to be in their interest, were resented by the French
Canadians as clearly intended to place them in a position of
inferiority to the English Canadians. Indeed it was with natural
indignation they read that portion of Lord Durham's report which
expressed the opinion that it was necessary to unite the two races on
terms which would give the domination to the English. "Without
effecting the change so rapidly or so roughly," he wrote, "as to shock
the feelings or to trample on the welfare of the existing generation,
it must henceforth be the first and steady purpose of the British
government to establish an English population, with English laws and
language, in this province, and to trust its government to none but a
decidedly English legislature."
French Canadians dwelt with emphasis on the feet that their province
had a population of 630,000 souls, or 160,000 more than Upper Canada,
and nevertheless received only the same number of representatives.
French Canada had been quite free from the financial embarrassment
which had brought Upper Canada to the verge of bankruptcy before the
union; in fact the former had actually a considerable surplus when its
old constitution was revoked on the outbreak of the rebellion. It was,
consequently, with some reason, considered an act of injustice to make
the people of French Canada pay the debts of a province whose revenue
had not for years met its liabilities. Then, to add to these decided
grievances, there was a proscription of the French language, which was
naturally resented as a flagrant insult to the race which first
settled the valley of the St. Lawrence, and as the first blow levelled
against the special institutions so dear to French Canadians and
guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris and the Quebec Act. Mr. LaFontaine,
whose name will frequently occur in the following chapters of this
book, declared, when he presented himself at the first election under
the Union Act, that "it was an act of injustice and despotism"; but,
as we shall soon see, he became a prime minister under the very act he
first condemned. Like the majority of his compatriots, he eventually
found in its provisions protection for the rights of the people, and
became perfectly satisfied with a system of government which enabled
them to obtain their proper position in the public councils and
restore their language to its legitimate place in the legislature.
But without the complete grant of responsible government it would
never have been possible to give to French Canadians their legitimate
influence in the administration and legislation of the country, or to
reconcile the differences which had grown up between the two
nationalities before the union and seemed likely to be perpetuated by
the conditions of the Union Act just stated. Lord Durham touched the
weakest spot in the old constitutional system of the Canadian
provinces when he said that it was not "possible to secure harmony in
any other way than by administering the government on those principles
which have been found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain." He
would not "impair a single prerogative of the crown"; on the contrary
he believed "that the interests of the people of these provinces
require the protection of prerogatives which have not hitherto been
exercised." But he recognized the fact as a constitutional statesman
that "the crown must, on the other hand, submit to the necessary
consequences of representative institutions; and if it has to carry on
the government in unison with a representative body, it must consent
to carry it on by means of those in whom that representative body has
confidence." He found it impossible "to understand how any English
statesman could have ever imagined that representative and
irresponsible government could be successfully combined." To suppose
that such a system would work well there "implied a belief that French
Canadians have enjoyed representative institutions for half a century
without acquiring any of the characteristics of a free people; that
Englishmen renounce every political opinion and feeling when they
enter a colony, or that the spirit of Anglo-Saxon freedom is utterly
changed and weakened among those who are transplanted across the
Atlantic."
No one who studies carefully the history of responsible government
from the appearance of Lord Durham's report and Lord John Russell's
despatches of 1839 until the coming of Lord Elgin to Canada in 1847,
can fail to see that there was always a doubt in the minds of the
imperial authorities--a doubt more than once actually expressed in the
instructions to the governors--whether it was possible to work the new
system on the basis of a governor directly responsible to the parent
state and at the same time acting under the advice of ministers
directly responsible to the colonial parliament. Lord John Russell had
been compelled to recognize the fact that it was not possible to
govern Canada by the old methods of administration--that it was
necessary to adopt a new colonial policy which would give a larger
measure of political freedom to the people and ensure greater harmony
between the executive government and the popular assemblies. Mr.
Poulett Thomson, afterwards Lord Sydenham, was appointed
governor-general with the definite objects of completing the union of
the Canadas and inaugurating a more liberal system of colonial
administration. As he informed the legislature of Upper Canada
immediately after his arrival, in his anxiety to obtain its consent to
the union, he had received "Her Majesty's commands to administer the
government of these provinces in accordance with the well understood
wishes and interests of the people." When the legislature of the
united provinces met for the first time, he communicated two
despatches in which the colonial secretary stated emphatically that,
"Her Majesty had no desire to maintain any system or policy among her
North American subjects which opinion condemns," and that there was
"no surer way of gaining the approbation of the Queen than by
maintaining the harmony of the executive with the legislative
authorities." The governor-general was instructed, in order "to
maintain the utmost possible harmony," to call to his councils and to
employ in the public service "those persons who, by their position and
character, have obtained the general confidence and esteem of the
inhabitants of the province." He wished it to be generally made known
by the governor-general that thereafter certain heads of departments
would be called upon "to retire from the public service as often as
any sufficient motives of public policy might suggest the expediency
of that measure." It appears, however, that there was always a
reservation in the minds of the colonial secretary and of governors
who preceded Lord Elgin as to the meaning of responsible government
and the methods of carrying it out in a colony dependent on the crown.
Lord Sydenham himself believed that the council should be one "for the
governor to consult and no more"; that the governor could "not be
responsible to the government at home and also to the legislature of
the province," for if it were so "then all colonial government becomes
impossible." The governor, in his opinion, "must therefore be the
minister [i.e., the colonial secretary], in which case he cannot be
under control of men in the colony." But it was soon made clear to so
astute a politician as Lord Sydenham that, whatever were his own views
as to the meaning that should be attached to responsible government,
he must yield as far as possible to the strong sentiment which
prevailed in the country in favour of making the ministry dependent on
the legislature for its continuance in office. The resolutions passed
by the legislature in support of responsible government were
understood to have his approval. They differed very little in
words--in essential principle not at all--from those first introduced
by Mr. Baldwin. The inference to be drawn from the political situation
of that time is that the governor's friends in the council thought it
advisable to gain all possible credit with the public in connection
with the all-absorbing question of the day, and accordingly brought in
the following resolutions in amendment to those presented by the
Liberal chief:--
"1. That the head of the executive government of the
province, being within the limits of his government the
representative of the sovereign, is responsible to the
imperial authority alone, but that nevertheless the
management of our local affairs can only be conducted by him
with the assistance, counsel, and information of subordinate
officers in the province.
"2. That in order to preserve between the different branches
of the provincial parliament that harmony which is essential
to the peace, welfare, and good government of the province,
the chief advisers of the representative of the sovereign,
constituting a provincial administration under him, ought to
be men possessed of the confidence of the representatives of
the people; thus affording a guarantee that the
well-understood wishes and interests of the people--which
our gracious sovereign has declared shall be the rule of the
provincial government--will on all occasions be faithfully
represented and advocated.
"3. That the people of this province have, moreover, the
right to expect from such provincial administration the
exercise of their best endeavours, that the imperial
authority, within its constitutional limits, shall be
exercised in the manner most consistent with their
well-understood wishes and interests."
It is quite possible that had Lord Sydenham lived to complete his term
of office, the serious difficulties that afterwards arose in the
practice of responsible government would not have occurred. Gifted
with a clear insight into political conditions and a thorough
knowledge of the working of representative institutions, he would have
understood that if parliamentary government was ever to be introduced
into the colony it must be not in a half-hearted way, or with such
reservations as he had had in his mind when he first came to the
province. Amid the regret of all parties he died from the effects of a
fall from his horse a few months after the inauguration of the union,
and was succeeded by Sir Charles Bagot, who distinguished himself in a
short administration of two years by the conciliatory spirit which he
showed to the French Canadians, even at the risk of offending the
ultra loyalists who seemed to think, for some years after the union,
that they alone were entitled to govern the dependency.
The first ministry after that change was composed of Conservatives and
moderate Liberals, but it was soon entirely controlled by the former,
and never had the confidence of Mr. Baldwin. That eminent statesman
had been a member of this administration at the time of the union, but
he resigned on the ground that it ought to be reconstructed if it was
to represent the true sentiment of the country at large. When Sir
Charles Bagot became governor the Conservatives were very sanguine
that they would soon obtain exclusive control of the government, as he
was known to be a supporter of the Conservative party in England. It
was not long, however, before it was evident that his administration
would be conducted, not in the interests of any set of politicians,
but on principles of compromise and justice to all political parties,
and, above all, with the hope of conciliating the French Canadians and
bringing them into harmony with the new conditions. One of his first
acts was the appointment of an eminent French Canadian, M. Vallières
de Saint-Réal, to the chief-justiceship of Montreal. Other
appointments of able French Canadians to prominent public positions
evoked the ire of the Tories, then led by the Sherwoods and Sir Allan
MacNab, who had taken a conspicuous part in putting down the rebellion
of 1837-8. Sir Charles Bagot, however, persevered in his policy of
attempting to stifle racial prejudices and to work out the principles
of responsible government on broad national lines. He appointed an
able Liberal and master of finance, Mr. Francis Hincks, to the
position of inspector-general with a seat in the cabinet. The
influence of the French Canadians in parliament was now steadily
increasing, and even strong Conservatives like Mr. Draper were forced
to acknowledge that it was not possible to govern the province
on the principle that they were an inferior and subject people,
whose representatives could not be safely entrusted with any
responsibilities as ministers of the crown. Negotiations for the
entrance of prominent French Canadians in opposition to the government
went on without result for some time, but they were at last
successful, and the first LaFontaine-Baldwin cabinet came into
existence in 1842, largely through the instrumentality of Sir Charles
Bagot. Mr. Baldwin was a statesman whose greatest desire was the
success of responsible government without a single reservation. Mr.
LaFontaine was a French Canadian who had wisely recognized the
necessity of accepting the union he had at first opposed, and of
making responsible government an instrument for the advancement of the
interests of his compatriots and of bringing them into unison with all
nationalities for the promotion of the common good. The other
prominent French Canadian in the ministry was Mr. A.N. Morin, who
possessed the confidence and respect of his people, but was wanting in
the energy and ability to initiate and press public measures which his
leader possessed.
The new administration had not been long in office when the
governor-general fell a victim to an attack of dropsy, complicated by
heart disease, and was succeeded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had held
prominent official positions in India, and was governor of Jamaica
previous to Lord Elgin's appointment. No one who has studied his
character can doubt the honesty of his motives or his amiable
qualities, but his political education in India and Jamaica rendered
him in many ways incapable of understanding the political conditions
of a country like Canada, where the people were determined to work out
the system of parliamentary government on strictly British principles.
He could have obtained little assistance from British statesmen had he
been desirous of mastering and applying the principles of responsible
government to the dependency. Their opinions and instructions were
still distinguished by a perplexing vagueness. They would not believe
that a governor of a dependency could occupy exactly the same relation
with respect to his responsible advisers and to political parties as
is occupied with such admirable results by the sovereign of England.
It was considered necessary that a governor should make himself as
powerful a factor as possible in the administration of public
affairs--that he should be practically the prime minister,
responsible, not directly to the colonial legislature, but to the
imperial government, whose servant he was and to whom he should
constantly refer for advice and assistance whenever in his opinion the
occasion arose. In other words it was almost impossible to remove from
the mind of any British statesman, certainly not from the colonial
office of those days, the idea that parliamentary government meant one
thing in England and the reverse in the colonies, that Englishmen at
home could be entrusted with a responsibility which it was inexpedient
to allow to Englishmen or Frenchmen across the sea. The colonial
office was still reluctant to give up complete control of the local
administration of the province, and wished to retain a veto by means
of the governor, who considered official favour more desirable than
the approval of any colonial legislature. More or less imbued with
such views, Sir Charles Metcalfe was bound to come into conflict with
LaFontaine and Baldwin, who had studied deeply the principles and
practice of parliamentary government, and knew perfectly well that
they could be carried out only by following the precedents established
in the parent state.
It was not long before the rupture came between men holding views so
diametrically opposed to each other with respect to the conduct of
government. The governor-general decided not to distribute the
patronage of the crown under the advice of his responsible ministry,
as was, of necessity, the constitutional practice in England, but to
ignore the latter, as he boldly declared, whenever he deemed it
expedient. "I wish," he wrote to the colonial secretary, "to make the
patronage of the government conducive to the conciliation of all
parties by bringing into the public service men of the greatest merit
and efficiency without any party distinction." These were noble
sentiments, sound in theory, but entirely incompatible with the
operation of responsible government. If patronage is to be properly
exercised in the interests of the people at large, it must be done by
men who are directly responsible to the representatives of the people.
If a governor-general is to make appointments without reference to his
advisers, he must be more or less subject to party criticism, without
having the advantage of defending himself in the legislature, or of
having men duly authorized by constitutional usage to do so. The
revival of that personal government which had evoked so much political
rancour, and brought governors into the arena of party strife before
the rebellion, was the natural result of the obstinate and
unconstitutional attitude assumed by Lord Metcalfe with respect to
appointments to office and other matters of administration.
All the members of the LaFontaine-Baldwin government, with the
exception of Mr. Dominick Daly, resigned in consequence of the
governor's action. Mr. Daly had no special party proclivities, and
found it to his personal interests to remain his Excellency's sole
adviser. Practically the province was without an administration for
many months, and when, at last, the governor-general was forced by
public opinion to show a measure of respect for constitutional methods
of government, he succeeded after most strenuous efforts in forming a
Conservative cabinet, in which Mr. Draper was the only man of
conspicuous ability. The French Canadians were represented by Mr.
Viger and Mr. Denis B. Papineau, a brother of the famous rebel,
neither of whom had any real influence or strength in Lower Canada,
where the people recognized LaFontaine as their true leader and ablest
public man. In the general election which soon followed the
reconstruction of the government, it was sustained by a small
majority, won only by the most unblushing bribery, by bitter appeals
to national passion, and by the personal influence of the
governor-general, as was the election which immediately preceded the
rising in Upper Canada. In later years, Lord Grey[4] remarked that
this success was "dearly purchased, by the circumstance that the
parliamentary opposition was no longer directed against the advisers
of the governor but against the governor himself, and the British
government, of which he was the organ." The majority of the government
was obtained from Upper Canada, where a large body of people were
misled by appeals made to their loyalty and attachment to the crown,
and where a large number of Methodists were influenced by the
extraordinary action of the Rev. Egerton Ryerson, a son of a United
Empire Loyalist, who defended the position of the governor-general,
and showed how imperfectly he understood the principles and practice
of responsible government. In a life of Sir Charles Metcalfe,[5] which
appeared shortly after his death, it is stated that the
governor-general "could not disguise from himself that the government
was not strong, that it was continually on the brink of defeat, and
that it was only enabled to hold its position by resorting to shifts
and expedients, or what are called tactics, which in his inmost soul
Lord Metcalfe abhorred."
The action of the British ministry during this crisis in Canadian
affairs proved quite conclusively that it was not yet prepared to
concede responsible government in its fullest sense. Both Lord
Stanley, then secretary of state for the colonies, and Lord John
Russell, who had held the same office in a Whig administration,
endorsed the action of the governor-general, who was raised to the
peerage under the title of Baron Metcalfe of Fernhill, in the county
of Berks. Earthly honours were now of little avail to the new peer. He
had been a martyr for years to a cancer in the face, and when it
assumed a most dangerous form he went back to England and died soon
after his return. So strong was the feeling against him among a large
body of the people, especially in French Canada, that he was bitterly
assailed until the hour when he left, a dying man. Personally he was
generous and charitable to a fault, but he should never have been sent
to a colony at a crisis when the call was for a man versed in the
practice of parliamentary government, and able to sympathize with the
aspirations of a people determined to enjoy political freedom in
accordance with the principles of the parliamentary institutions of
England. With a remarkable ignorance of the political conditions of
the province--too often shown by British statesmen in those days--so
great a historian and parliamentarian as Lord Macaulay actually wrote
on a tablet to Lord Metcalfe's memory:--"In Canada, not yet recovered
from the calamities of civil war, he reconciled contending factions to
each other and to the mother country." The truth is, as written by Sir
Francis Hincks[6] fifty years later, "he embittered the party feeling
that had been considerably assuaged by Sir Charles Bagot."
Lord Metcalfe was succeeded by Lord Cathcart, a military man, who was
chosen because of the threatening aspect of the relations between
England and the United States on the question of the Oregon boundary.
During his short term of office he did not directly interfere in
politics, but carefully studied the defence of the country and quietly
made preparations for a rupture with the neighbouring republic. The
result of his judicious action was the disappearance of much of the
political bitterness which had existed during Lord Metcalfe's
administration. The country, indeed, had to face issues of vital
importance to its material progress. Industry and commerce were
seriously affected by the adoption of free trade in England, and the
consequent removal of duties which had given a preference in the
British markets to Canadian wheat, flour, and other commodities. The
effect upon the trade of the province would not have been so serious
had England at this time repealed the old navigation laws which closed
the St. Lawrence to foreign shipping and prevented the extension of
commerce to other markets. Such a course might have immediately
compensated Canadians for the loss of those of the motherland. The
anxiety that was generally felt by Canadians on the reversal of the
British commercial policy under which they had been able to build up a
very profitable trade, was shown in the language of a very largely
signed address from the assembly to the Queen. "We cannot but fear,"
it was stated in this document, "that the abandonment of the
protective principle, the very basis of the colonial commercial
system, is not only calculated to retard the agricultural improvement
of the country and check its hitherto rising prosperity, but seriously
to impair our ability to purchase the manufactured goods of Great
Britain--a result alike prejudicial to this country and the parent
state." But this appeal to the selfishness of British manufacturers
had no influence on British statesmen so far as their fiscal policy
was concerned. But while they were not prepared to depart in any
measure from the principles of free trade and give the colonies a
preference in British markets over foreign countries, they became
conscious that the time had come for removing, as far as possible, all
causes of public discontent in the provinces, at this critical period
of commercial depression. British statesmen had suddenly awakened to
the mistakes of Lord Metcalfe's administration of Canadian affairs,
and decided to pursue a policy towards Canada which would restore
confidence in the good faith and justice of the imperial government.
"The Queen's representative"--this is a citation from a London
paper[7] supporting the Whig government--"should not assume that he
degrades the crown by following in a colony with a constitutional
government the example of the crown at home. Responsible government
has been conceded to Canada, and should be attended in its workings
with all the consequences of responsible government in the mother
country. What the Queen cannot do in England the governor-general
should not be permitted to do in Canada. In making imperial
appointments she is bound to consult her cabinet; in making provincial
appointments the governor-general should be bound to do the same."
The Oregon dispute had been settled, like the question of the Maine
boundary, without any regard to British interests in America, and it
was now deemed expedient to replace Lord Cathcart by a civil governor,
who would be able to carry out, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, the
new policy of the colonial office, and strengthen the ties between the
province and the parent state.
As I have previously stated, Lord John Russell's ministry made a wise
choice in the person of Lord Elgin. In the following pages I shall
endeavour to show how fully were realized the high expectations of
those British statesmen who sent him across the Atlantic at this
critical epoch in the political and industrial conditions of the
Canadian dependency.