What, indeed, could the unification of physics be? The inspiring idea of

that science was to isolate, within the universe, systems of material

points such that, the position of each of these points being known at a

given moment, we could then calculate it for any moment whatever. As,

moreover, the systems thus defined were the only ones on which the new

science had hold, and as it could not be known beforehand whether a

system satisfied or did not satisfy the desired condition, it was useful

to proceed always and everywhere _as if_ the condition was realized.

There was in this a methodological rule, a very natural rule--so

natural, indeed, that it was not even necessary to formulate it. For

simple common sense tells us that when we are possessed of an effective

instrument of research, and are ignorant of the limits of its

applicability, we should act as if its applicability were unlimited;

there will always be time to abate it. But the temptation must have been

great for the philosopher to hypostatize this hope, or rather this

impetus, of the new science, and to convert a general rule of method

into a fundamental law of things. So he transported himself at once to

the limit; he supposed physics to have become complete and to embrace

the whole of the sensible world. The universe became a system of points,

the position of which was rigorously determined at each instant by

relation to the preceding instant and theoretically calculable for any

moment whatever. The result, in short, was universal mechanism. But it

was not enough to formulate this mechanism; what was required was to

found it, to give the reason for it and prove its necessity. And the

essential affirmation of mechanism being that of a reciprocal

mathematical dependence of all the points of the universe, as also of

all the moments of the universe, the reason of mechanism had to be

discovered in the unity of a principle into which could be contracted

all that is juxtaposed in space and successive in time. Hence, the whole

of the real was supposed to be given at once. The reciprocal

determination of the juxtaposed appearances in space was explained by

the indivisibility of true being, and the inflexible determinism of

successive phenomena in time simply expressed that the whole of being is

given in the eternal.

The new philosophy was going, then, to be a recommencement, or rather a

transposition, of the old. The ancient philosophy had taken each of the

_concepts_ into which a becoming is concentrated or which mark its

apogee: it supposed them all known, and gathered them up into a single

concept, form of forms, idea of ideas, like the God of Aristotle. The

new philosophy was going to take each of the _laws_ which condition a

becoming in relation to others and which are as the permanent substratum

of phenomena: it would suppose them all known, and would gather them up

into a unity which also would express them eminently, but which, like

the God of Aristotle and for the same reasons, must remain immutably

shut up in itself.

True, this return to the ancient philosophy was not without great

difficulties. When a Plato, an Aristotle, or a Plotinus melt all the

concepts of their science into a single one, in so doing they embrace

the whole of the real, for concepts are supposed to represent the things

themselves, and to possess at least as much positive content. But a law,

in general, expresses only a relation, and physical laws in particular

express only _quantitative_ relations between concrete things. So that

if a modern philosopher works with the laws of the new science as the

Greek philosopher did with the concepts of the ancient science, if he

makes all the conclusions of a physics supposed omniscient converge on a

single point, he neglects what is concrete in the phenomena--the

qualities perceived, the perceptions themselves. His synthesis

comprises, it seems, only a fraction of reality. In fact, the first

result of the new science was to cut the real into two halves, quantity

and quality, the former being credited to the account of _bodies_ and

the latter to the account of _souls_. The ancients had raised no such

barriers either between quality and quantity or between soul and body.

For them, the mathematical concepts were concepts like the others,

related to the others and fitting quite naturally into the hierarchy of

the Ideas. Neither was the body then defined by geometrical extension,

nor the soul by consciousness. If the [Greek: psychê] of Aristotle, the

entelechy of a living body, is less spiritual than our "soul," it is

because his [Greek: oôma], already impregnated with the Idea, is less

corporeal than our "body." The scission was not yet irremediable between

the two terms. It has become so, and thence a metaphysic that aims at an

abstract unity must resign itself either to comprehend in its synthesis

only one half of the real, or to take advantage of the absolute

heterogeneity of the two halves in order to consider one as a

translation of the other. Different phrases will express different

things if they belong to the same language, that is to say, if there is

a certain relationship of sound between them. But if they belong to two

different languages, they might, just because of their radical diversity

of sound, express the same thing. So of quality and quantity, of soul

and body. It is for having cut all connection between the two terms that

philosophers have been led to establish between them a rigorous

parallelism, of which the ancients had not dreamed, to regard them as

translations and not as inversions of each other; in short, to posit a

fundamental identity as a substratum to their duality. The synthesis to

which they rose thus became capable of embracing everything. A divine

mechanism made the phenomena of thought to correspond to those of

extension, each to each, qualities to quantities, souls to bodies.

It is this parallelism that we find both in Leibniz and in Spinoza--in

different forms, it is true, because of the unequal importance which

they attach to extension. With Spinoza, the two terms Thought and

Extension are placed, in principle at least, in the same rank. They are,

therefore, two translations of one and the same original, or, as Spinoza

says, two attributes of one and the same substance, which we must call

God. And these two translations, as also an infinity of others into

languages which we know not, are called up and even forced into

existence by the original, just as the essence of the circle is

translated automatically, so to speak, both by a figure and by an

equation. For Leibniz, on the contrary, extension is indeed still a

translation, but it is thought that is the original, and thought might

dispense with translation, the translation being made only for us. In

positing God, we necessarily posit also all the possible views of God,

that is to say, the monads. But we can always imagine that a view has

been taken from a point of view, and it is natural for an imperfect mind

like ours to class views, qualitatively different, according to the

order and position of points of view, qualitatively identical, from

which the views might have been taken. In reality the points of view do

not exist, for there are only views, each given in an indivisible block

and representing in its own way the whole of reality, which is God. But

we need to express the plurality of the views, that are _unlike_ each

other, by the multiplicity of the points of view that are _exterior_ to

each other; and we also need to symbolize the more or less close

relationship between the views by the relative situation of the points

of view to one another, their nearness or their distance, that is to

say, by a magnitude. That is what Leibniz means when he says that space

is the order of coexistents, that the perception of extension is a

confused perception (that is to say, a perception relative to an

imperfect mind), and that nothing exists but monads, expressing thereby

that the real Whole has no parts, but is repeated to infinity, each time

integrally (though diversely) within itself, and that all these

repetitions are complementary to each other. In just the same way, the

visible relief of an object is equivalent to the whole set of

stereoscopic views taken of it from all points, so that, instead of

seeing in the relief a juxtaposition of solid parts, we might quite as

well look upon it as made of the _reciprocal complementarity_ of these

whole views, each given in block, each indivisible, each different from

all the others and yet representative of the same thing. The Whole, that

is to say, God, is this very relief for Leibniz, and the monads are

these complementary plane views; for that reason he defines God as "the

substance that has no point of view," or, again, as "the universal

harmony," that is to say, the reciprocal complementarity of monads. In

short, Leibniz differs from Spinoza in this, that he looks upon the

universal mechanism as an aspect which reality takes for us, whereas,

Spinoza makes of it an aspect which reality takes for itself.

It is true that, after having concentrated in God the whole of the real,

it became difficult for them to pass from God to things, from eternity

to time. The difficulty was even much greater for these philosophers

than an Aristotle or a Plotinus. The God of Aristotle, indeed, had been

obtained by the compression and reciprocal compenetration of the Ideas

that represent, in their finished state or in their culminating point,

the changing things of the world. He was, therefore, transcendent to the

world, and the duration of things was juxtaposed to His eternity, of

which it was only a weakening. But in the principle to which we are led

by the consideration of universal mechanism, and which must serve as its

substratum, it is not concepts or _things_, but laws or _relations_ that

are condensed. Now, a relation does not exist separately. A law connects

changing terms and is immanent in what it governs. The principle in

which all these relations are ultimately summed up, and which is the

basis of the unity of nature, cannot, therefore, be transcendent to

sensible reality; it is immanent in it, and we must suppose that it is

at once both in and out of time, gathered up in the unity of its

substance and yet condemned to wind it off in an endless chain. Rather

than formulate so appalling a contradiction, the philosophers were

necessarily led to sacrifice the weaker of the two terms, and to regard

the temporal aspect of things as a mere illusion. Leibniz says so in

explicit terms, for he makes of time, as of space, a confused

perception. While the multiplicity of his monads expresses only the

diversity of views taken of the whole, the history of an isolated monad

seems to be hardly anything else than the manifold views that it can

take of its own substance: so that time would consist in all the points

of view that each monad can assume towards itself, as space consists in

all the points of view that all monads can assume towards God. But the

thought of Spinoza is much less clear, and this philosopher seems to

have sought to establish, between eternity and that which has duration,

the same difference as Aristotle made between essence and accidents: a

most difficult undertaking, for the [Greek: ylê] of Aristotle was no

longer there to measure the distance and explain the passage from the

essential to the accidental, Descartes having eliminated it for ever.

However that may be, the deeper we go into the Spinozistic conception of

the "inadequate," as related to the "adequate," the more we feel

ourselves moving in the direction of Aristotelianism--just as the

Leibnizian monads, in proportion as they mark themselves out the more

clearly, tend to approximate to the Intelligibles of Plotinus.[109] The

natural trend of these two philosophies brings them back to the

conclusions of the ancient philosophy.

To sum up, the resemblances of this new metaphysic to that of the

ancients arise from the fact that both suppose ready-made--the former

above the sensible, the latter within the sensible--a science one and

complete, with which any reality that the sensible may contain is

believed to coincide. _For both, reality as well as truth are integrally

given in eternity._ Both are opposed to the idea of a reality that

creates itself gradually, that is, at bottom, to an absolute duration.

* * * * *

Now, it might easily be shown that the conclusions of this metaphysic,

springing from science, have rebounded upon science itself, as it were,

by ricochet. They penetrate the whole of our so-called empiricism.

Physics and chemistry study only inert matter; biology, when it treats

the living being physically and chemically, considers only the inert

side of the living: hence the mechanistic explanations, in spite of

their development, include only a small part of the real. To suppose _a

priori_ that the whole of the real is resolvable into elements of this

kind, or at least that mechanism can give a complete translation of what

happens in the world, is to pronounce for a certain metaphysic--the very

metaphysic of which Spinoza and Leibniz have laid down the principles

and drawn the consequences. Certainly, the psycho-physiologist who

affirms the exact equivalence of the cerebral and the psychical state,

who imagines the possibility, for some superhuman intellect, of reading

in the brain what is going on in consciousness, believes himself very

far from the metaphysicians of the seventeenth century, and very near to

experience. Yet experience pure and simple tells us nothing of the kind.

It shows us the interdependence of the mental and the physical, the

necessity of a certain cerebral substratum for the psychical

state--nothing more. From the fact that two things are mutually

dependent, it does not follow that they are equivalent. Because a

certain screw is necessary to a certain machine, because the machine

works when the screw is there and stops when the screw is taken away, we

do not say that the screw is the equivalent of the machine. For

correspondence to be equivalence, it would be necessary that to any part

of the machine a definite part of the screw should correspond--as in a

literal translation in which each chapter renders a chapter, each

sentence a sentence, each word a word. Now, the relation of the brain to

consciousness seems to be entirely different. Not only does the

hypothesis of an equivalence between the psychical state and the

cerebral state imply a downright absurdity, as we have tried to prove in

a former essay,[110] but the facts, examined without prejudice,

certainly seem to indicate that the relation of the psychical to the

physical is just that of the machine to the screw. To speak of an

equivalence between the two is simply to curtail, and make almost

unintelligible, the Spinozistic or Leibnizian metaphysic. It is to

accept this philosophy, such as it is, on the side of Extension, but to

mutilate it on the side of Thought. With Spinoza, with Leibniz, we

suppose the unifying synthesis of the phenomena of matter achieved, and

everything in matter explained mechanically. But, for the conscious

facts, we no longer push the synthesis to the end. We stop half-way. We

suppose consciousness to be coextensive with a certain part of nature

and not with all of it. We are thus led, sometimes to an

"epiphenomenalism" that associates consciousness with certain particular

vibrations and puts it here and there in the world in a sporadic state,

and sometimes to a "monism" that scatters consciousness into as many

tiny grains as there are atoms; but, in either case, it is to an

incomplete Spinozism or to an incomplete Leibnizianism that we come

back. Between this conception of nature and Cartesianism we find,

moreover, intermediate historical stages. The medical philosophers of

the eighteenth century, with their cramped Cartesianism, have had a

great part in the genesis of the "epiphenomenalism" and "monism" of the

present day.

* * * * *

These doctrines are thus found to fall short of the Kantian criticism.

Certainly, the philosophy of Kant is also imbued with the belief in a

science single and complete, embracing the whole of the real. Indeed,

looked at from one aspect, it is only a continuation of the metaphysics

of the moderns and a transposition of the ancient metaphysics. Spinoza

and Leibniz had, following Aristotle, hypostatized in God the unity of

knowledge. The Kantian criticism, on one side at least, consists in

asking whether the whole of this hypothesis is necessary to modern

science as it was to ancient science, or if part of the hypothesis is

not sufficient. For the ancients, science applied to _concepts_, that is

to say, to kinds of _things_. In compressing all concepts into one, they

therefore necessarily arrived at a _being_, which we may call Thought,

but which was rather thought-object than thought-subject. When Aristotle

defined God the [Greek: noêseôs noêsis], it is probably on [Greek:

noêseôs], and not on [Greek: noêsis] that he put the emphasis. God was

the synthesis of all concepts, the idea of ideas. But modern science

turns on laws, that is, on relations. Now, a relation is a bond

established by a mind between two or more terms. A relation is nothing

outside of the intellect that relates. The universe, therefore, can only

be a system of laws if phenomena have passed beforehand through the

filter of an intellect. Of course, this intellect might be that of a

being infinitely superior to man, who would found the materiality of

things at the same time that he bound them together: such was the

hypothesis of Leibniz and of Spinoza. But it is not necessary to go so

far, and, for the effect we have here to obtain, the human intellect is

enough: such is precisely the Kantian solution. Between the dogmatism of

a Spinoza or a Leibniz and the criticism of Kant there is just the same

distance as between "it may be maintained that--" and "it suffices

that--." Kant stops this dogmatism on the incline that was making it

slip too far toward the Greek metaphysics; he reduces to the strict

minimum the hypothesis which is necessary in order to suppose the

physics of Galileo indefinitely extensible. True, when he speaks of the

human intellect, he means neither yours nor mine: the unity of nature

comes indeed from the human understanding that unifies, but the unifying

function that operates here is impersonal. It imparts itself to our

individual consciousnesses, but it transcends them. It is much less than

a substantial God; it is, however, a little more than the isolated work

of a man or even than the collective work of humanity. It does not

exactly lie within man; rather, man lies within it, as in an atmosphere

of intellectuality which his consciousness breathes. It is, if we will,

a _formal_ God, something that in Kant is not yet divine, but which

tends to become so. It became so, indeed, with Fichte. With Kant,

however, its principal rôle was to give to the whole of our science a

relative and _human_ character, although of a humanity already somewhat

deified. From this point of view, the criticism of Kant consisted

chiefly in limiting the dogmatism of his predecessors, accepting their

conception of science and reducing to a minimum the metaphysic it

implied.

But it is otherwise with the Kantian distinction between the matter of

knowledge and its form. By regarding intelligence as pre-eminently a

faculty of establishing relations, Kant attributed an extra-intellectual

origin to the terms between which the relations are established. He

affirmed, against his immediate predecessors, that knowledge is not

entirely resolvable into terms of intelligence. He brought back into

philosophy--while modifying it and carrying it on to another plane--that

essential element of the philosophy of Descartes which had been abandoned

by the Cartesians.

Thereby he prepared the way for a new philosophy, which might have

established itself in the extra-intellectual matter of knowledge by a

higher effort of intuition. Coinciding with this matter, adopting the

same rhythm and the same movement, might not consciousness, by two

efforts of opposite direction, raising itself and lowering itself by

turns, become able to grasp from within, and no longer perceive only

from without, the two forms of reality, body and mind? Would not this

twofold effort make us, as far as that is possible, re-live the

absolute? Moreover, as, in the course of this operation, we should see

intellect spring up of itself, cut itself out in the whole of mind,

intellectual knowledge would then appear as it is, limited, but not

relative.

Such was the direction that Kantianism might have pointed out to a

revivified Cartesianism. But in this direction Kant himself did not go.

He _would_ not, because, while assigning to knowledge an

extra-intellectual matter, he believed this matter to be either

coextensive with intellect or less extensive than intellect. Therefore

he could not dream of cutting out intellect in it, nor, consequently, of

tracing the genesis of the understanding and its categories. The molds

of the understanding and the understanding itself had to be accepted as

they are, already made. Between the matter presented to our intellect

and this intellect itself there was no relationship. The agreement

between the two was due to the fact that intellect imposed its form on

matter. So that not only was it necessary to posit the intellectual form

of knowledge as a kind of absolute and give up the quest of its genesis,

but the very matter of this knowledge seemed too ground down by the

intellect for us to be able to hope to get it back in its original

purity. It was not the "thing-in-itself," it was only the refraction of

it through our atmosphere.

If now we inquire why Kant did not believe that the matter of our

knowledge extends beyond its form, this is what we find. The criticism

of our knowledge of nature that was instituted by Kant consisted in

ascertaining what our mind must be and what Nature must be _if_ the

claims of our science are justified; but of these claims themselves Kant

has not made the criticism. I mean that he took for granted the idea of

a science that is one, capable of binding with the same force all the

parts of what is given, and of coördinating them into a system

presenting on all sides an equal solidity. He did not consider, in his

_Critique of Pure Reason_, that science became less and less objective,

more and more symbolical, to the extent that it went from the physical

to the vital, from the vital to the psychical. Experience does not move,

to his view, in two different and perhaps opposite ways, the one

conformable to the direction of the intellect, the other contrary to it.

There is, for him, only _one_ experience, and the intellect covers its

whole ground. This is what Kant expresses by saying that all our

intuitions are sensuous, or, in other words, infra-intellectual. And

this would have to be admitted, indeed, if our science presented in all

its parts an equal objectivity. But suppose, on the contrary, that

science is less and less objective, more and more symbolical, as it goes

from the physical to the psychical, passing through the vital: then, as

it is indeed necessary to perceive a thing somehow in order to symbolize

it, there would be an intuition of the psychical, and more generally of

the vital, which the intellect would transpose and translate, no doubt,

but which would none the less transcend the intellect. There would be,

in other words, a supra-intellectual intuition. If this intuition exist,

a taking possession of the spirit by itself is possible, and no longer

only a knowledge that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we

have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra-intellectual intuition)

then sensuous intuition is likely to be in continuity with it through

certain intermediaries, as the infra-red is continuous with the

ultra-violet. Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted. It will

no longer attain only the phantom of an unattainable thing-in-itself. It

is (provided we bring to it certain indispensable corrections) into the

absolute itself that it will introduce us. So long as it was regarded as

the only material of our science, it reflected back on all science

something of the relativity which strikes a scientific knowledge of

spirit; and thus the perception of bodies, which is the beginning of the

science of bodies, seemed itself to be relative. Relative, therefore,

seemed to be sensuous intuition. But this is not the case if

distinctions are made between the different sciences, and if the

scientific knowledge of the spiritual (and also, consequently, of the

vital) be regarded as the more or less artificial extension of a certain

manner of knowing which, applied to bodies, is not at all symbolical.

Let us go further: if there are thus two intuitions of different order

(the second being obtained by a reversal of the direction of the first),

and if it is toward the second that the intellect naturally inclines,

there is no essential difference between the intellect and this

intuition itself. The barriers between the matter of sensible knowledge

and its form are lowered, as also between the "pure forms" of

sensibility and the categories of the understanding. The matter and form

of intellectual knowledge (restricted to its own object) are seen to be

engendering each other by a reciprocal adaptation, intellect modeling

itself on corporeity, and corporeity on intellect.

But this duality of intuition Kant neither would nor could admit. It

would have been necessary, in order to admit it, to regard duration as

the very stuff of reality, and consequently to distinguish between the

substantial duration of things and time spread out in space. It would

have been necessary to regard space itself, and the geometry which is

immanent in space, as an ideal limit in the direction of which material

things develop, but which they do not actually attain. Nothing could be

more contrary to the letter, and perhaps also to the spirit, of the

_Critique of Pure Reason_. No doubt, knowledge is presented to us in it

as an ever-open roll, experience as a push of facts that is for ever

going on. But, according to Kant, these facts are spread out on one

plane as fast as they arise; they are external to each other and

external to the mind. Of a knowledge from within, that could grasp them

in their springing forth instead of taking them already sprung, that

would dig beneath space and spatialized time, there is never any

question. Yet it is indeed beneath this plane that our consciousness

places us; there flows true duration.

In this respect, also, Kant is very near his predecessors. Between the

non-temporal, and the time that is spread out in distinct moments, he

admits no mean. And as there is indeed no intuition that carries us into

the non-temporal, all intuition is thus found to be sensuous, by

definition. But between physical existence, which is spread out in

space, and non-temporal existence, which can only be a conceptual and

logical existence like that of which metaphysical dogmatism speaks, is

there not room for consciousness and for life? There is, unquestionably.

We perceive it when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from

that duration to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to

bind them again and to construct duration.

Yet it was to a non-temporal intuition that the immediate successors of

Kant turned, in order to escape from the Kantian relativism. Certainly,

the ideas of becoming, of progress, of evolution, seem to occupy a large

place in their philosophy. But does duration really play a part in it?

Real duration is that in which each form flows out of previous forms,

while adding to them something new, and is explained by them as much as

it explains them; but to deduce this form directly from one complete

Being which it is supposed to manifest, is to return to Spinozism. It

is, like Leibniz and Spinoza, to deny to duration all efficient action.

The post-Kantian philosophy, severe as it may have been on the

mechanistic theories, accepts from mechanism the idea of a science that

is one and the same for all kinds of reality. And it is nearer to

mechanism than it imagines; for though, in the consideration of matter,

of life and of thought, it replaces the successive degrees of

complexity, that mechanism supposed by degrees of the realization of an

Idea or by degrees of the objectification of a Will, it still speaks of

degrees, and these degrees are those of a scale which Being traverses in

a single direction. In short, it makes out the same articulations in

nature that mechanism does. Of mechanism it retains the whole design; it

merely gives it a different coloring. But it is the design itself, or at

least one half of the design, that needs to be re-made.

If we are to do that, we must give up the method of _construction_,

which was that of Kant's successors. We must appeal to experience--an

experience purified, or, in other words, released, where necessary, from

the molds that our intellect has formed in the degree and proportion of

the progress of our action on things. An experience of this kind is not

a non-temporal experience. It only seeks, beyond the spatialized time in

which we believe we see continual rearrangements between the parts, that

concrete duration in which a radical recasting of the whole is always

going on. It follows the real in all its sinuosities. It does not lead

us, like the method of construction, to higher and higher

generalities--piled-up stories of a magnificent building. But then it

leaves no play between the explanations it suggests and the objects it

has to explain. It is the detail of the real, and no longer only the

whole in a lump, that it claims to illumine.

* * * * *

That the thought of the nineteenth century called for a philosophy of

this kind, rescued from the arbitrary, capable of coming down to the

detail of particular facts, is unquestionable. Unquestionably, also, it

felt that this philosophy ought to establish itself in what we call

concrete duration. The advent of the moral sciences, the progress of

psychology, the growing importance of embryology among the biological

sciences--all this was bound to suggest the idea of a reality which

_endures_ inwardly, which is duration itself. So, when a philosopher

arose who announced a doctrine of evolution, in which the progress of

matter toward perceptibility would be traced together with the advance

of the mind toward rationality, in which the complication of

correspondences between the external and the internal would be followed

step by step, in which change would become the very substance of

things--to him all eyes were turned. The powerful attraction that

Spencerian evolutionism has exercised on contemporary thought is due to

that very cause. However far Spencer may seem to be from Kant, however

ignorant, indeed, he may have been of Kantianism, he felt, nevertheless,

at his first contact with the biological sciences, the direction in

which philosophy could continue to advance without laying itself open to

the Kantian criticism.

But he had no sooner started to follow the path than he turned off

short. He had promised to retrace a genesis, and, lo! he was doing

something entirely different. His doctrine bore indeed the name of

evolutionism; it claimed to remount and redescend the course of the

universal becoming; but, in fact, it dealt neither with becoming nor

with evolution.

We need not enter here into a profound examination of this philosophy.

Let us say merely that _the usual device of the Spencerian method

consists in reconstructing evolution with fragments of the evolved_. If

I paste a picture on a card and then cut up the card into bits, I can

reproduce the picture by rightly grouping again the small pieces. And a

child who working thus with the pieces of a puzzle-picture, and putting

together unformed fragments of the picture finally obtains a pretty

colored design, no doubt imagines that he has _produced_ design and

color. Yet the act of drawing and painting has nothing to do with that

of putting together the fragments of a picture already drawn and already

painted. So, by combining together the most simple results of evolution,

you may imitate well or ill the most complex effects; but of neither the

simple nor the complex will you have retraced the genesis, and the

addition of evolved to evolved will bear no resemblance whatever to the

movement of evolution.

Such, however, is Spencer's illusion. He takes reality in its present

form; he breaks it to pieces, he scatters it in fragments which he

throws to the winds; then he "integrates" these fragments and

"dissipates their movement." Having _imitated_ the Whole by a work of

mosaic, he imagines he has retraced the design of it, and made the

genesis.

Is it matter that is in question? The diffused elements which he

integrates into visible and tangible bodies have all the air of being

the very particles of the simple bodies, which he first supposes

disseminated throughout space. They are, at any rate, "material points,"

and consequently unvarying points, veritable little solids: as if

solidity, being what is nearest and handiest to us, could be found at

the very origin of materiality! The more physics progresses, the more it

shows the impossibility of representing the properties of ether or of

electricity--the probable base of all bodies--on the model of the

properties of the matter which we perceive. But philosophy goes back

further even than the ether, a mere schematic figure of the relations

between phenomena apprehended by our senses. It knows indeed that what

is visible and tangible in things represents our possible action on

them. It is not by dividing the evolved that we shall reach the

principle of that which evolves. It is not by recomposing the evolved

with itself that we shall reproduce the evolution of which it is the

term.

Is it the question of mind? By compounding the reflex with the reflex,

Spencer thinks he generates instinct and rational volition one after the

other. He fails to see that the specialized reflex, being a terminal

point of evolution just as much as perfect will, cannot be supposed at

the start. That the first of the two terms should have reached its final

form before the other is probable enough; but both the one and the other

are _deposits_ of the evolution movement, and the evolution movement

itself can no more be expressed as a function solely of the first than

solely of the second. We must begin by mixing the reflex and the

voluntary. We must then go in quest of the fluid reality which has been

precipitated in this twofold form, and which probably shares in both

without being either. At the lowest degree of the animal scale, in

living beings that are but an undifferentiated protoplasmic mass, the

reaction to stimulus does not yet call into play one definite mechanism,

as in the reflex; it has not yet choice among several definite

mechanisms, as in the voluntary act; it is, then, neither voluntary nor

reflex, though it heralds both. We experience in ourselves something of

this true original activity when we perform semi-voluntary and

semi-automatic movements to escape a pressing danger. And yet this is

but a very imperfect imitation of the primitive character, for we are

concerned here with a mixture of two activities already formed, already

localized in a brain and in a spinal cord, whereas the original activity

was a simple thing, which became diversified through the very

construction of mechanisms like those of the spinal cord and brain. But

to all this Spencer shuts his eyes, because it is of the essence of his

method to recompose the consolidated with the consolidated, instead of

going back to the gradual process of consolidation, which is evolution

itself.

Is it, finally, the question of the correspondence between mind and

matter? Spencer is right in defining the intellect by this

correspondence. He is right in regarding it as the end of an evolution.

But when he comes to retrace this evolution, again he integrates the

evolved with the evolved--failing to see that he is thus taking useless

trouble, and that in positing the slightest fragment of the actually

evolved he posits the whole--so that it is vain for him, then, to

pretend to make the genesis of it.

For, according to him, the phenomena that succeed each other in nature

project into the human mind images which represent them. To the

relations between phenomena, therefore, correspond symmetrically

relations between the ideas. And the most general laws of nature, in

which the relations between phenomena are condensed, are thus found to

have engendered the directing principles of thought, into which the

relations between ideas have been integrated. Nature, therefore, is

reflected in mind. The intimate structure of our thought corresponds,

piece by piece, to the very skeleton of things--I admit it willingly;

but, in order that the human mind may be able to represent relations

between phenomena, there must first be phenomena, that is to say,

distinct facts, cut out in the continuity of becoming. And once we posit

this particular mode of cutting up such as we perceive it to-day, we

posit also the intellect such as it is to-day, for it is by relation to

it, and to it alone, that reality is cut up in this manner. Is it

probable that mammals and insects notice the same aspects of nature,

trace in it the same divisions, articulate the whole in the same way?

And yet the insect, so far as intelligent, has already something of our

intellect. Each being cuts up the material world according to the lines

that its action must follow: it is these lines of _possible action_

that, by intercrossing, mark out the net of experience of which each

mesh is a fact. No doubt, a town is composed exclusively of houses, and

the streets of the town are only the intervals between the houses: so,

we may say that nature contains only facts, and that, the facts once

posited, the relations are simply the lines running between the facts.

But, in a town, it is the gradual portioning of the ground into lots

that has determined at once the place of the houses, their general

shape, and the direction of the streets: to this portioning we must go

back if we wish to understand the particular mode of subdivision that

causes each house to be where it is, each street to run as it does.

Now, the cardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already

allotted as given, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment

was worked. I agree that the laws of thought are only the integration of

relations between facts. But, when I posit the facts with the shape they

have for me to-day, I suppose my faculties of perception and

intellection such as they are in me to-day; for it is they that portion

the real into lots, they that cut the facts out in the whole of reality.

Therefore, instead of saying that the relations between facts have

generated the laws of thought, I can as well claim that it is the form

of thought that has determined the shape of the facts perceived, and

consequently their relations among themselves: the two ways of

expressing oneself are equivalent; they say at bottom the same thing.

With the second, it is true, we give up speaking of evolution. But, with

the first, we only speak of it, we do not think of it any the more. For

a true evolutionism would propose to discover by what _modus vivendi_,

gradually obtained, the intellect has adopted its plan of structure, and

matter its mode of subdivision. This structure and this subdivision work

into each other; they are mutually complementary; they must have

progressed one with the other. And, whether we posit the present

structure of mind or the present subdivision of matter, in either case

we remain in the evolved: we are told nothing of what evolves, nothing

of evolution.

And yet it is this evolution that we must discover. Already, in the

field of physics itself, the scientists who are pushing the study of

their science furthest incline to believe that we cannot reason about

the parts as we reason about the whole; that the same principles are not

applicable to the origin and to the end of a progress; that neither

creation nor annihilation, for instance, is inadmissible when we are

concerned with the constituent corpuscles of the atom. Thereby they tend

to place themselves in the concrete duration, in which alone there is

true generation and not only a composition of parts. It is true that the

creation and annihilation of which they speak concern the movement or

the energy, and not the imponderable medium through which the energy and

the movement are supposed to circulate. But what can remain of matter

when you take away everything that determines it, that is to say, just

energy and movement themselves? The philosopher must go further than the

scientist. Making a clean sweep of everything that is only an

imaginative symbol, he will see the material world melt back into a

simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming. And he will thus be

prepared to discover real duration there where it is still more useful

to find it, in the realm of life and of consciousness. For, so far as

inert matter is concerned, we may neglect the flowing without committing

a serious error: matter, we have said, is weighted with geometry; and

matter, the reality which _descends_, endures only by its connection

with that which _ascends_. But life and consciousness are this very

ascension. When once we have grasped them in their essence by adopting

their movement, we understand how the rest of reality is derived from

them. Evolution appears and, within this evolution, the progressive

determination of materiality and intellectuality by the gradual

consolidation of the one and of the other. But, then, it is within the

evolutionary movement that we place ourselves, in order to follow it to

its present results, instead of recomposing these results artificially

with fragments of themselves. Such seems to us to be the true function

of philosophy. So understood, philosophy is not only the turning of the

mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living

principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort: it is

the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and

consequently the true continuation of science--provided that we

understand by this word a set of truths either experienced or

demonstrated, and not a certain new scholasticism that has grown up

during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics of

Galileo, as the old scholasticism grew up around Aristotle.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 96: The part of this chapter which treats of the history of

systems, particularly of the Greek philosophy, is only the very succinct

résumé of views that we developed at length, from 1900 to 1904, in our

lectures at the Collège de France, especially in a course on the

_History of the Idea of Time_ (1902-1903). We then compared the

mechanism of conceptual thought to that of the cinematograph. We believe

the comparison will be useful here.]

[Footnote 97: The analysis of the idea of the nought which we give here

(pp. 275-298) has appeared before in the _Revue philosophique_ (November

1906).]

[Footnote 98: Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_, 2nd edition, p. 737:

"From the point of view of our knowledge in general ... the peculiar

function of negative propositions is simply to prevent error." Cf.

Sigwart, _Logik_, 2nd edition, vol. i. pp. 150 ff.]

[Footnote 99: That is, we do not consider the sophism of Zeno refuted by

the fact that the geometrical progression _a_(1 + 1/_n_ + 1/_n_2 +

1/_n_3 +,... etc.)--in which _a_ designates the initial distance between

Achilles and the tortoise, and _n_ the relation of their respective

velocities--has a finite sum if _n_ is greater than 1. On this point we

may refer to the arguments of F. Evellin, which we regard as conclusive

(see Evellin, _Infini et quantité_, Paris, 1880, pp. 63-97; cf. _Revue

philosophique_, vol. xi., 1881, pp. 564-568). The truth is that

mathematics, as we have tried to show in a former work, deals and can

deal only with lengths. It has therefore had to seek devices, first, to

transfer to the movement, which is not a length, the divisibility of the

line passed over, and then to reconcile with experience the idea

(contrary to experience and full of absurdities) of a movement that is a

length, that is, of a movement _placed upon_ its trajectory and

arbitrarily decomposable like it.]

[Footnote 100: Plato, _Timaeus_, 37 D.]

[Footnote 101: We have tried to bring out what is true and what is false

in this idea, so far as spatiality is concerned (see Chapter III.). It

seems to us radically false as regards _duration_.]

[Footnote 102: Aristotle, _De anima_, 430 a 14 [Greek: kai hestin ho men

toioutos nous tô pynta ginesthai, ho de tô panta poiein, ôs hexis tis,

oion to phôs. tropon gar tina ka to phôs poiei ta dynamei onta chrômata

energeia chrômata].]

[Footnote 103: _De caelo_, ii. 287 a 12 [Greek: tês eschatês periphoras

oute kenon estin exôthen oute topos.] _Phys._ iv. 212 a 34 [Greek: to de

pan esti men hôs kinêsetai hesti d' hôs ou. hôs men gar holon, hama ton

topon hou metaballei. kyklô de kinêsetai, tôn moriôn gar outos ho

topos].]

[Footnote 104: _De caelo_, i. 279 a 12 [Greek: oude chronos hestin hexô

tou ouranou]. _Phys._ viii. 251 b 27 [Greek: ho chronos pathos ti

kinêseôs].]

[Footnote 105: Especially have we left almost entirely on one side those

admirable but somewhat fugitive intuitions that Plotinus was later to

seize, to study and to fix.]

[Footnote 106: See page 10.]

[Footnote 107: Descartes, _Principes_, ii. § 29.]

[Footnote 108: Descartes, _Principes_, ii. §§ 36 ff.]

[Footnote 109: In a course of lectures on Plotinus, given at the Collège

de France in 1897-1898, we tried to bring out these resemblances. They

are numerous and impressive. The analogy is continued even in the

formulae employed on each side.]

[Footnote 110: "Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique" (_Revue de

métaphysique et de morale_, Nov. 1904, pp. 895-908). Cf. _Matière et

mémoire_, Paris, 1896, chap. i.]

INDEX

(Compiled by the Translator)

Abolition of everything a self-contradiction, 280, 283, 296, 298

idea of, 279, 282, 283, 295, 296.

_See_ Nought

Absence of order, 231, 234, 274.

_See_ Disorder

Absolute and freedom, 277

reality, 99, 228-9, 269, 358, 361

reality of the person, 269

time and the, 239, 240, 298, 340, 344

Absoluteness of duration, 206

of understanding, xi, 47, 152, 190, 197, 199

Abstract becoming, 304-7

multiplicity, 257-9

time, 9, 17, 20-2, 37, 39, 46, 51, 163, 318-9, 336, 352-3

Accident and essence in Aristotle's philosophy, 353

in evolution, 86-7, 104, 114-5, 127, 169, 170, 252, 254-5, 266, 267,

326-7

Accidental variations, 55, 63, 68, 69, 74, 85-6, 168

Accumulation of energy, function of vegetable organisms, 253, 255

Achilles and tortoise, in Zeno, 311, 312-3

Acquired characters, inheritance of, 76-9, 83-4, 87, 169, 170, 173, 231

Act, consciousness as inadequacy of, to representation, 144

form (or essence), quality, three classes of representation, 302-3

Action, creativeness of free, 192, 247

and concepts, 160, 297

and consciousness, xiii, 5, 143-4, 145, 179-80, 207, 262

discontinuity of, 154, 307

freedom of, in animals, 130

as function of nervous system, 262-3

indivisibility of, 94, 95, 308-9

and inert matter, 96, 136, 141-2, 156, 187, 198, 226, 366

instinct and, 136, 141

instrument of, consciousness, 180

instrument of, life, 162

instrument of matter, 161, 198-9

as instrument of consciousness, 180

and intellect. _See_ Intellect and action

intensity of consciousness varies with ratio of possible, to real, 145

meaning of, 301-3

moves from want to fulness, 297, 298

organism a machine for, 252, 254, 300

and perception, 5, 11, 12, 93, 188, 189, 206, 227-30, 300, 307, 368

possible, 12, 13, 96, 144, 145, 146-7, 159, 165, 179-81, 188, 264

and science, 93, 195-6, 198-9, 329-30

and space, 203

sphere of the intellect, 155

tension in a free, 200, 207, 238, 240, 301-2

Activity, dissatisfaction the starting-point of, 297

of instinct, continuous with vital process, 139, 140

life as, 128-9, 247

mutually inverse factors in vital, 248

and nervous system, 110, 130, 132-3, 134-5, 180, 252, 261-3

organism as, 174

potential. _See_ Action, possible

tension of free, 200, 202, 207-8, 223-4, 237, 239, 300-1

and torpor in evolution, 109, 111, 113, 114, 119-20, 129-30,

135-6, 181, 292

vital, has evolved divergently, 134

_See_ Divergent lines of evolution

Adaptation, 50-1, 55, 57-8, 59, 70, 101, 129, 133, 192, 255, 270, 305-6

and causation, 102

mutual, between materiality and intellectuality, 187, 206-7

and progress, 101-2

Adequate and inadequate in Spinoza, 353

Adjectives, substantives and verbs, 303-4, 315

Aesthetics and philosophy, 177

Affection, Role of, in the idea of chance, 234

in the idea of nought, 281-3, 289, 293, 295, 296

in negation, 286-7

Affirmation and negation, 285-6, 293

Age and individuality, 15-6

Albuminoid substances, 121-2

Alciope, 96

Alexandrian philosophy, 322, 323

Algae in illustration of probable consciousness in vegetable forms, 112

Alimentation, 113-4, 117, 247

Allegory of the Cave, 191

Alternations of increase and decrease of mutability of the universe, 245-6

Alveolar froth, 33-4

Ambiguity of the idea of "generality" in philosophy, 230-1, 320-1

of primitive organisms, 99, 112, 113, 129-30

Ammophila hirsuta, paralyzing instinct in, 173

Amoeba, in illustration of imitation of the living by the unorganized, 33-6

in illustration of the ambiguity of primitive organisms, 99

in illustration of the mobility characteristic of animals, 108

in illustration of the "explosive" expenditure of energy characteristic

of animals, 120, 253

Anagenesis, 34

Anarchy, idea of, 233, 234.

_See_ Disorder

Anatomy, comparative, and transformism, 25

Ancient philosophy, Achilles and tortoise, 311-2

Alexandrian philosophy, 322-3

Allegory of the Cave, 191

Anima (De), 322 _note_

Apogee of sensible object, 344, 345, 349

Archimedes, 343-4

Aristotle, 135, 174-5, 227-8, 314, 316, 321, 323, 324, 328-33, 347, 349,

353, 356, 370

Arrow of Zeno, 308-13

ascent toward God, in Aristotle, 323

Astronomy, ancient and modern, 334-6

attraction and impulsion in, 323-4

becoming in, 313-4, 317

bow and indivisibility of motion, 308-9

Caelo (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_, 324 _note_

and Cartesian geometry, 334-5

causality in, 323, 325-6

change in, 313-4, 317, 328-9, 342-3

cinematographical nature of, 315

circularity of God's thought, 323-4

concentric spheres, 328

concepts, 326-7, 356

"conversion" and "procession" in, 323

degradation of ideas into sensible flux, 317-8, 321, 323-4, 327, 328,

343-5, 352-3

degrees of reality, 323-4, 327

diminution, derivation of becoming by. _See_ Degradation of Ideas, etc.

duration, 317-9 _note_, 323-4, 327-9

Eleatic philosophy, 308, 314

Enneads of Plotinus, 210 _note_

essence and accident, 354

essence or form, 314-5

eternal, 317-8, 324-6

Eternity, 317-8, 320, 324, 328-9

extension, 210 _note_, 318, 324, 327

form or idea, 314-20, 322, 327, 329-31, 352

geometry, Cartesian, and ancient philosophy, 334

God of Aristotle, 196-7, 322-4, 349, 352, 356

[Greek: hylê], 353

Idea, 314-22, 352-3

and indivisibility of motion, 307-8, 311

intelligible reality in, 326

intelligibles of Plotinus, 353

[Greek: logos], of Plotinus, 210 _note_

matter in Aristotle's philosophy, 316, 327

and modern astronomy, 333-4, 335

and modern geometry, 333-4

and modern philosophy, 226-7, 228-9, 232, 281-2, 344-5, 346, 349-51, 364,

369

and modern science, 329-30, 336, 342-3, 344-5, 357

motion in, 307-8, 312-3

necessity in, 327

[Greek: noêseôs noêsis], 356

non-being, 316, 327

[Greek: nous poiêtikos], 322

oscillation about being, sensible reality as, 317-8

Physics of Aristotle, 227-8 _note_, 324 _note_, 330-1

Plato, 48, 156, 191, 210 _note_, 316-8, 321-4, 327, 330, 348, 349

Plotinus, 210, 316, 323, 326 _note_, 349, 352-4

procession in Alexandrian philosophy, 323

[Greek: psychê], 210 _note_, 350

realism in, 232

refraction of idea through matter or non-being, 317

sectioning of becoming, 318-9

sensible reality, 314, 316-8, 321, 327-9, 352-3

[Greek: sôma], 350

space and time, 317-9, 320

Timaeus, 318 _note_

time in ancient and in modern science, 330-1, 336-7, 341-4

time and space, 317-9, 320

vision of God in Alexandrian philosophy, 322

Zeno, 308, 313

Ancient science and modern, 329-31, 336-7, 342-5, 357

Anima (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_

Animal kingdom, 12, 105-6, 119-21, 126, 129, 131-2, 134-6, 137-8, 139, 179,

184-5

Animals, 105-47, 167, 170, 181, 183, 187, 212, 214, 246, 252, 253, 254,

262-5, 267, 271, 293, 301

deduction in, 212

induction in, 214

and man, 139-43, 183, 187, 188, 212, 263, 264, 267

and man in respect to brain, 183, 184-5, 263-5

and man in respect to consciousness, 139-43, 180, 183, 187, 188, 192,

212, 263-8

and man in respect to instruments of action, 139-43, 150-1

and man in respect to intelligence, 137-8, 187, 188, 191-2, 212

and plants, 105-39, 124-6, 143, 145, 146-7, 168-70, 181-2, 253, 254, 293

and plants in respect to activity of consciousness, 109, 111, 113,

119-21, 128-9, 132, 134-6, 142-3, 144, 181-2, 293

and plants in respect to function, 117-8, 121-2, 127

and plants in respect to instinct, 167, 170

and plants in respect to mobility, 109, 110, 113, 129-30, 132-3, 135, 181

and plants in respect to nature of consciousness, 134-5

Antagonistic currents of the vital impetus, 129, 135-6, 181, 184, 250,

258-9

Anthophora, 146-7

Antinomies of Kant, 204, 205

Antipathy. _See_ Sympathy, Feeling, Divination

Antithesis and thesis, 205

Ants, 101, 134, 140, 157

Ape's brain and consciousness contrasted with man's, 263

Aphasia, 181

Apidae, social instinct in the, 171

Apogee of instinct in the hymenoptera and of intelligence in man, 174-5

_See_ Evolutionary superiority

Apogee of sensible object, in philosophy of Ideas, 343-4, 349

Approximateness of the knowledge of matter, 206-7

Approximation, in matter, to the mathematical order, 218.

_See_ Order

Archimedes, 333-4

Aristotle. _See_ Ancient Philosophy, Aristotle

Arrow, Flying, of Zeno, 308-9, 310, 312-3

Art, 6-7, 29 _note_, 45, 89, 177

Artemia Salina, transformations of, 72, 73

Arthropods in evolution, 130-5, 142

Articulate species, 133

Articulations of matter relative to action, 156, 367

of motion, 310-1

of real time, 332-3

Artificial, how far scientific knowledge is, 197, 218-9

instruments, 138, 139, 140-1

Artist, in illustration of the creativeness of duration, 340-1

Ascending cosmic movement, 11, 208, 275, 369

Ascent toward God, in Aristotle, 323

Association of organisms, 260.

_See_ Individuation

universal oscillation between association and individuation, 259, 260.

_See_ Societies

Astronomy and deduction, 213

and the inert order, 224

modern, in reference to ancient science, 334-6

Atmosphere of spatiality bathing intelligence, 204

Atom, 240, 254, 255

as an intellectual view of matter, 203, 250

and interpenetration, 207

Attack and defence in evolution, 131-2

Attention, 2, 148-9, 154, 184, 209

discontinuity of, 2

in man and in lower animals, 184.

_See_ Tension and instinct, Tension as inverted extension,

Tension of personality, Sympathetic appreciation, etc.,

Relaxation and intellect

Attraction and impulsion in Greek philosophy, 323, 324

Attribute and subject, 148

Automatic activity, 145

as instrument of voluntary, 252

order, 224, 231-4.

_See_ Negative movement, etc., Geometrical order

Automatism, 127, 143-4, 174, 223-4, 261, 264

Background of instinct and intelligence, consciousness as, 186

Backward-looking attitude of the intellect, 47, 48, 237

Baldwin, J.M., 27 _note_

Ballast of intelligence, 152, 230, 239, 369-70

Bastian, 212 _note_

Bateson, 63

Becoming, 164, 236, 248-9, 273, 299-304, 307-8, 313-4, 316, 337-8,

342-3, 345, 363

in ancient philosophy, 313-4, 317

in Descartes's philosophy, 346

in Eleatic philosophy, 313-4, 315

in general, or abstract becoming, 304, 306-7

instantaneous and static views of, 272, 304-5

states of, falsely so called, 164, 247-8, 273, 298-301, 307-8

in the successors of Kant, 363.

_See_ Change, New, Duration, Time, Views of reality

Bees, 101, 140, 142, 146, 166, 172

Beethoven, 224

Berthold, 34 _note_

Bethe, 176 _note_

Bifurcations of tendency, 54.

_See_ Divergent lines of evolution

Biology, 12, 25, 26, 31-2, 43, 168-9, 174-5, 194-6

evolutionist, 168-9

and philosophy, 43, 194-6

and physico-chemistry, 26

Blaringhem, 85

Bodies, 156, 188, 189, 300-1, 360.

_See_ Inert matter as a relaxation of the unextended into the

extended defined as bundles of qualities, 349

Bois-Reymond (Du), 38

Boltzmann, 245

Bombines, social instincts in, 171

Bouvier, 142 _note_

Bow, strain of, illustrating indivisibility of motion, 308-10

Brain and consciousness, 5, 109, 110, 179-80, 183-4, 212 _note_, 252,

261-4, 270, 354, 356, 366.

_See_ Nervous System in man and lower animals, 183, 184, 263-5

Brandt, 66 _note_

Breast-Plate, in reference to animal mobility, 130, 131.

_See_ Carapace, Cellulose envelope

Brown-Séquard, 80-2

Bulb, medullary, in the development of the nervous system, 110, 252

Busquet, 259 _note_

Bütschli, 33 _note_

Buttel-Reepen, 171 _note_

Butterflies, in illustration of variation from evolutionary type, 72

Caelo (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_, 324 _note_

Calcareous sheath, in reference to animal mobility, 130-1

Calkins, 16 _note_

Canal, in illustration of the relation of function and structure, 93

Canalization, in illustration of the function of animal organisms, 93,

95, 110, 126, 256, 270

Canvas, embroidering "something" on the, of "nothing," 297

Caprice, an attribute not of freedom but of mechanism, 47

Carapace, in reference to animal mobility, 130-1

Carbohydrates, in reference to the function of the animal organism, 121-2

Carbon, in reference to the function of organisms, 107, 113, 114, 117,

254, 255

Carbonic acid, in reference to the function of organisms, 254, 255

Carnot, 243, 246, 256

Cartesian geometry, compared with ancient, 334

Cartesianism, 345, 356, 358

Cartesians, 358. _See_ Spinoza, Leibniz

Carving, the, of matter by intellect, 155

Categorical propositions, characteristic of instinctive knowledge, 149-50

Categories, conceptual, x, xiii, 48, 147, 148-9, 165, 189-90, 195-7, 207,

220-1, 257-60, 265, 358, 361.

_See_ Concept deduction of, and genesis of the intellect, 196, 207, 359.

_See_ Genesis of matter and of the intellect

innate, 147, 148-9

misfit for the vital, x, xiii, 48, 165, 195-9, 220-1, 257-9

in reference to the adaptation to each other of the matter and form of

knowledge, 361

Cats, in illustration of the law of correlation, 67

Causal relation in Aristotle, 325

between consciousness and movement, 111

in Greek philosophy, 324-5

Causality, mechanical, a category which does not apply to life, x, xiv, 177

in the philosophy of Ideas, 323-6

Causation and adaptation, 101, 102

final, involves mechanical, 44

Cause and effect as mathematical functions of each other, 20, 21

efficient, 238, 277, 323

efficient, in Aristotle's philosophy, 324

efficient, in Leibniz's philosophy, 353

final, 40, 44, 238

final, in Aristotle's philosophy, 324

by impulsion, release and unwinding, 73

mechanical, as containing effect, 14, 233, 269

in the vital order, 95, 164

Cave, Plato's allegory of the, 191

Cell, 16, 24, 33, 162, 166, 167, 260, 269

as artificial construct, 162

in the "colonial theory," 260

division, 16, 24, 33

instinct in the, 166, 167

in relation to the soul, 269

Cellulose envelope in reference to vegetable immobility and torpor, 108,

111, 130

Cerebral activity and consciousness, 5, 109-10, 180-1, 183-4, 212 _note_,

252, 253, 261, 264, 268, 270, 350, 351, 354, 355, 366

mechanism, 5, 252, 253, 262, 264, 366

Cerebro-spinal system, 124. _See_ Nervous system

Certainty of induction, 215, 216

Chance analogous to disorder, 233, 234.

_See_ Affection

in evolution, 86-7, 104, 114-5, 126, 169-70, 171, 252, 254, 255, 266,

267, 326-7.

_See_ Indetermination

Change, 1, 7-8, 18, 85-6, 248, 275, 294, 300-304, 308, 313-4, 317, 326,

328-9, 343-4, 344-5

in ancient philosophy, 313-4, 316-7, 325-6, 327-9, 343, 345

in Eleatic philosophy, 314

known only from within, 307-8

Chaos, 232.

_See_ Disorder

Character, moral, 5, 99-100

Charrin, 81 _note_

Chemistry, 27, 34-6, 55, 72, 74, 98, 194, 226, 256, 260

Child, intelligence in, 147-8

adolescence of, in illustration of evolutionary becoming, 311-3

Chipped stone, in paleontology, 139

Chlorophyllian function, 107-9, 114, 117, 246, 253

Choice, 110, 125, 143-5, 179, 180, 252, 260-4, 276, 366

and consciousness, 110, 179, 260-4

Chrysalis, 114 _note_

Cinematograph, 306-7, 339-40

Cinematographical character of ancient philosophy, 315-6

of intellectual knowledge, 306, 307, 312-8, 323-4, 331-3, 346

of language, 306-7, 312-5

of modern science, 329-31, 336-7, 341-3, 345, 346, 347

Circle of the given, broken by action, 192, 247

logical and physical, 277

vicious, in intellectualist philosophy, 193, 197, 320

vicious, in the intuitional method is only apparent, 192, 193

Circularity of God's thought in Aristotle's philosophy, 324

of each special evolution, 128

Circulation, protoplasmic, imitated, 32-3

in plants and animals, 108

Circumstances in the determination of evolution, 101-2, 128-9, 133, 138,

142, 150-1, 167, 168, 170-1, 193, 194, 252, 256

in relation to special instincts, 138, 168, 193

Classes of words corresponding to the three kinds of representation, 303-4

Clausius, 243

Clearness characteristic of intellect, 160

Cleft between the organized and the unorganized, 190, 196-9

Climbing plants, instincts of, 170 _note_

Coincidence of matter with space as in Kant, 206, 207, 244

of mind with intellect as in Kant, 48, 206

of qualities, 216

of seeing and willing, 237

of self with self, definition of the feeling of duration, 199-200

Coleopter, instinct in, 146

Colonial theory, 259, 260

Colonies, microbial, 259

Color variation in lizards, 72, 74

Coming and going of the mind between the without and the within gives rise

to the idea of "Nothing," 279

between nature and mind, the true method of philosophy, 239

Common-sense, 29, 153, 161, 213, 224, 277

defined as continuous experience of the real, 213

Comparison of ancient philosophy with modern, 226, 228-9, 232, 328-9,

345-6, 349-51, 353-4, 356

Compenetration, 352-3. _See_ Interpenetration

Complementarity of forms evolved, xii, xiii, 51, 101, 103, 113, 116-7,

135, 136, 254, 255

of instinct and intelligence, 146, 173.

_See_ Opposition of Instinct and Intelligence

of intuition and intellect, 343, 345

in the powers of life, 49, 96-7, 140-3, 177, 178-9, 183-5, 239, 246,

254, 343

of science and metaphysics, 344

Complexity of the order of mathematics, 208-10, 217, 251

Compound reflex, instinct as a, 174

Concentration, intellect as, 191, 301

of personality, 198-9, 201

Concentric spheres in Aristotle's philosophy, 328

Concept accessory to action, ix

analogy of, with the solid body, ix

in animals, 187

externality of, 160, 168, 175-8, 199-200, 251, 306, 311, 314

fringed about with intuition, 46

and image distinguished, 160, 279

impotent to grasp life, ix-xiii, 49

intellect the concept-making faculty, vi, 49

misfit for the vital, 48

representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed on things, 161

synthesis of, in ancient philosophy, 325-6, 356.

_See_ Categories, Externality, Frames, Image, Space, Symbol

Conditions, external, in evolution, 128-9, 133, 138, 141-2, 150-1, 166-7,

168, 170, 193, 194, 251, 256, 257

external, in determination of special instinct, 141-2, 150-1, 167,

168, 171

Conduct, mechanism and finality in the evolution of, 47.

_See_ Freedom, Determination, Indetermination

Confused plurality of life, 257

Conjugation of Infusoria, 16

Consciousness and action, ix, 5, 144, 145, 179-80, 207, 260-1

consciousness as appendage to action, ix

consciousness as arithmetical difference between possible and real

activity, 145

consciousness as auxiliary to action, 179-80

consciousness as inadequacy of act to representation, 144

consciousness as instrument of action, 180

consciousness as interval between possible and real action, 145, 179

consciousness as light from zone of possible actions surrounding the

real act, 179

consciousness and locomotion, 262

consciousness plugged up by action, 144, 145.

_See_ Torpor, Sleep

consciousness as sketch of action, 207

intensity of, varies with ratio of possible to real action, 145

Consciousness in animals, as distinguished from the consciousness of

plants, 130, 135-6, 143

as distinguished from the consciousness of man, 139-43, 180, 183, 184,

187, 188, 212, 263-9.

_See_ Torpor, Sleep

characteristic of animals, torpor of plants, 109, 111, 113, 120, 128-9,

135-6, 181, 182, 292

as background of instinct and intelligence, 186

and brain, 180, 262, 263, 269, 270, 354

and choice, 110, 144-5, 179, 262-4

coextensive with universal life, 186, 270

and creation, consciousness as demand for creation, 261

current of, penetrating matter, 181, 270

as deficiency of instinct, 145

in dog and man, 180

double form of, 179

function of, 207

as hesitation or choice, 143, 144

imprisonment of, 180, 183-4, 264

as invention and freedom, 264, 270

in man as distinguished from, in lower forms of life, 180, 263, 264,

267, 268

and matter, 179, 181-2

as motive principle of evolution, 181-2

nullified, as distinguished from the absence of consciousness, 143

and the organism, 270

in plants, 131, 135-6, 143

as world principle, 237, 261

Conservation of energy, 243, 244

Construction, 139-42, 150-1, 156, 157-8, 180, 182.

_See_ Manufacture, Solid

the characteristic work of intellect, 163-4

as the method of Kant's successors, 364-5

Contingency, 96, 255, 268.

_See_ Accident, Chance

the, of order, 231, 235

Continuation of vital process in instinct, 138, 139, 166, 167, 246.

_See_ Variations, Vital process

Continuity, 1, 26, 29-30, 37, 138-40, 154, 162-4, 258, 302, 306-7, 311-2,

321, 325-6, 329-30, 347

of becoming, 306-7, 312

of change, 325-6

of evolution, 18, 19

of extension, 154

of germinative plasma, 26, 37

of instinct with vital process, 139, 140, 166-7, 246

of life, 1-11, 29, 163-4, 258

of living substance, 162

of psychic life, 1, 30

of the real, 302, 329-30

of sensible intuition with ultra-intellectual, 361

of sensible universe, 346

Conventionality of science, 207

"Conversion" and "procession" in Alexandrian philosophy, 323

Cook, Plato's comparison of the, and the dialectician, 156

Cope, 35 _note_, 77, 111

Correlation, law of, 66, 67

Correspondence between mind and matter in Spencer, 368.

_See_ Simultaneity

Cortical mechanism, 252, 253, 262.

_See_ Cerebral mechanism

Cosmogony and genesis of matter, 188.

_See_ Genesis of matter and of intellect, Spencer

Cosmology the, that follows from the philosophy of Ideas, 315, 328

as reversed psychology, 208

Counterweight representation as, to action, 145

Counting simultaneities, the measurement of time is, 338, 341-2

Creation, xi, 7, 11, 12, 22, 29, 30, 45, 93, 100, 101, 103, 105, 108, 114,

128-31, 161, 163-4, 178, 200, 217, 218, 223, 226, 230, 237-40, 261,

270, 275, 339-40

in Descartes's philosophy, 345

of intellect, 248-9

of matter, 237, 239, 247-8, 249.

_See_ Materiality the inversion of spirituality

of present by past, 5, 20-3, 27, 167, 199-202

the vital order as, 230

Creative evolution, 7, 15, 21, 27, 29, 36, 37, 65, 100, 104-5, 161,

163, 223-4, 230-1, 237, 264, 269

Creativeness of free action, 192, 243

of invention, 250

Creeping plants in illustration of vegetable mobility, 108

Cricket victim of paralyzing instinct of sphex, 172

Criterion, quest of a, 53 _ff._

of evolutionary rank, 133, 265

Criticism, Kantian, 205, 287 _note_, 356, 360-2

of knowledge, 194-5

Cross-cuts through becoming by intellect, 314.

_See_ Views of reality

through matter by perception, 206

Cross-roads of vital tendency, 51, 52, 54, 110, 126

Crustacea, 19, 111, 129-30

Crystal illustrating (by contrast) individuation, 12

Cuénot, 79 _note_

Culminating points of evolutionary progress, 50, 133-5.

_See_ Evolutionary superiority

Current, 26, 27, 51, 185, 236, 237, 250, 266, 269

Currents, antagonistic, 250

of existence, 185

of life penetrating matter, 26, 27, 266, 270

vital, 26, 27, 51, 237, 266, 270

of will penetrating matter, 237

Curves, as symbol of life, 32, 90, 213

Cuts through becoming by the intellect, 313-4.

_See_ Views of reality, Snapshots in illustration, etc.

through matter by perception, 206

Cuvier, 125 _note_

Dantec (Le), 18 _note_, 34 _note_

Darwin, 62-5, 66, 72, 108, 170 _note_

Darwinism, 56, 85, 86

Dastre, 36 _note_

Dead, the, is the object of intellect, 165

Dead-locks in speculation, 155, 312

Death, 246 _note_, 271

Declivity descended by matter, 208, 246, 256, 339-40.

_See_ Descending movement

Decomposing and recomposing powers characteristic of intellect, 157, 251

Deduction, analogy between, related to moral sphere and tangent to

curve, 213

and astronomy, 213

duration refractory to, 213

geometry the ideal limit of, 213-26, 361

in animals, 212

inverse to positive spiritual effort, 212

nature of, 211

physics and, 213

weakness of, in psychology and moral science, 213

Defence and attack in evolution, 132

Deficiency of will the negative condition of mathematical order and

complexity, 209

Definition in the realm of life, 13, 105, 106

Degenerates, 133-5

_Dégénérescence sénile (La)_, by Metchnikoff, 18 _note_

Degradation of energy, 241, 242, 246

of the extra-spatial into the spatial, 207

of the ideas into the sensible flux in ancient philosophy, 317-9,

324-5, 327-9, 331, 343, 345, 352-3

Degrees of being in the successors of Kant, 362-3

Degrees of reality in Greek philosophy, 324, 327

Delage, 59 _note_, 81 _note_, 260 _note_

Delamare, 81 _note_

Deliberation, 144

De Manacéine, 124 _note_

Deposit, instinct and intelligence as deposits, emanations, issues, or

aspects of life, x, xii, xiii, 49, 103, 105, 136, 365

De Saporta, 107 _note_

Descartes, 280, 334, 345, 346, 353, 358

becoming, 345-6

creation, 346

determinism, 345

duration, 346

freedom, 345, 346

geometry, 334

God, 346

image and idea or concept, 281

indeterminism, 345

mechanism, 345, 346

motion, 346

vacillation between abstract time and real duration, 345

Descending movement of existence, 11, 202, 203, 208, 271, 275, 369

Design, motionless, of action the object of intellect, 154-5, 299,

301-2, 303

Detention in the dream state, 202

of intuition in intellect, 238

Determination, 76-7, 129-30, 223, 246

Determinism, 217, 264, 345, 348. _See_ Inert matter, Geometry

in Descartes, 345

Development, 133, 134-5, 141.

_See_ Order, Progress, Evolution, Superiority

Deviation from type, 82-4

Dialect and intuition in philosophy, 238

Dichotomy of the real in modern philosophy, 350

Differentiation of parts in an organism, 253, 260

Dilemma of any systematic metaphysics, 195, 197, 230

Diminution, derivation of becoming from being by, in ancient philosophy,

316, 317, 322, 323-4, 327-8, 343-5, 352

geometrical order as, or lower complication of the vital order, 236

Dionaea illustrating certain animal characteristics in plants, 107,

108, 109

Discontinuity of action, 154, 306-7

of attention, 2

of extension relative to action, 154, 163

of knowledge, 306

of living substance, 163

a positive idea, 154

Discontinuous the object of intellect, 154

Discord in nature, 127, 128, 254-5, 267

Disorder, 40, 104, 222-3, 225-6, 232-5, 274.

_See_ Expectation, Order, mathematical, Orders of reality, two

Disproportion between an invention and its consequences, 182

Dissociation as a cosmic principle opposed to association, 260

of tendencies, 54, 89, 135, 254, 255, 257, 258.

_See_ Divergent lines of evolution

Distance, extension as the, between what is and what ought to be, 318-9,

327-8, 331

Distinct multiplicity in the dream state, 201, 210

of the inert, 257

Distinctness characteristic of the intellect, 160, 237, 251

characteristic of perception, 227, 251

as spatiality, 203, 207-8, 244, 250

Divergent lines of evolution, xii, 54, 55, 87, 97-101, 103-4, 106, 107,

109, 112, 113, 116, 119, 130, 132, 134-5, 142, 149, 150, 168, 173, 181,

254, 255, 266, 267.

_See_ Dissociation of tendencies, Complementarity, etc., Schisms

in the primitive impulsion of life

Diversity, sensible, 205, 220-1, 231, 235, 236

Divination, instinct as, 176.

_See_ Sympathy, etc.

Divisibility of extension, 154, 162

Division as function of intellect, 152, 154, 162-3, 189

of labor, 99, 110, 118, 157, 166, 260

of labor in cells, 166

Dog and man, consciousness in, 180

Dogmatism of the ancient epistemology contrasted with the relativism of

the modern, 230

of Leibniz and Spinoza, 356-7

skepticism, and relativism, 196-7, 230

Dogs and the law of correlation, 66

Domestication of animals and heredity, 80

Dominants of Reinke, 42 _note_

Dorfmeister, 72

Dream, 144, 180-1, 202, 209, 256.

_See_ Interpenetration, Relaxation, Detention, Recollection

as relaxation, 202

Driesch, 42 _note_

Drosera, 107, 108, 109

Dufourt, 124 _note_

Duhem, 242 _note_

Dunan, Ch., xv _note_

Duration, xiv _note_, 2, 4-6, 8-11, 15, 17, 21, 22, 37, 39, 46, 51,

199, 201, 206, 213, 216, 240, 272, 273, 276, 298-9, 308-9, 317-8, 319

_note_, 324, 328, 332, 339, 342, 343, 345, 354, 361, 363-4

absoluteness of, 206

and deduction, 213

in Descartes's philosophy, 346

gnawing of, 4, 8, 46

indivisibility of, 6, 308-9

and induction, 216

and the inert, 343-4

in the philosophy of the Ideas, 316-7, 319 _note_, 324, 327, 328-9

rhythm of, 11, 128, 346.

_See_ Creation, Evolution, Invention, Time, Unforeseeableness,

Uniqueness

Echinoderms in reference to animal mobility, 130, 131

Efficient cause in conception of chance, 234

Spinoza and, 269

Effort in evolution, 170

[Greek: Eidos], 314-5

Eimer, 55, 72, 73, 86

Elaborateness of the mathematical order, 208-10, 217, 251

Eleatic philosophy, 308, 314-5

Emanation, logical thought an, issue, aspect or deposit of life, ix, xii,

xiii, 49

Embroidering "something" on the canvas of "nothing," 297

Embroidery by descendants on the canvas handed down by ancestors, 23

Embryo, 18, 19, 26, 27, 75, 81, 89, 101, 166

Embryogeny, comparative, and transformism, 25

Embryonic life, 27, 166

Empirical study of evolution the centre of the theory of knowledge and of

the theory of life, 178

theories of knowledge, 205

Empty, thinking the full by means of the empty, 273-4

End in Eleatic philosophy, 314-5

of science is practical utility, 329

Energy, 115-7, 120-3, 242, 243, 245, 246, 252-5, 256, 257, 262

conservation of, 242

degradation of, 242, 243, 246

solar, stored by plants, released by animals, 245, 254

Enneadae of Plotinus, 210 _note_

Entelechy of Driesch, 42 _note_

Entropy, 243

Environment in evolution, 129, 133, 138, 140, 142, 150, 167, 168, 170,

192, 193, 252, 256, 257

and special instincts, 138, 168, 192, 193

Epiphenomenalism, 262

Essence and accidents in Aristotle's philosophy, 353

or form in Eleatic philosophy, 314-5

the meaning of, 302-3

Essences (or forms), qualities and acts, the three kinds of

representation, 303-4

Eternity, 39, 298, 314, 317, 320, 324, 328, 346, 352, 354

in the philosophy of Ideas, 316-7, 319, 324, 328

in Spinoza's philosophy, 353

Euglena, 116

Evellin, 311 _note_

Eventual actions, 11, 96.

_See_ Possible activity

Evolution, ix-xv, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26-7, 37, 46-55, 63, 68, 79

_note_, 84-8, 97-105, 107, 113, 116, 126, 127, 129-30, 131-2,

133, 134, 136, 138-40, 141-2, 143, 161, 166, 167, 168-72, 173, 174,

175, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, 190, 193, 198-9, 207-8, 224, 231, 242

_note_, 246, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254, 264-6, 268, 273, 302, 311,

345, 359, 360, 366

accident in, 104, 169, 170, 173, 174, 251, 252

animal, a progress toward mobility, 131

antagonistic tendencies in, 103, 113, 185

automatic and determinate, is action being undone, 248

blind alleys of, 129

circularity of each special, 128

complementarity of the divergent lines of, 97-102, 103, 116

conceptually inexpressible, 49, 50, 52, 53, 127, 181, 273

continuity of, 18, 19, 26, 37, 46, 273, 302, 312, 345

creative, 7, 15, 21, 27, 30, 36, 37, 65, 100, 105, 161, 162, 163, 223,

230, 238, 264, 269

culminating points of, 50, 133, 174, 185, 265, 266, 268

development by, 133, 134, 141-2

divergent lines of, xii, 53, 54, 87, 97-101, 103-4, 107, 173-4, 246

and duration, 20, 22, 37, 45-6

empirical study of, the centre of the theory of knowledge and of life,

178

and environment, 101-3, 129, 133, 138, 142, 150, 167, 168, 169, 192,

193, 251, 256, 257

of instinct, 170, 171, 174-5.

_See_ Divergent lines, etc., Culminating points, etc., Evolution

and environment

of intellect, x-xii, 153, 186, 189-90, 193, 198-9, 207-8, 359, 360.

_See_ Divergent lines, etc., Culminating points, etc., Genesis

of matter and of intellect

as invention, 344

of man, 264, 266, 268. _See_ Culminating points, etc.

motive principle of, is consciousness, 181

of species product of the vital impetus opposed by matter, 247-8, 254

and transformism, 24

unforeseeable, 47, 48, 53, 86, 224

variation in, 23-4, 55, 63, 68, 72 _note_, 85, 131, 137-8, 167, 169,

171, 264

Evolutionary, qualitative, and extensive motion 302-3, 311, 312

superiority, 133-5, 174-5.

_See_ Success, Criterion of evolutionary rank, Culminating points, etc.

Evolutionism, x-xii, xiv, 77, 84, 364

Exhaustion of the mutability of the universe, 337-8

Existence, logical, as contrasted with psychical and physical, 276, 362

of matter tends toward instantaneity, 201

of self means change, 1 _ff._

superaddition of, upon nothingness, 276

Expectation, 214-6, 221, 222, 226, 233, 235, 274, 281, 292

in conception of disorder, 221, 222, 226, 233, 234, 235, 274

in conception of void or naught, 282, 292

Experience, 138, 147, 177, 197, 204, 229, 321, 354, 359, 363, 368

Explosion, illustrating cause by release, 73

Explosive character of animal energy, 116, 119, 120, 246

of organization, 92

Explosives, manufacture of, by plants and use by animals, 246, 254

Extension, 149, 154, 161, 202, 203, 207, 211, 223, 236, 245, 318-20,

324, 327, 351, 352

continuity of, 154

discontinuity of, relative to action, 154, 162

as the distance between what is and what ought to be, 318

divisibility of, 154, 162

the most general property of matter, 154, 250, 251

the inverse movement to tension, 245

of knowledge, 150

in Leibniz's philosophy, 351, 352

of matter in space, 204, 211

in the philosophy of Ideas, 318-9, 323-4, 327

and relaxation, 202, 207, 209, 211, 212, 218, 223, 245

in Spinoza's philosophy, 350

in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 203

unity of, 158-9

as weakening of the essence of being, in Plotinus, 210 _note_

Extensive, evolutionary and qualitative motion, 302-3, 311, 312

External conditions in evolution, 128, 133, 137, 141-2, 150-1, 167,

168, 170, 192, 193, 252, 256, 257

finality, 41

Externality of concepts, 160, 168, 174, 177, 199, 251, 305, 311-4

the most general property of matter, 154, 250, 251

Externalized action in distinction from internalized, 147, 165.

_See_ Somnambulism, etc., Automatic activity, etc.

Eye of mollusc and vertebrate compared, 60, 75, 77, 84, 86, 87-8

Fabre, 172 _note_

Fabrication. _See_ Construction

Fallacies, two fundamental, 272, 273

Fallacy of thinking being by not-being, 276, 277, 284, 297-8

of thinking the full by the empty, 273-5

of thinking motion by the motionless, 272, 273, 297-8, 307-8, 309-14

Fallibility of instinct, 172-3

Falling back of matter upon consciousness, 264

bodies, comparison of Aristotle and Galileo, 228, 331-2, 334

weight, figure of material world, 245, 246

Familiar, the, is the object of intellect, 163, 164, 199, 270

Faraday, 203

Fasting, in reference to primacy of nervous system over the other

physiological systems, 124

Fauna, menace of torpor in primitive, 130

Feeling in the conception of chance, 207

and instinct, 143, 174-5

Fencing-master, illustrating hereditary transmission, 79

Ferments, certain characteristics of, 106

Fertilization of orchids by insects, by Darwin, 170 _note_

Fichte's conception of the intellect, 189-90, 357

Filings, iron, in illustration of the relation of structure to

function, 94, 95

Film, cinematographic, figure of abstract motion, 304-6

Final cause, 40, 45, 234, 325

conception of, involves conception of mechanical cause, 44

God as, in Aristotle, 322-3

Finalism, 39-53, 58, 74, 88-97, 101-5, 126-8

Finality, 41, 164, 177-8, 185, 223, 224, 266

external and internal, 41

misfit for the vital, 177, 223-4, 225, 266

and the unforeseeableness of life, 164, 185

Fischel, 75 _note_

Fish in illustration of animal tendency to mobility, 130, 131

Fixation of nutritive elements, 107-9, 113, 117, 246, 247, 253

Fixity, 108-13, 118, 119, 130, 155.

_See_ Torpor

apparent or relative, 155

cellulose envelope and the, of plants, 108, 111, 130

of extension, 155

of plants, 108-13, 118, 119, 130-1

of torpid animals, 130

Flint hatchets and human intelligence, 137

Fluidity of life, 153, 165, 193

of matter as a whole, 186, 369

Flux of material bodies, 265

of reality, 250, 251, 337, 342, 344

Flying arrow of Zeno, 308, 309, 310

Focalization of personality, 201

Food, 106-9, 113-4, 117, 120, 121, 246, 247, 254

Foraminifera, failure of certain, to evolve, 197

Force, 126-7, 141, 149, 150, 175, 246, 254, 339

life a, inverse to matter, 246

limitedness of vital force, 126, 127, 141, 149, 162

time as, 339-40

Forel, 176 _note_

Foreseeing, 8, 28, 29, 30, 37, 45, 47, 96.

_See_ Unforeseeableness

Form, xi, 51, 101, 104, 113, 116-8, 129, 135-6, 148-53, 155, 156, 160,

164, 195-7, 222, 237, 250, 255, 302, 303, 314, 317, 318, 322, 341,

357, 359, 361, 362

complementarity of forms evolved, xi, 51, 101, 104, 113, 116-8, 135-6,

255

expansion of the forms of consciousness, xii, xiii

(or essences), qualities and acts the three kinds of representation,

302-3

God as pure form in Aristotle, 196, 322

or idea in ancient philosophy, 317, 318, 330

of intelligence, xiv, 48, 147, 148, 165, 190, 195, 196, 198, 207, 219,

257-9, 266, 358-9, 361. _See_ Concept

and matter in creation, 239, 250

and matter in knowledge, 195, 361

a snapshot view of transition, 302

Formal knowledge, 152

logic, 292

Forms of sensibility, 361

Fossil species, 102

Foster, 125 _note_

Fox in illustration of animal intelligence, 138

Frames of the understanding, 46-7, 48, 150-2, 173, 177, 197-9, 219-20,

223-4, 258, 270, 313, 358, 364

fit the inert, 197, 218

inadequate to reality entire, 364

misfit for the vital, x, xiii, xiv, 46, 48, 173, 177, 197-9, 223,

258, 313

product of life, 358

transform freedom into necessity, 270

utility of, lies in their unlimited application, 149-50, 152

Freedom, 11, 48, 126, 130, 163, 164, 200, 202, 207, 208, 217, 223, 231,

237, 239, 247, 249, 264-6, 269, 270, 277, 300, 339-41, 345, 346

the absolute as freely acting, 277

affirmed by conscience, 269

animal characteristic rather than vegetable, 129-30

caprice attribute not of, but of mechanism, 47

coextensiveness of consciousness with, 111, 112, 202, 264, 270

of creation and life, 247, 254, 255

creativeness of, 223, 239, 248

in Descartes's philosophy, 345, 346

as efficient causality, 277

inversion of necessity, 236

and liberation of consciousness, 265, 266.

_See_ Imprisonment of consciousness

and novelty, 12, 163, 164, 200, 218, 231, 239, 249, 270, 339-42

order in, 223

property of every organism, 129-31

relaxation of, into necessity, 217

tendency of, to self-negation in habit, 127

tension of, 200, 201, 202, 207, 223, 237, 301

transformed by the understanding into necessity, 270

_See_ Spontaneity

Fringe of intelligence around instinct, 136

of intuition around intellect, xii, xiii, 46

of possible action around real action, 179, 272

Froth, alveolar, in imitation of organic phenomena, 33-4

Full, fallacy of thinking the, by the empty, 273-6

Function, ix, 3, 5, 44, 46, 47, 88-90, 94, 95, 106-10, 113, 114, 117, 120,

121, 127, 132, 140, 141, 145, 152, 153, 157, 161, 163, 164, 168, 173-5,

186-92, 199, 206, 207, 233, 237, 246, 251, 254-6, 262, 263, 270, 273,

298, 306, 346, 358, 369

accumulation of energy the function of vegetable organisms, 254, 255

action the, of intellect, ix, 12, 44, 47, 93, 161, 162, 186-8, 206, 251,

273, 305

action the, of nervous system, 262, 263

alimentation, 106, 107, 120, 121, 246, 254

of animals is canalization of energy, 93, 110, 126, 255, 256

carbon and the, of organisms, 107, 113, 114, 117, 254, 255

chlorophyllian, 107-9, 114, 117, 246, 254

concept-making the, of intellect, x, 49

of consciousness: sketching movements, 207

construction the, of intellect, 108

illumination of action, of perception, 5, 206, 307-8

of intelligence: action, ix, 12, 44, 46, 93, 160, 162, 186-8, 206, 251,

273, 307-8

of intelligence: concept-making, x, 50

of intelligence: construction, 160, 163, 181-2

of intelligence: division, 154, 155, 162, 189

of intelligence: illumination of action by perception, 5, 206, 301

of intelligence: repetition, 164, 199, 214-6

of intelligence: retrospection, 47, 237

of intelligence: connecting same with same, 199, 233, 270

of intelligence: scanning the rhythm of the universe, 346

of intelligence: tactualizing all perception, 168

of intelligence: unification, 152, 154, 357

of the nervous system: action, 262, 263

and organ, 88-90, 94, 95, 132-3, 140, 141, 158.

_See_ Function and structure

and organ in arthropods, vertebrates and man, 132-3

of the organism, 94, 106-10, 112, 114, 117, 120, 126, 173-5, 246, 253-6

of the organism, alimentation, 106, 107, 120, 121, 246, 254

of the organism, animal: canalization of energy, 93, 110, 126, 255, 256

of the organism, carbon in, 107, 113, 114, 117, 254, 255

of the organism, chlorophyllian function, 107-9, 114, 117, 246, 247, 254

of the organism, primary functions of life: storage and expenditure of

energy, 254-6

of the organism, vegetable: accumulation of energy, 254, 255

of philosophy: adoption of the evolutionary movement of life and

consciousness, 370

of science, 168, 346

sketching movements the, of consciousness, 207

and structure, 55, 62, 66, 69, 74, 75, 76, 86, 88-91, 93, 94, 96, 118,

132, 140, 141, 158, 162, 250, 252, 256

tactualizing all perception the, of science, 168

of vegetable organism: accumulation of energy, 254, 255

Functions of life, the two: storage and expenditure of energy, 254-6

Galileo, homogeneity of time in, 332

his influence on metaphysics, 20, 228

his influence on modern science, 334, 335

extension of Galileo's physics, 357, 370

his theory of the fall of bodies compared with Aristotle's, 228, 331,

332, 334

Ganoid breast-plate of ancient fishes, in reference to animal mobility,

130, 131

Gaudry, 130 _note_

Genera, relation of, to individuals, 226

relation of, to laws, 225, 226, 330

potential, 226-7

and signs, 158

Generality, ambiguity of the idea of, in philosophy, 229-31, 236

Generalization dependent on repetition, 230, 231

distinguished from transference of sign, 158

in the vital and mathematical orders, 224, 225, 230

Generic, type of the: similarity of structure between generating and

generated, 223, 224

Genesis, xiii, xiv, 153, 186-199, 207, 359, 360

of intellect, xiii, xiv, 153, 186, 187, 190, 193, 194, 196-7, 207,

264, 360

of knowledge, 191

of matter, xiii, xiv, 153, 186, 188, 190, 193, 199, 207, 360

Genius and the willed order, 223, 237

Genus. _See_ Genera

Geometrical, the, is the object of the intellect, 190

Geometrical order as a diminution or lower complication of the vital,

223, 225, 236, 330.

_See_ Genera, Relation of, to laws

mutual contingency of, and vital order, 235

_See_ Mathematical order

space, relation of, to the spatiality of things, 203

Geometrism, the latent, of intellect, 194, 211-3

Geometry, fitness of, to matter, 10

goal of intellectual operations, 211, 213, 218

ideal limit of induction and deduction, 214-8, 361.

_See_ Space, Descending movement of existence

modern, compared with ancient, 36, 161, 333-4

natural, 194, 211-2

perception impregnated with, 205, 230

reasoning in, contrasted with reasoning concerning life, 7, 8

scientific, 161, 211

Germ, accidental predisposition of, in Neo-Darwinism, 168, 169, 170

Germ-plasm, continuity of, 27, 37, 78-83

Giard, 84

Glucose in organic function, 122, 123

Glycogen in organic function, 122-4

God, as activity, 249

of Aristotle, 196, 322, 325, 349, 353, 356-7

ascent toward, in Aristotle's philosophy, 322-3

circularity of God's thought, in Aristotle's philosophy, 324, 325

in Descartes's philosophy, 346, 347

as efficient cause in Aristotle's philosophy, 324

as hypostasis of the unity of nature, 196, 322, 357

in Leibniz's philosophy, 352, 353, 356-7

as eternal matter, 196-7

as pure form, 196-7, 322

in Spinoza's philosophy, 351, 357

Greek philosophy. _See_ Ancient philosophy

Green parts of plants, 107-9, 114, 117, 246, 247, 254

Growing old, 15

Growth, creation is, 240-1, 275

and novelty, 231

of the powers of life, 132, 134-5

reality is, 237

of the universe, 343, 345

Guérin, P., 59 _note_

Guinea-pig, in illustration of hereditary transmission, 80, 81