OF HISTORY AS A SCIENCE[32]

"What is History," said Napoleon, "but a fiction agreed upon?" "My

friend," said Faust to the student, who was growing enthusiastic about

the spirit of past ages,--"my friend, the times which are gone are a

book with seven seals; and what you call the spirit of past ages is

but the spirit of this or that worthy gentleman in whose mind those

ages are reflected."

[Footnote 32: From the first chapter in Volume I of the "Short Studies

on Great Subjects," the same being a lecture delivered at the Royal

Institution in London, November 5, 1864.]

One lesson, and only one, history may be said to repeat with

distinctness; that the world is built somehow on moral foundations;

that, in the long run, it is well with the good; in the long run it is

ill with the wicked. But this is no science; it is no more than the

old doctrine taught long-ago by the Hebrew prophets. The theories of

M. Comte and his disciples advance us, after all, not a step beyond

the trodden and familiar ground. If men are not entirely animals, they

are at least half animals, and are subject in this aspect of them to

the conditions of animals. So far as those parts of man's doings are

concerned, which neither have, nor need have, anything moral about

them, so far the laws of him are calculable. There are laws for his

digestion, and laws of the means by which his digestive organs are

supplied with matter. But pass beyond them, and where are we? In a

world where it would be as easy to calculate men's actions by laws

like those of positive philosophy as to measure the orbit of Neptune

with a foot rule, or weigh Sirius in a grocer's scale.

And it is not difficult to see why this should be. The first

principle, on which the theory of a science of history can be

plausibly argued, is that all actions whatsoever arise from

self-interest. It may be enlightened self-interest, it may be

unenlightened; but it is assumed as an axiom that every man, in

whatever he does, is aiming at something which he considers will

promote his happiness. His conduct is not determined by his will; it

is determined by the object of his desire. Adam Smith, in laying the

foundations of political economy, expressly eliminates every other

motive. He does not say that men never act on other motives; still

less, that they never ought to act on other motives. He asserts merely

that, as far as the arts of production are concerned and of buying and

selling, the action of self-interest may be counted upon as uniform.

What Adam Smith says of political economy, Mr. Buckle[33] would extend

over the whole circle of human activity.

[Footnote 33: In his "History of Civilization in England."]

Now, that which especially distinguishes a high, order of man from a low

order of man--that which constitutes human goodness, human greatness,

human nobleness--is surely not the degree of enlightenment with which

men pursue their own advantage; but it is self-forgetfulness; it is

self-sacrifice; it is the disregard of personal pleasure, personal

indulgence, personal advantages remote or present, because some other

line of conduct is more right.

We are sometimes told that this is but another way of expressing the

same thing; that, when a man prefers doing what is right, it is only

because to do right gives him a higher satisfaction. It appears to me,

on the contrary, to be a difference in the very heart and nature of

things. The martyr goes to the stake, the patriot to the scaffold, not

with a view to any future reward to themselves, but because it is a

glory to fling away their lives for truth and freedom. And so through

all phases of existence, to the smallest details of common life, the

beautiful character is the unselfish character. Those whom we most

love and admire are those to whom the thought of self seems never to

occur; who do simply and with no ulterior aim--with no thought whether

it will be pleasant to themselves or unpleasant--that which is good

and right and generous.

Is this still selfishness, only more enlightened? I do not think so.

The essence of true nobility is neglect of self. Let the thought of

self pass in, and the beauty of a great action is gone, like the bloom

from a soiled flower. Surely it is a paradox to speak of the

self-interest of a martyr who dies for a cause, the triumph of which

he will never enjoy; and the greatest of that great company in all

ages would have done what they did, had their personal prospects'

closed with the grave. Nay, there have been those so zealous for some

glorious principle as to wish themselves blotted out of the book of

Heaven if the cause of Heaven could succeed.

And out of this mysterious quality, whatever it be, arise the higher

relations of human life, the higher modes of human obligation. Kant,

the philosopher, used to say that there were two things which

overwhelmed him with awe as he thought of them. One was the star-sown

deep of space, without limit and without end; the other was right and

wrong. Right, the sacrifice of self to good; wrong, the sacrifice of

good to self,--not graduated objects of desire, to which we are

determined by the degrees of our knowledge, but wide asunder as pole

and pole, as light and darkness; one, the object of infinite love; the

other, the object of infinite detestation and scorn. It is in this

marvelous power in men to do wrong (it is an old story, but none the

less true for that),--it is in this power to do wrong--wrong or right,

as it lies somehow with ourselves to choose--that the impossibility

stands of forming scientific calculations of what men will do before

the fact, or scientific explanations of what they have done after the

fact. If men were consistently selfish, you might analyze their

motives; if they were consistently noble, they would express in their

conduct the laws of the highest perfection. But so long as two natures

are mixt together, and the strange creature which results from the

combinations is now under one influence and now under another, so long

you will make nothing of him except from the old-fashioned moral--or,

if you please, imaginative--point of view.

Even the laws of political economy itself cease to guide us when they

touch moral government. So long as labor is a chattel to be bought and

sold, so long, like other commodities, it follows the condition of

supply and demand. But if, for his misfortune, an employer considers

that he stands in human relations to his workmen; if he believes

rightly or wrongly, that he is responsible for them; that in return

for their labor he is bound to see that their children are decently

taught, and they and their families decently fed and clothed and

lodged; that he ought to care for them in sickness and in old

age,--then political economy will no longer direct him, and the

relations between himself and his dependents will have to be arranged

on quite other principles.

So long as he considers only his own material profit, so long supply

and demand will settle every difficulty; but the introduction of a new

factor spoils the equation.

And it is precisely in this debatable ground of low motives and noble

emotions; in the struggle, ever failing yet ever renewed, to carry

truth and justice into the administration of human society; in the

establishment of states and in the overthrow of tyrannies; in the

rise and fall of creeds; in the world of ideas; in the character and

deeds of the great actors in the drama of life, where good and evil

fight out their everlasting battle, now ranged in opposite camps, now

and more often in the heart, both of them, of each living man,--that

the true human interest of history resides. The progress of

industries, the growth of material and mechanical civilization, are

interesting; but they are not the most interesting. They have their

reward in the increase of material comforts; but, unless we are

mistaken about our nature, they do not highly concern us after all.

Once more; not only is there in men this baffling duality of

principle, but there is something else in us which still more defies

scientific analysis.

Mr. Buckle would deliver himself from the eccentricities of this and

that individual by a doctrine of averages. Tho he can not tell whether

A, B, or C will cut his throat, he may assure himself that one man in

every fifty thousand, or thereabout (I forget the exact proportion),

will cut his throat, and with this he consoles himself. No doubt it is

a comforting discovery. Unfortunately, the average of one generation

need not be the average of the next. We may be converted by the

Japanese, for all that we know, and the Japanese methods of taking

leave of life may become fashionable among us. Nay, did not Novalis

suggest that the whole race of men would at last become so disgusted

with their impotence, that they would extinguish themselves by a

simultaneous act of suicide, and make room for a better order of

things? Anyhow, the fountain out of which the race is flowing

perpetually changes; no two generations are alike. Whether there is a

change in the organization itself we can not tell; but this is

certain,--that, as the planet varies with the atmosphere which

surrounds it, so each new generation varies from the last, because it

inhales as its atmosphere the accumulated experience and knowledge of

the whole past of the world. These things form the spiritual air which

we breathe as we grow; and, in the infinite multiplicity of elements

of which that air is now composed, it is forever matter of conjecture

what the minds will be like which expand under its influence.

From the England of Fielding and Richardson to the England of Miss

Austen, from the England of Miss Austen to the England of railways and

free trade, how vast the change! Yet perhaps Sir Charles Grandison

would not seem so strange to us now as one of ourselves will seem to

our great-grandchildren. The world moves faster and faster; and the

difference will probably be considerably greater.

The temper of each new generation is a continual surprize. The Fates

delight to contradict our most confident expectations. Gibbon believed

that the era of conquerors was at an end. Had he lived out the full

life of man, he would have seen Europe at the feet of Napoleon. But a

few years ago we believed the world had grown too civilized for war,

and the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park was to be the inauguration of a

new era. Battles bloody as Napoleon's are now the familiar tale of

every day; and the arts which have made greatest progress are the

arts of destruction. What next? We may strain our eyes into the future

which lies beyond this waning century; but never was conjecture more

at fault. It is blank darkness, which even the imagination fails to

people.

What, then, is the use of history, and what are its lessons? If it can

tell us little of the past, and nothing of the future, why waste our

time over so barren a study?

First, it is a voice forever sounding across the centuries the laws of

right and wrong. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall,

but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity. For every

false word or unrighteous deed, for cruelty and oppression, for lust

or vanity, the price has to be paid at last, not always by the chief

offenders, but paid by some one. Justice and truth alone endure and

live. Injustice and falsehood may be long-lived, but doomsday comes at

last to them, in French revolutions and other terrible ways.

That is one lesson of history. Another is, that we should draw no

horoscope; that we should expect little, for what we expect will not

come to pass. Revolutions, reformations,--those vast movements into

which heroes and saints have flung themselves, in the belief that they

were the dawn of the millennium,--have not borne the fruit which they

looked for. Millenniums are still far away. These great convulsions

leave the world changed,--perhaps improved, but not improved as the

actors in them hoped it would be. Luther would have gone to work with

less heart could he have foreseen the Thirty Years' War, and in the

distance the theology of Tübingen. Washington might have hesitated to

draw the sword against England, could he have seen the country which

he made as we see it now.[34]

[Footnote 34: This is a reference to the condition of this country

during the Civil War.]

The most reasonable anticipations fail us, antecedents the most

opposite mislead us, because the conditions of human problems never

repeat themselves. Some new feature alters everything--some element

which we detect only in its after-operation.

Bishop Butler says somewhere that the best book which could be written

would be a book consisting only of premises, from which the readers

should draw conclusions for themselves. The highest poetry is the very

thing which Butler requires, and the highest history ought to be. We

should no more ask for a theory of this or that period of history,

than we should ask for a theory of "Macbeth" or "Hamlet." Philosophies

of history, sciences of history,--all these there will continue to be;

the fashions of them will change, as our habits of thought will

change; each new philosopher will find his chief employment in showing

that before him no one understood anything; but the drama of history

is imperishable, and the lessons of it will be like what we learn from

Homer or Shakespeare,--lessons for which we have no words.

The address of history is less to the understanding than to the higher

emotions. We learn in it to sympathize with what is great and good; we

learn to hate what is base. In the anomalies of fortune we feel the

mystery of our mortal existence; and in the companionship of the

illustrious natures who have shaped the fortunes of the world, we

escape from the littlenesses which cling to the round of common life,

and our minds are tuned in a higher and nobler key.

For the rest, and for those large questions which I touched in

connection with Mr. Buckle, we live in times of disintegration, and

none can tell what will be after us. What opinions, what convictions,

the infant of to-day will find prevailing on the earth, if he and it

live out together to the middle of another century, only a very bold

man would undertake to conjecture. "The time will come," said

Lichtenberg, in scorn at the materializing tendencies of modern

thought,--"the time will come when the belief in God will be as the

tales with which old women frighten children; when the world will be a

machine, the ether a gas, and God will be a force." Mankind, if they

last long enough on the earth, may develop strange things out of

themselves; and the growth of what is called the Positive Philosophy

is a curious commentary on Lichtenberg's prophecy. But whether the end

be seventy years hence, or seven hundred,--be the close of the mortal

history of humanity as far distant in the future as its shadowy

beginnings seem now to lie behind us,--this only we may foretell with

confidence,--that the riddle of man's nature will remain unsolved.

There will be that in him yet which physical laws will fail to

explain,--that something, whatever it be, in himself and in the world,

which science can not fathom, and which suggests the unknown

possibilities of his origin and his destiny.

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