CHAPTER VII

THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT

A few days after the dispatch of the last American Note concerning

the _Lusitania_ incident, on July 21st, 1915, Mr. Lansing asked

me to call on him. He then told me that the American Government

had come to the end of its resources, and if any further cases

occurred of loss of American lives by the torpedoing of merchant

ships, war must inevitably result. The United States Government

intended to write no more Notes, which had been proved useless,

but would request me to undertake further negotiations in person.

My action in the _Lusitania_ incident had given proof of my earnest

desire to avoid war, and the American Government were confident

that I should succeed, even under such difficult conditions in

finding some way out of the present _impasse_.

From this time onwards, Mr. Lansing agreed with me that, as a regular

thing, I should be permitted, whatever negotiations were going on,

to send cipher dispatches to my Government through the channels

of the State Department and the American Embassy in Berlin. It

will be remembered that a similar privilege had been granted me

at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident.

My sole ground of hope for success lay in one passage of the American

Note of July 21st, which read as follows:

"The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government,

contending for the same great object, long stood together in urging

the very principles on which the Government of the United States

now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom

of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to

contend for that freedom from whatever quarter it is violated,

without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical

co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time, when

co-operation may accomplish most, and this great common object can

be most strikingly and effectively achieved. The Imperial German

Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure

be accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be.

"The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to

insist upon it, by whomsoever it is violated or ignored, in the

protection of its own citizens, but it is also deeply interested

in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves.

It holds itself ready at any time to act as a common friend who

may be privileged to suggest a way."

It seemed possible to reach some sort of agreement on the basis

of the above request from America that we should co-operate in

endeavoring to restore the freedom of the seas; but there remained

the question of finding a formula which should serve as a basis

for the settlement of the _Lusitania_ question and prevent any

repetition of such incidents.

I was aware that there were two political counter-currents in Berlin:

the one party desiring at all costs to prevent war with the United

States, the other preferring to risk war for the sake of continuing

the submarine campaign. I was clearly bound to co-operate with

the first named, as I was convinced that America's participation

in the war would certainly result in our eventual defeat; this

view was, I knew, that Von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, whose opinion on this point was identical with mine. Up

to January 31st, 1917, however, I could never ascertain which of

these two views was the accepted one in Berlin, although, of course,

I always hoped that the party of common sense would eventually

prevail, nor was I able to discover what degree of success, if

any, Meyer Gerhardt, who had been sent to represent my views to

the authorities in Berlin, or Dr. Dernburg, who was working for the

same end, had managed to achieve. As will be seen from my account

of the subsequent course of events, my information on this point

was very insufficient, and I was not even made acquainted with the

views of the Berlin Government, on the conduct of the submarine

campaign, or on the subsequent peace proposals put forward by the

President. I was never informed beforehand as to the real intentions

of Berlin, and I cannot understand, even to-day, why I was not

told, until after the _Arabic_ incident, that the German submarine

commanders had been instructed immediately after the torpedoing

of the _Lusitania_ not to attack liners. A knowledge of this fact

at the time would have assisted me greatly in my dealings with

Washington. I do not intend to assert that in all this there was

any deliberate neglect on the part of the Berlin Government but

neither, on, the other hand, can I credit the commonly accepted

explanation that the technical difficulties of transmitting reports

were insuperable. It should have been possible to give me definite

information on these matters by any one of the various channels

of communication which were available between the Foreign Office

and the Embassy at Washington. No other explanation is possible,

except that which is to be found in the conflict of the two parties

in Germany. The head of the Foreign Office was well aware that my

policy in Washington was the same as his own in Berlin, but he

was frequently unable to send me definite and early information

because he, himself, could not tell whether his own views could

be accepted and acted upon.

At this time I sent the following report to Berlin:

"Cedarhurst, 28th July, 1915.

"I have on more than one occasion respectfully begged your Excellency

to be so good as to wait for my report before deciding whether the

last American _Lusitania_ Note is to be answered, and if a reply is

to be sent, in what sense it should be drafted. Neither the Government

nor public opinion considers such a reply absolutely necessary, so

that there is no danger in delay; but I respectfully request that

I may be permitted at all events to undertake further negotiations

here, verbally and confidentially, even if my instructions have

to be sent by letter. Experience has proved that negotiations,

if they are to have any prospect of success with the American

Government, must be carried on in Washington. Both President Wilson

and Mr. Lansing are now prepared to attempt to reach an agreement

by this means. In Germany, where the tone of the American Note

must have appeared unnecessarily abrupt, this fact is perhaps not

realized the explanation of course is that Mr. Wilson was carried

away by the popular excitement over the _Lusitania_ incident, and

was, thus, compelled to adopt an intransigent attitude, from which

he cannot now recede, without making his position impossible here.

Then besides the resignation of Mr. Bryan, and that unfortunate

telegram of Dr. Dumba's, which has become known here has convinced

him that we are not in earnest. Finally, he wishes to come to some

kind of settlement with us by means of this exchange of Notes,

in order that he may then turn his attention to England; and his

well-known pride confirms him in the view that only after he has

concluded his negotiations with us, can he take up the matter with

her. It should be clearly understood that Mr. Wilson does not want

war with us, nor does he wish to side with England, despite all

statements to the contrary in the Press of the Eastern States. This

Press, in agreement with other powerful and influential circles

is Anglophile to a degree and not altogether averse to a war with

Germany; but this view is not shared by Mr. Wilson, or the large

majority of the American people.

"The great danger of the present situation is that we may be driven

to war, either by the efforts of this Press, or by a new _Lusitania_

incident. What Mr. Wilson wants is to satisfy public opinion here,

by the serious tone of the Note sent to us, and at the same time

to induce us to make certain concessions and thus carry out his

darling project of the freedom of the seas, by finding some middle

course between the German and English views. In his last note,

the President has certainly modified his views in our favor by

his admission that submarine warfare is legitimate, whereas he

formerly maintained that it could not be regarded as permissible

from the point of view of international law.

"It is not my business, even were I in possession of all the necessary

facts, to say whether it would be better policy from our point of

view, to reply to this Note, or to leave it unanswered; I can only

describe the situation, as it appears to me at the moment. From

that point of view the decision must depend very largely on the

results which we expect to follow from the submarine campaign. If

this campaign is regarded as an end in itself, and we are justified

in believing that it can bring about the overthrow of England, it

would be wiser to leave the American note unanswered, and carry on

with the submarine campaign and turn a deaf ear to neutral protests.

If, on the other hand, this campaign is only a means to an end,

the end being the removal or slackening of the British blockade

restrictions, then I beg respectfully to urge that it would be

worth our while to make some concessions to President Wilson's

convictions, in the hope of achieving our object through his

co-operation. He is reported by a witness in whom I have complete

confidence, to have said: 'If I receive a favorable answer from

Germany I will see this thing through with England to the end.'

"Before this report reaches your Excellency, Wilson's Note will

have been delivered to the English Government. If this is couched

in as peremptory a tone as the one addressed to us, then I urgently

recommend that we should endeavor to come to an agreement with the

American Government on the basis of the following draft note. I hope

that your Excellency will send me an authorization by wireless--it

should be sent in duplicate for greater safety's sake--to enter

into negotiations on this basis; I believe that I can guarantee

to find a satisfactory principle to serve as a weapon for Wilson

in his attack on England. If we show ourselves ready to help him

out of his present difficulties, I am sure he for his part will

energetically prosecute against England his design of vindicating

the validity of international law. 'It can be,' said the President

himself in his last Note. In these three words may be seen the

conviction of Mr. Wilson, that he can impose his will upon England

in this matter.

"As I have already reported, I earnestly hope that it will be decided

to reply to the American note; and a reply should, to my mind,

deal with these three points:

"(1) Settlement of the _Lusitania_ incident. In this connection

it would be well to state that from the point of view of reprisals

we were entirely justified in attacking the _Lusitania_. In so

doing, however, we had no intention of taking American lives, and

deeply regret that through a combination of unfortunate circumstances

this has actually occurred. If any distress still exists among the

survivors of the disaster, we should be quite prepared to leave the

amount of financial compensation to be decided by a later agreement.

"(2) We propose in the future course of the submarine campaign to

abide by the practice recently adopted. As things stand at present,

the arrangement is that no liner is to be torpedoed without warning.

"(3) We should be prepared to support to the utmost of our power

the efforts of President Wilson, to insist on the observation of

the dictates of international law during the present conflict,

and leave it to his discretion to enter into conversations to this

end with the British Government. The Declaration of London might

serve as a basis for these conversations, more especially as it

was drawn up at the time by the American Government.

"If we act in accordance with these my respectful recommendations,

the breakdown of the negotiations with England is the worst that

can happen; and then it would be clear for all the world to see

that our enemies were to blame for this breakdown, and Mr. Wilson

would come over to our side. Knowing the President as I do, I have

not the slightest doubt of this."

I gather from the account in Karl Helfferich's "World War," Vol.

II., p. 322, that the Secretary of the Treasury in Berlin was in

favor of this policy, which I held to be the only possible one.

When he stated, as before mentioned, that his proposal had found

no support from the Foreign Office, I was much astonished.

I was instructed to commence negotiations verbally and confidentially

with Mr. Lansing on these lines, and was convinced myself that

these would lead to nothing, so long as we persisted in carrying

on our submarine campaign on the old lines. Policy should be based

on what is possible; now it was not really possible to unite these

two contradictory methods, and to come to an understanding with

the United States over the freedom of the seas, and at the same

time to bring her to agree to the continuation of submarine warfare

on the existing lines. We were bound to decide once for all on the

one policy or the other. I supposed that Berlin had decided for

the former course of action, as I knew that our submarine commanders

had lately been ordered to arrange for the rescue of noncombatants

before torpedoing merchantmen, and I was confirmed in my supposition

by the very fact that I had been authorized to open conversations

with Mr. Lansing.

Scarcely had these conversations begun, when on August 19th the

passenger steamer _Arabic_ was sunk, and again some American lives

were lost. Excitement at once attained a high pitch, and once more

we seemed to be on the brink of war.

On August 20th I dispatched by one of my usual routes the following

wire (written for reasons of safety in French) to the Foreign Office:

"I fear I cannot prevent rupture this time if our answer in _Arabic_

matter is not conciliatory; I advise dispatch of instructions to

me at once to negotiate whole question. Situation may thus perhaps

be saved."

At the same time, without writing for instructions, I explained

both officially and also through the Press that on our side the

United States would be given full compensation, if the commander

of the _Arabic_ should be found to have been treacherously dealt

with. It was my first preoccupation to calm the public excitement

before it overflowed all bounds; and I succeeded in so calming

it. The action I thus took on my own responsibility turned out

later to have been well advised, as, although I did not know this

at the time, the submarine commander's instructions had, in fact,

been altered as a result of the disaster to the _Lusitania_.

On the 24th of August, in accordance with instructions from Berlin,

I wrote to Mr. Lansing the following letter, which was immediately

published:

"I have received instructions from my Government to address to you

the following observations: Up to the present no reliable information

has been received as to the circumstances of the torpedoing of

the _Arabic_. The Imperial Government, therefore, trusts that the

Government of the United States will refrain from taking any decided

steps, so long as it only has before it one-sided reports which my

Government believe do not in any way correspond to the facts. The

Imperial Government hopes that it may be allowed an opportunity

of being heard. It has no desire to call in question the good faith

of those eyewitnesses whose stories have been published by the

European Press, but it considers that account should be taken of

the state of emotion, under the influence of which, this evidence

was given, and which might well give rise to false impressions. If

American subjects have really lost their lives by the torpedoing

of this ship, it was entirely contrary to the intentions of my

Government, which has authorized me to express to the Government of

the United States their deepest regrets, and their most heartfelt

sympathy."

Fortunately, as already mentioned, orders had been given before

the torpedoing of the _Arabic_, to all submarine commanders that

no liner should be sunk before preliminary warning had been given,

and the non-combatants had been placed in safety, unless any ships

tried to escape or offered resistance. At the end of August I received

an official statement to this effect, intended for my use in the

negotiations over the _Lusitania_ question. This statement caused the

first hitch in these negotiations. The American Government regarded

the term "liner" as comprising every steamer plying on recognized

routes as distinguished from the so-called "tramp steamer." The

German Naval authorities, on the other hand, averred that their

reservation only applied to the large ships of the regular passenger

services. However, this divergence of opinion only became important

at a later date, and was not for the moment an obstacle to our

proceedings.

On the other hand, it was certainly unfortunate for us that up to

the 31st January, 1917, neither of the two contending parties in

Berlin were able to gain complete control in the matter of policy.

I, myself, was never in favor of the submarine campaign, because

I was convinced that it could not fulfil its avowed object, and

would probably involve us in hostilities with the United States;

but bad as this policy was, it would have been better to follow

it consistently than to halt between two opinions.

The submarine campaign was in the end gradually and unwillingly

sacrificed, owing to our desire to placate the United States. If we

had made a clean sweep of it, once and for all, after the _Lusitania_

incident, or, at any rate, after the sinking of the _Arabic_, as we

actually did after the torpedoing of the _Sussex_, considerable

advantages would have been gained from the diplomatic point of view.

To my mind, there was now only one thing to be done--to abandon

our pretensions that the submarine campaign was being conducted

in accordance with the recognized principles of cruiser warfare,

laid down by international law, and to offer compensation for the

loss of the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_. Having done this, we

could then proceed to recall to the American Government their

oft-expressed original view of the freedom of the seas. As a matter

of fact, immediately after the settlement of the _Arabic_ incident,

Mr. Lansing sent a peremptory Note to England. But the prospect of

any favorable result for ourselves from this exchange of Notes was

never fulfilled, as our methods of war at sea always resulted in

fresh incidents and fresh conflicts. There was, of course, a second

possibility: that is, while persisting in the submarine campaign to

recognize that it was inevitably bound to lead to friction with

America, and to discount all the ensuing consequences.

Neither of these two courses was consistently followed in our policy.

We were for ever trying to square the circle, and to conduct a submarine

campaign which should be from a military point of view effective,

without at the same time leading to a breach with America. The order

that "liners" should not be torpedoed under any circumstances was

regarded simply as a piece of red tape, and not applicable to war

conditions, as the submarine was not in a position to distinguish

through its periscope between "liners" and other craft. We thus

contrived at one and the same time to cripple our submarines, and

yet to fail to give satisfaction to America. Probably the German

Government did not venture in face of public opinion in the country

to desist altogether from the use of submarines.

It has been said that "the freedom of the seas" was an unattainable

ideal, a mere phrase, a red herring drawn across our track; but

it was in reality none of these things. America attached to this

phrase a definite and concrete meaning; namely, the abolition of

the law of capture at sea, and I am convinced that after the World

War America will yet fall out with England over this question,

and will not rest till she has achieved her object. Certainly the

original sin of the United States against the spirit of neutrality

lay in the fact that she suffered the violation of her admitted

rights by England's interference with the reciprocal trade of the

neutral States. Messrs. Wilson and House often talked with me about

this matter of the law of capture at sea. It would be a complete

misconception of American policy to deny that in this phrase, "the

freedom of the seas," one of their dearest desires found expression.

When I informed Mr. Lansing confidentially at the end of August

of the latest instructions to our submarine commanders, he was

much gratified, but explained at once that the fact of its being

confidential would deprive the information of all its value; something

must, at all costs, be done to reassure public opinion. I could

not but admit that the view of the Secretary of State was correct

in this respect. The factor of public opinion obviously appeared

of less importance in Berlin than in Washington; besides, I knew

from experience that no secret could be kept in Washington for

long, and that in a few days this, our first sign of yielding,

would be common knowledge. I thought it best, therefore, to get

the full diplomatic advantage from the new situation, and took it

upon myself, on September 1st, to publish my instructions. This

exercise of initiative got me a reprimand from Berlin, but I attained

my object none the less, in that I avoided any immediate danger

of war.

Concerning these negotiations the following correspondence took

place with Berlin:

(1) CIPHER

"Cedarhurst, August 30th, 1915.

"I have tried to wire reports to your Excellency by the route placed

at our disposal, and inform you as to the progress of the negotiations

between myself and Mr. Lansing over the _Arabic_ incident. In

consequence of the instructions given to me and the information given

by your Excellency to the Associated Press in Berlin, the general

situation here has taken a turn for the better. The prospect of war

is becoming more remote; there are signs of returning confidence

on the Stock Exchange, and I have even succeeded in inducing the

Press to see things in a more reasonable light.

"Thus up to the present, everything seems to be going well, and a

rupture of diplomatic relations appears once more to be indefinitely

postponed. None the less, our difficulties are really much greater than

at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident. The American Government's

intentions are undoubtedly peaceful, and the case of the _Arabic_,

involving as it did the loss of only two American lives, may be

said to be in itself comparatively unimportant. There are other

factors, however, to be considered. Both the Government and the

people are beginning to have shrewd suspicions, which for reasons

of policy they refrain from expressing at present, that we cheated

the United States in the matter of the _Lusitania_, that we spun out

the discussion as long as possible, and then replied to President

Wilson's last and most peremptory Note, by torpedoing the _Arabic_.

I am convinced that Mr. Lansing, who is an able lawyer, and as a

result of his American training alive to every possible move of

an opponent, expects us to follow the same policy over the matter

of the _Arabic_. He has thus no great confidence in our good faith,

though the President, I am told, is more optimistic, his friend

House having informed him that his policy of the 'freedom of the

seas' commands general assent in Berlin. The facts of the situation,

then, are that the President will not permit any procrastination

in the negotiations over the _Arabic_ affair, for should no more

satisfactory conclusion be reached now than was the case after

the _Lusitania_ incident, Wilson would forfeit the respect of his

countrymen, and would have no other resource but to forego his

cherished design with what face he might, or else break off diplomatic

relations with Germany. There can be no doubt in the minds of any

who are well versed in American affairs that he would elect for

the latter course. The Spanish-American War arose out of just such

a situation.

"The following conclusions result from the above: I gather from

the Berlin reports of the Associated Press that your Excellency

has decided to settle the present dispute with the United States

on the lines which I have respectfully suggested to you. If this

be so I urge the utmost expedition in the matter, that confidence

here may be restored, and the way opened for negotiations with

England. It is not so much a matter of making apologies or giving

explanations, but rather of making a full statement to this Government

as to the instructions given to our submarine commanders. If we can

prove by this means that after the _Lusitania_ incident, orders

had been given to attack no passenger ships while negotiations with

the United States were going on, or to do so only under certain

conditions, all outstanding questions could be solved without

difficulty."

(2) CIPHER DISPATCH

"Berlin, September 10th, 1915.

"_Daily Telegraph_ of September 2nd publishes what purports to

be extract from your aforesaid letter to Mr. Lansing, informing

him of instructions issued to submarine commanders. Extract ends

as follows:

"'I have no objection to your making any use you please of the above

information.'

"If _Daily Telegraph_ has reproduced your letter correctly, above

statement is contrary to instructions, which authorized you only to

give information confidentially to American Government. Premature

publication in American Press places us in difficult position here,

especially as no official report of actual contents of your

communication to Mr. Lansing has reached us. I beg that you will

kindly furnish an explanation.

(Signed) JAGOW."

(3) CIPHER REPORT

"Cedarhurst, October 2nd, 1915.

"Reference your wire No. A 129 of September 10th, I ask your Excellency

to be kind enough to pardon me for having taken upon myself to act

on my own responsibility over the submarine question. The position

at the end of August rendered some action to pacify public opinion

imperative, if a breach were to be avoided. Owing to the difficulties

of communication with Berlin I could do nothing but acquaint Mr.

Lansing with a portion of my instructions concerning the case of

the _Lusitania_--the only ones which had then reached me. I at once

reported my action to your Excellency in my wireless message, No.

179, and in a previous telegram, No. 165, and requested approval

of my action; probably these messages have been delayed in transit,

or have not reached Berlin. In further explanation, I may add that

in this country, confidential matter, in the European sense, does

not exist, and such matter can never be kept a secret from the

Press. Sometimes I have been able to come to an agreement with the

Government over the wording of their _communiques_ to the Press;

that is one of the great advantages of conducting the negotiations

on the spot. Had the whole American Press entirely refused to accept

our official explanations, nothing further could have been done

with the Government."

While my negotiations with Mr. Lansing in Washington for a simultaneous

settlement of the _Arabic_ and _Lusitania_ questions were still

in progress, a memorandum was handed to Mr. Gerard, the American

Ambassador in Berlin which purported to justify the action of the

offending submarine commanders. Thus the situation once more became

acute. The contents of this document were as follows:

"On August 19th a German submarine held up the English steamer

_Dunele_ about sixty miles south of Kinsale, and having ordered

the crew to leave the ship, were about to sink it by gun-fire when

the commander observed a large steamer heading directly towards

him. This latter, which afterwards proved to be the _Arabic_, bore

no ensign, or other marks of neutrality, and was thus obviously an

enemy. Approaching nearer, she altered her original course, and

again made directly for the submarine thus leading the commander

of the latter to suppose that she was about to attack and ram him.

In order to parry this attack, the submarine dived and fired a

torpedo which struck the ship. The submarine commander observed

that those on board got away in fifteen boats.

"According to his instructions, the German commander was authorized

to attack the _Arabic_ without warning, and without allowing time

for the rescue of her crew, in case of an attempt at flight or

resistance. The action of the _Arabic_ undoubtedly gave him good

grounds for supposing that an attack on him was intended. He was the

more inclined to this belief, by the fact that a few days before, on

the 14th, he had been fired at from long range by a large passenger

steamer, apparently belonging to the British Royal Mail Steam Packet

Company, which he saw in the Irish Sea, but which he had made no

attempt to attack or hold up.

"The German Government deeply regrets that loss of life should have

resulted from the action of this officer, and it desires that these

sentiments should be conveyed more particularly to the Government of

the United States, as American citizens were among the missing. No

obligation to make compensation for the damage done can, however,

be admitted, even on the hypothesis that the submarine commander

mistook the intentions of the _Arabic_. In the event of an insoluble

difference arising on this point between the German and American

Governments, the German Government suggests that the matter in

dispute should be referred to the Hague Tribunal as a question

of international law, in accordance with Article 38 of the Hague

convention for the peaceful solution of differences between nations;

but it can do so only with this reservation, that the arbitrator's

award shall not have the validity of a general decision as to the

international legality or otherwise of the German submarine warfare."

The following three reports or telegrams dispatched by me to the

Imperial Chancellor describe the situation in Washington at this

juncture:

(1) CIPHER

"Washington, September 14th, 1915.

"Lansing has given me permission to wire you by this route, without

the messages being seen by him; he will also forward your Excellency's

reply, and from this it appears to be the Government's view, that

any further exchange of Notes, the subsequent publication of which,

in both countries, would merely involve further misunderstandings,

is bound to lead to a breach. It considers the present system of

confidential negotiations with me as the only promising method of

arriving at an agreement. The memorandum on the _Arabic_ is not

understood here, and in so far as it is understood, is considered

to be a manifestation of German bad faith--a sign that we may perhaps

give way in principle, but will always in practice seek to evade

our obligations thus incurred.

"Lest this telegram should, by its length, give offence to the

British, Mr. Lansing is forwarding the evidence in the _Arabic_ case

to Mr. Gerard for transmission to your Excellency; he is himself

quite convinced that the submarine commander was not compelled in

self-defense to torpedo the _Arabic_, and that his action in so

doing was therefore unjustified. He hopes that your Excellency

will after study of the evidence, agree with him in this.

"To obtain full and complete agreement it is first of all necessary

that I should be empowered to publish in full those instructions

given to our submarine commanders in so far as these were not given

in my previous summaries on the matter. If we still consider ourselves

bound to maintain that the officer concerned in the _Arabic_ case

was only obeying orders, we can never hope to come to an agreement,

for no one can possibly feel any confidence in the sincerity of our

intentions. In the meantime I shall try to reach a settlement on

the matters now in dispute by means of arbitration. Finally, the

question of compensation must, in accordance with my instructions

for the _Lusitania_ case, be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

"I am quite certain that if we fail to reach an agreement, severance

of diplomatic relations cannot but follow.

"Lansing will not reply to the _Arabic_ memorandum, and, as I said

before, will conduct the diplomatic exchanges on this matter only

through me. He considers this as the only possible course on the

ground that Wilson and I are alike committed to the policy of 'the

freedom of the seas.'

"Finally, I may observe that everyone here would be much gratified

if we could see our way to extend the scope of our latest instructions

to our submarines so as to include all merchant shipping. It is

argued that these vessels are slow moving and could easily be warned;

the advantage of acting without warning is only of importance in

the case of swift passenger ships, which we have, none the less,

undertaken not to attack without notice. The suggested proposal,

therefore, could not harm us; it would, on the other hand, make us

very popular here and give the United States a very strong position

in her negotiations with England. Of course, I may be able to effect

an agreement without this. The main point in dispute is the verdict

on the action of the commander in the _Arabic_ case, because this

involves the whole question of our good faith. Anyway, there is

no doubt whatever that a second _Arabic_ case is bound to result

in war."

(2) CIPHER TELEGRAM

"Cedarhurst, September 22nd, 1915.

"As position is still very difficult, I am carrying on conversations

in strict confidence through personal friend of Wilson's. Request,

therefore, that no directions be sent as regards question of

responsibility for _Arabic_ incident, till your Excellency hears

again from me. Lansing at present gone on leave. Personally I do not

believe that I shall manage to secure International Commission of

Inquiry. According to present view, main point of dispute is question

of disavowing action of submarine commander. I hope, however, that

after reviewing American evidence, your Excellency will be able

to find formula for such disavowal, agreeable to both Governments,

especially if I can get concurrence of Wilson before press gets

hold of it. Request, therefore, that American correspondents in

Germany be told nothing more than that American evidence being

carefully gone into in Berlin."

(3) CIPHER REPORT

"Cedarhurst, September 28th, 1915.

"The negotiations about the submarine campaign are at a standstill

at present. From the fact that Lansing has not been recalled from

leave and that President Wilson does not seem over-eager to give

an opinion on the proposals which I have put forward for his

consideration, I consider myself justified in concluding that the

Americans do not consider the situation to be any longer critical.

Even the Press is no longer agitated, as in all recent cases of

attack by German submarines. Their commanders have acted quite in

accordance with our assurances. Under these circumstances Mr. Wilson

may possibly fall in with our proposal that the particular case of

the _Arabic_ should be dealt with by an International Commission

of Inquiry. In any case, some means must be found of finishing once

for all with the _Arabic_ and _Lusitania_ incidents; only then

shall we be in a position to see whether President Wilson will

keep his word, and take energetic measures _vis a vis_ England.

"The Anglo-French Loan Commission, assisted by their agency, the

Morgan group, are working at high pressure. Stories of Allied victories

in Europe are sedulously spread abroad in order to enlist the support

of public opinion. Despite these efforts the commission found Chicago

so invincibly hostile that they were compelled to proceed there in

person, but they will probably, in any case, manage to raise a

loan, as the Morgan group are quite strong enough for the purpose.

The rate of interest they are demanding is very high, as up till

now they have financed all English purchases here. By these means,

they are, no doubt, making considerable profits, but in order to

secure them, they will, of course consolidate their floating debt

and unload it on to the public. The only question is to what extent

they will be able to do this. Opinion varies as to the size of

England's present debt; a prominent banker here, in close touch

with the Morgan group, estimated the total to 500,000,000 dollars;

if this estimate is correct, a loan of 500,000,000 dollars would

only just cover the liabilities hitherto existing.

"The Morgan group certainly had to make two great concessions:

first, that the proceeds of the new loan shall not be employed

for the purchase of munitions, and second, that Russia shall be

excluded from the loan; only by these means could they overcome the

opposition of the German-Americans and the Jews. Our Jewish friends

here are in no easy position. Their action, or rather inaction,

takes the form of what is commonly known as 'egg-dancing,' or

'pussyfooting'; they wish to stand well with all sides, but have

not the courage of their convictions, and are very anxious to make

money. All this is very easily understood, when one remembers the

ambiguous position of these gentlemen. A regular devil's dance

around the 'Golden calf' is now going on here. All the European

Governments are coming to buy in the American market, and usually

paying double for their goods, as they only purchase what they

urgently need. _One lesson_ we may learn for future reference from

the present state of affairs, and that is that we must not allow

ourselves again to be left to the tender mercies of the German-Jew

bankers here. After the war, we must have branches of our large

banks in New York just as we have in London. All evidence goes

to show that New York will then be the center of world-finance,

and we should, therefore, take all steps to act on this assumption

as soon as possible."

The Foreign Office in Berlin, who naturally wished to avoid a rupture

with the United States, accordingly dispatched to me the following

telegraphic instructions:

"We have no doubt that in this instance submarine commander believed

_Arabic_ intended to ram and had every reason for such belief. However,

German Government prepared to give credence to sworn evidence of

English officers of _Arabic_ and agree that in reality no such

intention existed.

"Attack of submarine thus was unfortunately not in accordance with

instructions; communication to this effect will be made to commander.

German Government is for sake of final settlement by friendly agreement

prepared without admission of responsibility from point of view of

international law, to give indemnification for death of American

citizens. Your Excellency is empowered to notify American Government

of above, and to negotiate with them in case of acceptance concerning

amount of compensation, subject to our concurrence. Confidently

expect that incident will thus be finally liquidated, as above

is limit of possible concessions."

"The American Government during verbal negotiations with me on this

matter considered it essential that a phrase expressing Germany's

disapproval of the commander's action should be incorporated in the

explanation which I proposed to publish. I was not sure whether

I was really authorized by the above instructions to comply with

this condition, but in view of the fact that it was the only hope

of avoiding a breach and further delay in the negotiations would

profit us nothing, as we were bound to make some sort of reply to

the American demand within a certain definite time, I acted once

more on my own responsibility and gave the following explanation

to Mr. Lansing:

"The Government of his Majesty the Kaiser, in its orders with which

I previously made you acquainted, has so framed its instructions to

its submarine commanders as to avoid any repetition of incidents

such as that of the _Arabic_. According to the report of the officer

who sank the _Arabic_ and his sworn evidence, together with that

of his crew, this commander believed that the _Arabic_ intended

to ram the submarine. On the other hand, the Imperial Government

does not desire to call in question the good faith of the English

officers of the _Arabic_, who have given evidence on oath that the

_Arabic_ had no intention of ramming. The action of the submarine

was therefore contrary to orders, and the Imperial Government both

disapproves of it and regrets it. A communication to this effect

has been made to the officer in question. Under these circumstances

my Government is prepared to give compensation for the lives of

American subjects drowned, to their great regret, in the _Arabic_.

I am empowered to discuss with you the amount of this compensation."

The above explanation finally resolved the second crisis. The German

naval authorities naturally complained of my action, as the

"disapproval" stuck in their throats, and I was once more taken

to task--a matter which weighed little with me. For I felt that

my interpretation of the instructions from the Foreign Office was

the only one which could have saved us from war, and that now the

road was open for the final settlement of the _Lusitania_ incident

and the discussion of the great question of "the freedom of the

seas." The outlook for us was most promising. Opinion in America

as a result of the solution of the _Arabic_ question was once more

favorable to us. A leading American paper, the _New York Sun_,

said at this time in its leading article:

"The successful issue of the conversations with Germany over the

submarine campaign cannot fail to be of benefit to an nations,

as a proof of the possibilities of diplomacy as against war. It

has been a personal triumph for both the participants, President

Wilson and Count Bernstorff."

The position of both men has been much strengthened thereby, and

what they have already achieved is no doubt only a presage of still

greater results in the future.

The following four reports to the Foreign Office deal with the

settlement of the _Arabic_ case:

(1) CIPHER

"Cedarhurst, October 6th, 1915.

"The settlement of the _Arabic_ case reported to your Excellency

in my wire, has caused great satisfaction in all circles here. Of

course a few avowedly Anglophile papers, such as the _New York

Herald_ and the _New York Tribune_, reveal the cloven hoof, and

are clearly disappointed that a rupture of diplomatic relations

between America and Germany has been averted; for the rest, at

no time since the outbreak of war have we had such a good Press

as at this moment.

"History alone will be in a position to say whether the settlement

of the _Arabic_ case really prevented a war with the United States or

not; but your Excellency knows my views that without this settlement

a conflict must eventually have become inevitable. I respectfully

submit that the preservation of peace alone was a sufficient motive

to induce us to come to terms; but you also know that this was by

no means my sole object. I wished also to induce the Government

of the United States to take energetic proceedings against England,

with the object of translating into fact its idea of the freedom

of the seas. I trust we shall not be disappointed in this regard,

and I shall, certainly, leave no stone unturned to keep Mr. Wilson

on the right path. Whatever may be one's personal opinion of the

President, whether one believes him to be really neutrally-minded,

or not, his great services to the cause of peace cannot be denied.

A Republican President would certainly not have stood up, as he

has done, against the united forces of anti-Germanism represented

by Wall Street, the Press, and so-called Society.

"At the present moment it looks as if the American Government are

ready to let the _Lusitania_ matter drop altogether, provided we

agree to refer the question of compensation to the Hague Tribunal

after the war. The general belief here is that judicial proceedings

are out of the question during the continuance of hostilities. At

least I gather as much, indirectly, of course, from one of the

President's friends."

(2) CIPHER

"Cedarhurst, October 15th, 1915.

"I much regret that owing to a mistake on the part of the State

Department, your Excellency was not earlier informed of the settlement

of the submarine question. Mr. Lansing left my letter, which should

have accompanied the telegram, in his writing-table by mistake,

for which oversight he afterwards apologized to me. The Imperial

Embassy was in no way to blame.

"The importance attached by the President, from the very first,

to those main points on which we were unable to make concessions

rendered the task of arriving at an agreement by no means an easy

one. Thus on three of the most important points no agreement has

been reached and over these we must, for the present, draw the

veil. Only a few of the most rabid of the pro-English papers venture

openly to reproach President Wilson with having achieved nothing

but the security of passenger-ships, but all Americans are prepared

to admit in confidence that the Government has completely departed

from its original position.

"The three important questions still in dispute, as mentioned above,

are the following:

"(1) The German Government's responsibility for American lives lost

in the torpedoing of British Ships.

"(2) The responsibility for the payment of compensation for the

American lives so lost.

"(3) The American demand that _all_ merchant ships should be warned

by our submarines before being attacked.

"This demand was at first so worded as to imply that submarines,

like other warships, had only the right of search.

"The Government, realizing that we could not make concessions on

the above three points, had to be content with our admission that

the case of the _Arabic_ should be regarded as exceptional. This

very fast rendered it impossible to reach a similar settlement

in the case of the _Lusitania_, in which no error on the part of

the submarine commander concerned could be adduced. However, the

Government seemed to be only too satisfied to have come so well

out of their difficulties, and have no wish to raise any further

obstacles because of the _Lusitania_ incident. This matter, as

I have already had the honor to report, may now well be left to

drag on indefinitely, and can be referred in the end to the Hague

Tribunal after the war. Our Press should, therefore, be warned that

further discussion of the controversy between Germany and America

over the submarine campaign is undesirable."

(3) CIPHER

"Cedarhurst, October 20th, 1915.

"Your Excellency's last wireless requested me to render a report

on the settlement of the _Arabic_ question. I have already complied

with these instructions, and the documents are now on their way

to you, and should have reached you. However, it may be advisable

to explain briefly the more important points of the matter.

"From the date of the sinking of the _Lusitania_, America has always

been on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations with us.

The German people, I am convinced, have no idea of the full danger

of the situation, at least, if one may judge from our Press. On

two occasions we were compelled to sacrifice individuals in order

to avoid a breach, Dernburg and Dumba being our scapegoats. Their

mistakes would under normal circumstances have been overlooked,

but their removal was at the time necessary in order to give the

American Government the opportunity of showing its strength without

breaking off diplomatic relations with us.

"As I have more than once explained in my reports, no solution

of the _Lusitania_ question, agreeable to the Americans, could be

found, so long as we were not prepared to admit the responsibility

of the Imperial Government for the disaster, or its obligation

to make reparation, and so long as our views on the principles

of submarine warfare differed from those held by the American

Government.

"By dint of drawing out the negotiations as long as possible, and

by the employment of all my persuasive powers, I succeeded in tiding

over the moment of _acute_ tension. Then came the incident of the

_Arabic_. My laboriously constructed diplomatic edifice came tumbling

about my ears, and things looked blacker than ever. The American

Government regarded the _Arabic_ incident most seriously, believing

as they did that it was typical of the whole German policy _vis-a-vis_

America. They argued that either the whole affair had been prearranged

as a manifestation of our intention to have our own way in the

matter of submarine warfare, or else it was a blunder which could

be dealt with in the ordinary course of diplomacy. Negotiation

became possible when your Excellency notified this Government that

satisfaction would be given in the event of the submarine commander

being proved to have acted contrary to his instructions. Further

negotiations followed on this basis, and it was finally agreed

that we should admit the exceptional nature of the _Arabic_ case,

without yielding our ground on the main points. Such agreement would

have been impossible had President Wilson adhered to his previous

position, but he wished to have done with the whole business, and

could only do so by throwing dust in the eyes of the American public.

He hoped by these means to get rid of the _Lusitania_ incident

unostentatiously, and told me, through one of his personal friends,

'to let it drift.' The idea at the back of his mind is that it

shall be left to an international tribunal sitting after the war,

to decide whether we shall pay compensation or not.

"The only really important question as regards the settlement of

the _Arabic_ case, is whether it is worth while for us to risk a

rupture of relations with the United States, for the sake of this

affair. I still persist in my opinion, that it would infallibly

have led us into a new war."

(4) CIPHER

"Washington, 1st November, 1915.

"Your Excellency's last wire on the matter of the submarine campaign

raises two points of the highest importance.

"First, as to Wilson's policy of the 'freedom of the seas;' this

has been the idea underlying all our recent negotiations over the

submarine warfare. Our agreement with this policy has been constantly

emphasized in all my conversations with leading men here; but it is

of course necessary carefully to choose our moment for the public

declaration of our agreement with Wilson's point of view, as people

here naturally fear that if England believes us to be behind any

agitation for the freedom of the seas she will resist it all the

more firmly. I respectfully recommend, therefore, that we should

leave Mr. Wilson to carry on his present controversy with England,

for the present at all events, unaided. We shall lose nothing by

so doing, and if an opportunity comes for our participation, we

can make use of it.

"After this expression of opinion, let me pass on to the second

point I have always clearly stated here, that we reserve to ourselves

full liberty of decision, if England refuses to receive our advances.

At present, now that the _Arabic_ case has been recognized as

exceptional, this 'freedom' is only being encroached upon from

one direction as we have undertaken not to sink passenger ships

without warning, etc. By this undertaking we must abide, unless

we wish to go to war with the United States of America. Any future

destruction of passenger ships with Americans on board, especially

if such took place without warning, and with the approval of the

Imperial Government, would inevitably cause a rupture."

The political sky in the United States was thus becoming more propitious

day by day; but our enemies' exertions for the purpose of undermining

the present friendly relations, redoubled in proportion. The German

Embassy became the chief object of attack, owing to the fact being

clearly realized by our foes, that so long as its influence in

Washington political circles remained unimpaired, no rupture of

diplomatic relations could be hoped for. Entente diplomacy left no

stone unturned which could be of service against us; lies, robbery,

personal defamation, gossip, were all used to discredit us.

The conduct of a British officer on duty in Washington affords

a good example of the unscrupulous policy of our foes. According

to the evidence of Dr. Fuehr, this gentleman, now holding a high

position in London, attempted in the early months of 1916 to corrupt

a messenger of our Press Bureau in New York, one Alfred Hoff, whose

daily duty it was to take newspaper cuttings to Councillor Albert's

office. Two of his people stopped this boy in the street and invited

him to the British Consular offices; here he was received by the

Captain himself, who showed him a bag filled with bank notes and

promised him a liberal reward, if he would undertake to obtain

some letters from Dr. Fuehr's desk. Hoff pretended to fall in with

this suggestion, but at once informed his employer of the incident.

The Captain then made a second effort to bribe Hoff by the promise

of a money reward for every document from the Press Bureau, and

also a ride in a motor for the letters which it was his duty to

take from the Bureau to the German Embassy at Cedarhurst, during

the coming summer. One of the British agents told Hoff that he would

be well paid if he handed over the letters of Dr. Fuehr, which he

often used to seal and frank, and also certain other documents of

a specially confidential nature. Dr. Fuehr finally put an end to

this unsavory episode, which had been fully investigated by private

detectives, by publishing a detailed account of the whole affair in

the Hearst papers. At the same time he brought the matter before

the Public Prosecutor, who, however, was unwilling to interfere in

the matter unless it should be further discussed in the Press. This

limited comprehension of duty Dr. Fuehr could hardly be expected

to agree with.

During my encounters at this time with the Entente, I entirely lost

any respect I may previously have felt for their moral character,

which was reputed to be so high. I came then to realize that we

could expect nothing better from them in the hour of our defeat,

than a Peace of Versailles, which would make of no account all their

earlier loftier professions. We, in Washington, were therefore,

in duty bound, to strain every nerve to avert such a catastrophe to

our country. Unfortunately the activities of the agents dispatched

from home invariably deranged our plans in a most unfortunate manner,

and, while affording our foes the desired opportunities for damaging

our cause, achieved nothing of advantage in compensation. The English

Secret Police, and all the detective agencies of the United States

which were in their pay, were always at our heels, endeavoring

to establish some collusion on the part of the German Embassy in

these isolated cases of sabotage. However, all this subterranean

plotting and counter-plotting was but so much lost labor. It was

the decision on the policy of continuing or not continuing the

submarine campaign which finally turned the scale.

At the beginning of August one of these agents managed to steal a

portfolio of documents from Councillor Albert while he was traveling

on the New York elevated railway, and its contents were published

in the _World_ from the 15th of August onwards. We always thought

the perpetrator of this theft was an Entente agent, but it now

appears from Senator Frelinghuysen's evidence before the Senate

Committee of Enquiry on 13th July, 1919, that the guilty individual

was really a member of the American Secret Police. It would certainly

have been an unheard-of thing for an American agent to have robbed

a member of the diplomatic corps and sold the proceeds of his deed

to the Press. Probably what really happened was that the man was in

the pay of the Entente. The investigations at the Senate Committee

disclosed a number of cases of corruption and theft which the agents

of the Entente did not scruple to use in their efforts to compromise

and discredit the German Embassy; so this supposition is in itself

by no means improbable. The affair was merely a storm in a tea-cup;

the papers as published afforded no evidence of any action either

illegal or dishonorable; otherwise the American Government would

certainly have demanded the recall of Albert as they did later

in other cases. The Press manufactured a considerable sensation

out of the contents of the portfolio, but generally speaking the

efforts of the Entente in this affair proved completely without

effect.

The Entente agents, however, were more successful in their next

attack, to which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador fell a victim.

Dumba had already in the winter of 1914-15 recommended to me the

American war correspondent James Archibald, who had been at the

Austro-Hungarian Front, as having German sympathies. Thereupon I

also recommended this gentleman in Berlin, where he was granted all

facilities. In the Summer of 1915 Archibald returned to America, to

lecture on his experiences. As he was anti-Entente, these lectures

brought us financial profit, and therefore we paid Archibald's

traveling expenses. At the beginning of September, 1915, he went

once more to Europe, and dined on the eve of his departure with

Dumba and myself on the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in

New York. By this means our personal connection with Archibald

was openly recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, confiding

in his character and his American nationality, gave him certain

political reports which were not even in cipher, to take to Vienna.

Archibald had also offered to take papers to Berlin for me. I,

however, declined with thanks, as I scented danger, and I would

have warned Dumba also, if I had known that he intended to entrust

dispatches to Archibald. The English seized the latter in Kirkwall

and took away all his papers.

Since then I have never set eyes on Archibald, and I could not

help suspecting that there was something uncanny about the case.

By arresting Archibald the English undoubtedly thought they would

compromise me. I cannot prove that there was anything wrong with

Archibald, but in all the circumstances he could easily have destroyed

the papers, had he wished to do so. In the meanwhile a report was

found among the dispatches of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

transmitting to his Government a memorandum from the Hungarian

journalist, Warm. In this note Warm recommended propaganda to induce

a strike among the Hungarian workers in arms and munitions factories,

and demanded money for this object.

The statement of Dumba's report that the Ambassador had shown the

suggestion to Captain von Papen, who had thought it very valuable,

was very compromising for us.

The German Military Attache was therefore placed in an awkward

position; the letter contained several other blazing indiscretions.

Thus, for instance, in one paper Dumba described President Wilson

as self-willed, and von Papen in a letter to his wife spoke of

the "imbecile Yankees."

As I previously mentioned, the position of the Austro-Hungarian

Ambassador was much shaken by the Dumba-Bryan episode. His defence,

that he had only forwarded the note of an Hungarian journalist,

without identifying himself with it, was not favorably received by

the American Government. A few days later his passport was presented

to him; at the same time the Entente granted him a safe conduct.

Previous to his departure from New York similar scenes took place

to those which followed the sinking of the _Lusitania_.

The Hotel St. Regis, in which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador lived,

was surrounded day and night by innumerable reporters.

When I called on him there to take leave of him, I had to make

use of a back entrance to the hotel in order to avoid numerous

impertinent questions. Dumba himself was followed at every step

by reporters, who among other things often chased him for hours

on end in motor-cars.

In the meanwhile Rintelen (mentioned in the fifth chapter) had

been taken prisoner in England. Further, the case of Fay led to

a disagreeable discussion in public, and lastly action was taken

against the Hamburg-Amerika Line for supplying our squadron of

cruisers with coal and provisions. Thus it was easy for the Entente

agents to establish connection between these offenders and the

Military and Naval Attaches of the German Embassy. How far these

gentlemen were really implicated I did not know at the time, nor

do I now. In this they must plead their own case. As far as I am

concerned both gentlemen always denied that they in any way transgressed

against the American law. It cannot, however, be denied that they

were, in fact, compromised by their relations with these guilty

parties; I do not think that anything beyond this can be authenticated.

Captain von Papen's reputation, therefore, suffered from the time

of the Dumba-Archibald incident; both he and Captain Boy-Ed were

constantly attacked in the anti-German Press, and accused of being

behind every fire and every strike in any munition factory in the

United States. The _New York Herald_ and the _Providence Journal_

took the leading parts in this business. At the same time a campaign

was begun against the German-Americans, who were accused of being

practically without exception disloyal citizens of the United States.

All the various incidents, accusations, so-called conspiracies,

etc., were grist to the Entente's mill, and were exploited to the

full. Congress was about to assemble, and it was therefore to be

expected that the Government would take steps to strengthen its

position.

Mr. Lansing asked me on 1st December to call on him and informed me

that the American Government had requested that von Papen and Boy-Ed

should be recalled, as they were no longer _personoe gratoe!_

To my inquiry as to the reasons for this action, Lansing refused

to reply; he merely remarked that any Government was within its

rights in simply stating that a member of a diplomatic corps was

not _persona grata_. In the course of further conversation, however,

I discovered one thing at least, that Capt. Boy-Ed was supposed to

have been conspiring with the Mexican General Huerta--an obviously

baseless charge, considering that Boy-Ed had never made the acquaintance

of the ex-President. It is true, however, that Rintelen had had

dealings with Huerta, and it was known that Rintelen had received

from Boy-Ed the sum of half a million dollars previously mentioned.

My first message--written in English--to Berlin on this affair ran

as follows:

CIPHER MESSAGE

"Washington, 4th December, 1915.

"In an official Note of to-day's date American Government, as stated

in previous conversations with me, request immediate recall of

Military and Naval Attaches, on the ground of various facts brought

to notice of Government, particularly implication of these Attaches

in illegal and doubtful activities of certain individuals within

United States. Government deeply regrets necessity for this step, and

trusts Imperial Government will understand that no other course seems

to them to be compatible with the interests of the two Governments

and their reciprocal friendly relations."

I also telegraphed as follows to my Government on September 5th:

"Explanations of von Papen and Boy-Ed herewith as requested by Military

and Naval Authorities:

"'State Department request my recall. Reasons for this given to

Ambassador. Case of Stegler and my two supposed meetings with Huerta.

Stegler case settled since March. Stegler in matter of his pass

proved a liar. Had nothing to do with his transactions; not the

least proof that I ever had; see my report No. 4605, March 20th, and

others. I have never in my life met Huerta; I have never concerned

myself with Mexican affairs in any way; I have never to my knowledge

acted contrary to the interests or laws of the United States.

Conjectures and absurd newspaper stories about me result of English

influence and money. Must therefore request my recall be considered

unjustifiable.

"'BOY-EN.'

"'No illegal action can be laid to my charge; demand for recall

unjustified. Importance of military interests of our enemies here

renders necessary effective representation of Central Powers, so

long as America officially neutral. Therefore it should be insisted

on that American Government secure safe-conduct for my successor.

"'PAPEN.'"

In view of the approaching session of Congress, the Government,

on December 5th, published the fact that they had demanded the

recall of the Attaches. This fact, with slight foundation for the

American Government's suspicions, made a bad impression in Berlin;

I went therefore, to see Mr. Lansing on December 8th, and obtained

from him this letter:

"As I have already stated, the demand for recall of the two Attaches

of your Embassy was made as a result of the careful investigation of

a number of facts and circumstances, which convinced this Government

that they could no longer consider these two officers as _personoe

gratoe_, and that their continued residence in the United States

was, therefore, no longer compatible with diplomatic propriety.

This being the considered and deliberate view of this Government,

it would seem that the mere fact of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed

being no longer acceptable, should have been sufficient justification

for their immediate recall by the German Government without further

discussion. The expectations of the United States Government, in

this respect, were in accordance with all diplomatic precedent

in cases where such requests have been made, and there seemed to

be, therefore, no reason why this demand should have been kept a

secret. It is regretted that the Imperial Government should have

regarded the publication of the American request as an act of

discourtesy towards itself. The United States Government does not

share this view of its action, and, therefore, cannot be expected

to express its regret for having acted as it has done.

"This Government is surprised that the Imperial Government should

not have complied at once with its request for the recall of the

two Attaches, who are no longer _personoe gratoe_ here. It

seems to me obvious that whatever may have been the reasons for

such request, it is for this Government, and not for the German

Government, to say whether the charges alleged against the members

of a German diplomatic mission appear sufficiently well-founded to

justify action such as that now taken. In other words, the causes

of the demand are legitimate and sufficient, as being based on

suppositions or suspicions of undesirable activities on the part

of these two officers.

"In any case, the fact remains, that Boy-Ed and von Papen are no

longer acceptable to this Government.

"As I already apprised you by word of mouth, and in my letter of 4th

of this month, the relations of the two Attaches with individuals who

participated in illegal and questionable activities, are established.

The names of von Wedell, Rintelen, Stegler, Buroede, Archibald and

Fay may be mentioned as some of those who have transgressed against

our laws. I could also name other men and cite other examples of

their activities, but as these are at present the object of an

official inquiry, I, by this means, should only prevent the arrest

of those who violated our laws and still continue to violate them.

"Although I have already said that this Government does not want

to do anything further than to request the recall of Boy-Ed and

von Papen, since they are no longer _personoe gratoe_, I,

nevertheless, do not desire to go beyond the above declaration; so

that your Government may be in a position to institute an inquiry

into the manner of dealing with your Attaches, should it wish to

do so. If I should go into further details on this matter I might

interfere with the inquiry which is now being taken up by this

Government, dry up very valuable sources of information, and thus

hinder the course of justice. On the other hand there might thus

be raised other grounds for suspicion, serving rather to disturb

than to improve the present friendly relations between the two

countries. I need not tell your Excellency, that it is the sincere

wish of this Government to avoid difficulties of this kind, so far

as may be consistent with its dignity and its responsibilities."

Besides dispatching a copy of the above letter, I wired to Berlin

on 8th December, as follows:

CIPHER

"Convinced that Rintelen is the main cause of the Attaches' recall.

Immediate categorical disavowal is absolutely necessary. Only possible

connection with us is matter of 500,000 dollars, received from the

Naval Attache and demanded for the exportation of goods."

Thereupon I received the following wireless message in English:

CIPHER

"You are empowered to disclaim connection with Rintelen, who had

no orders to do anything whatsoever, which was an offence against

the American law.

"JAGOW."

The peculiar relations of the Naval and Military Attaches with

the Embassy had, even in times of peace, often led to diplomatic

difficulties. For instance, it has often happened to us and to

other countries to have to recall Military or Naval Attaches for

spying. The diplomatic standing of the head of the Mission would

not generally be affected thereby, but, in view of the passions of

wartime, and the general tension of nerves, I realized that I might be

compromised by the demand for the recall of the Attaches. I questioned

Lansing outright on this point, and added that I should immediately

hand in to my Government my resignation, if I was considered to

be myself "tarred with the same brush." The Secretary of State

assured me that I was by no means involved, and that I should not on

any account give up my post, since I had to carry on the momentous

negotiations now in course, and the American Government had full

confidence in me. Under the circumstances I saw no reason why the

enforced recall of the Attaches should have any further results, and

I was confirmed in this view a few days later when House repeated

to me Lansing's assurance with even greater emphasis. His exact

words were as follows:

"You must not dream of going home before peace is declared. You

are the one tie that still binds us to Germany. If this tie should

break, war would be inevitable."

Both Attaches returned to Berlin under safe-conduct from the Entente

at the end of December, 1915. Their offices were taken over by

their representatives, but only for the purpose of settling up any

outstanding matters.

At the beginning of 1916, there was in the United States no single

German organization which merited the name of "propaganda." Thus no

activities which could compromise us in any way ensued henceforward.

The political situation had become so serene that we had no need

for propaganda. The pacifist elements in the United States did

this work for us. The only question was as to whether we would

remain really at one with them, or whether we meant to persist in

submarine warfare, which must inevitably lead us into war.

President Wilson opened Congress on 7th December, 1915, with a

message, in which he set forth the new programme for national defence.

"Preparedness" became the order of the day in the United States.

The message demanded that the Army and Navy should be increased,

and added:

"The urgent question of our mercantile and passenger shipping is

closely connected with the problem of national supply. The full

development of our national industries, which is of such vital

importance to the nation, pressingly calls for a large commercial

fleet. It is high time to make good our deficiencies on this head

and to restore the independence of our commerce on the high seas."

In this message may be recognized the second important point in

the Presidential programme for the next election. "Peace and

Preparedness" was to be the battle-cry of the Democratic Party. The

Mexican imbroglio of 1913-14 had proved that the armed forces of

the United States were unequal even to the demands of a comparatively

small campaign; and the American Government, for lack of means,

had been unable to impose its will on Mexico. Now the European

War stirred all imaginations and offered a favorable occasion for

overcoming the prejudices of the pacifist section against military

armaments. It was not so long since the song "I didn't raise my

boy to be a soldier," was sung with fervor all the land over; but

now events had too clearly proved the powerlessness of any but

well-armed nations even to follow their own lines of policy; and

the necessity of a mercantile marine of their own grew daily clearer

to the people of the United States. Hitherto the Americans had

always found enough of foreign vessels for the transport of their

goods, had found it cheaper to make use of these facilities than to

supply their own under the conditions existing in the States. Now,

however, the shortage of merchant tonnage was acute, and American

goods were piled roof high in all the warehouses of New York harbor.

It was clear that now or never was the time to seize the chance

afforded by the war of persuading Congress to sanction the provision

of a strong Army and Fleet.

The Presidential message also touched on the "conspiracies," but

without any mention of the German Embassy's supposed share in them.

The period of these so-called "conspiracies" thus closed with a

sharp reprimand addressed by Mr. Wilson to the German-Americans,

and with my official recommendation to the Germans in the United

States to abstain from all forms of illegal action. The after-effects

of this period, however, may be traced in the subsequent lengthy

trials of the various offenders. I cannot be sure that since the

beginning of 1916, not one single incident which could be comprised

under the term "conspiracy" came to light; but these trials and

Entente propaganda kept the recollection of such affairs alive, and

the American war propaganda service had no difficulty subsequently

in retelling the old tales which, but for the entry of the United

States into the war, would have passed into oblivion.

The paragraphs of the message dealing with this subject ran as follows:

"We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is

reason to hope that no question in controversy between this and other

Governments will lead to any serious breach of amicable relations,

grave as some differences of attitude and policy have been and may

yet turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats

against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our

own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to

admit, born under other flags, but welcomed by under our generous

naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America,

who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of

our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good

name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries

wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to

strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign

intrigue. Their number is not great as compared with the whole

number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched

in recent generations out of virile foreign stocks; but it is great

enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it

necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law

by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers.

"But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we

are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to

enact such laws at the earliest possible moment, and feel that in

doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and

self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty

and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are

infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over

them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have

entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government,

they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the

Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. It is

possible to deal with these things very effectually. I need not

suggest the terms in which they may be dealt with."

The message, up to a point, maintained an impartial attitude, for it

not only blamed the German-Americans but continued in the following

words, aimed solely at the many Americans in London and Paris who

disapproved of Wilson's policy of peace and neutrality:

"I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken

sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were

born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and

misrepresenting the temper and principles of the country during

these days of terrible war, when it would seem that every man who

was truly an American would instinctively make it his duty and

his pride to keep the scales of judgment even and prove himself a

partisan of no nation but his own. But it cannot. There are some

men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in

the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten

themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate

sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict

above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States.

They also preach and practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can

reach corruptions of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of

others without also speaking of these and expressing the even deeper

humiliation and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully

patriotic American must feel when he thinks of them and of the

discredit they are daily bringing upon us."

About the turn of the year 1915-16, the severance of diplomatic

relations between the American and Austro-Hungarian Governments had

become imminent. The Italian liner _Ancona_ was torpedoed on November

7th in the Mediterranean Sea by an Austro-Hungarian submarine and

went down before all the passengers could succeed in escaping; many

lives were lost, American citizens being among them. In consequence,

the Washington Government dispatched to Vienna a Note couched in

far stronger terms than any it had yet sent; demanding that the

action should be admitted to be unlawful and inexcusable, that

compensation should be made, and that the officer responsible should

be punished for his deed, which would be branded by the whole world

as inhuman and barbarous, and would incur the abhorrence of all

civilized nations.

The Austro-Hungarian representative, Baron Zwiedeeneck von Suedenhorst,

found himself in an extremely difficult position. Owing to the fact

that he only ranked as charge d'affaires, and that his appointment

only dated from Dr. Dumba's departure, he was not empowered to

enter into negotiations. He had always proved himself a very loyal

colleague and acted in close co-operation with me, but in this

instance, as the matter was one solely for Vienna's decision, I

could be of little service to him. I counselled him to telegraph

frankly to his Government, that if the American demands were not

conceded, a breach was to be expected. I was myself inclined to

believe that, as in the case of our Naval and Military Attaches,

Mr. Wilson's real purpose was to give the lie to those accusations

of weakness which the Entente party was constantly casting in his

teeth, and this, I thought, accounted for the unwonted sternness of

the American Note, which seemed absolutely to challenge a rupture.

It was not conceivable that the Austrian Government could swallow

this bitter pill, while from the point of view of the American

Government, the breaking-off of relations would be a real diplomatic

victory; for on the one hand the political situation would remain

unchanged so long as the German Embassy was in Washington, and

on the other hand, Mr. Wilson would have achieved his object and

shown the Berlin Government that his threats of war were seriously

meant.

However, the Austro-Hungarian Government, after a short further

exchange of Notes, complied under protest with the American demands.

I learned after my return home that in so doing, they acted under

pressure from the German Foreign Office. Thus, this crisis also

blew over, not, however, without a serious loss of prestige for

the Central Powers, who had been compelled to yield to demands

generally regarded as utterly unacceptable. Nothing could be more

fatal to our position in the world than this alternation of defiance

and submission, which served no diplomatic object and merely betrayed

infirmity of purpose.