LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Effugit imago,
Par livibus ventis, volueri que simillima somno.
It seems to us that the vain attempts to define liberty in theory, or to
secure its enjoyment in practice, proceed from the fact that man is
naturally a social and gregarious animal, subject, not by contract or
agreement, as Locke and his followers assume, but by birth and nature,
to those restrictions of liberty which are expedient or necessary to
secure the good of the human hive, to which he may belong. There is no
such thing as _natural human_ liberty, because it is unnatural for man
to live alone and without the pale and government of society. Birds, and
beasts of prey, who are not gregarious, are naturally free. Bees and
herds are naturally subjects or slaves of society. Such is the theory of
Aristotle, promulged more than two thousand years ago, generally
considered true for two thousand years, and destined, we hope, soon
again to be accepted as the only true theory of government and society.
Modern social reformers, except Mr. Carlyle, proceeding upon the theory
of Locke, which is the opposite of Aristotle, propose to dissolve and
disintegrate society; falsely supposing that they thereby follow nature.
There is not a human tie that binds man to man, that they do not propose
to cut "sheer asunder." 'Tis true, after their work of destruction is
finished, they see the necessity of society; but instead of that natural
and historical society, which has usually existed in the world, with its
gradations of rank and power, its families and its slaves, they propose
wholly to disregard the natural relations of mankind, and profanely to
build up states, like Fourierite Phalansteries, or Mormon and Oneida
villages, where religion shall be banished, and in which property, wife
and children shall be held somewhat in common. These social
establishments, under a self-elected despotism like that of Joe Smith,
or Brigham Young, become patriarchal, and succeed, so long as such
despotism lasts. That is, when the association loses the character
intended by its founders, and acquires a despotic head like other family
associations, it works well, because it works naturally. But this
success can only be temporary; for nothing but the strong rule of a
Cromwell or Joe Smith can keep a society together, that wants the
elements of cohesion, in the natural ties that bind man to man: and
Cromwells and Joe Smiths are not to be found every day.
'Tis an historical fact, that this family association, this patriarchal
government, for purposes of defence against enemies from without,
gradually merges into larger associations of men under a common
government or ruler. This latter is the almost universal, and we may
thence infer, natural and normal condition of civilized man. In this
state of society there is no liberty for the masses. Liberty has been
exchanged by nature for security.
What is falsely called Free Society, is a very recent invention. It
proposes to make the weak, ignorant and poor, free, by turning them
loose in a world owned exclusively by the few (whom nature and education
have made strong, and whom property has made stronger,) to get a living.
In the fanciful state of nature, where property is unappropriated, the
strong have no weapons but superior physical and mental power with which
to oppress the weak. Their power of oppression is increased a thousand
fold, when they become the exclusive owners of the earth and all the
things thereon. They are masters without the obligations of masters, and
the poor are slaves without the rights of slaves.
It is generally conceded, even by abolitionists, that the serfs of
Europe were liberated because the multitude of laborers, and their
competition as freemen to get employment, had rendered free labor
cheaper than slave labor. But, strange to say, few seem to have seen
that this is in fact asserting that they were less free after
emancipation than before. Their obligation to labor was increased; for
they were compelled to labor more than before to obtain a livelihood,
else their free labor would not have been cheaper than their labor as
slaves. They lost something in liberty, and everything in rights--for
emancipation liberated or released the masters from all their burdens,
cares and liabilities, whilst it increased both the labors and the cares
of the liberated serf. In our chapter on the Decay of English Liberty,
we show that the whole struggle in England has been to oppress the
working man, pull down the powers, privileges and prerogatives of the
throne, the nobility, and the church, and to elevate the
property-holding class. The extracts from the Era and Northern
Churchman, in another chapter, will further elucidate this subject. We
promised to confirm our doctrine of the illusory and undefinable
character of liberty and slavery, by extracts from standard authors.
PALEY on Civil Liberty:
"To do what we will, is natural liberty: to do what we will,
consistently with the interest of the community to which we
belong, is civil liberty; that is to say, the only liberty to be
desired in a state of civil society.
I should wish, no doubt, to be allowed to act, in every instance,
as I pleased; but I reflect, that the rest also of mankind would
then do the same; in which state of universal independence and
self-direction, I should meet with so many checks and obstacles to
my own will, from the interference and opposition of other men's,
that not only my happiness, but my liberty, would be less than
whilst the whole community were subject to the dominion of equal
laws.
The boasted liberty of a state of nature exists only in a state of
solitude. In every kind and degree of union and intercourse with
his species, it is possible that the liberty of the individual may
be augmented by the very laws which restrain it; because he may
gain more from the limitation of other men's freedom than he
suffers by the diminution of his own. Natural liberty is the right
of common upon a waste; civil liberty is the safe, exclusive,
unmolested enjoyment of a cultivated enclosure.
The definitions which have been framed of civil liberty, and which
have become the subject of much unnecessary altercation, are most
of them adapted to this idea. Thus, one political writer makes the
essence of the subject's liberty to consist in his being governed
by no laws but those to which he hath actually consented; another
is satisfied with an indirect and virtual consent; another, again,
places civil liberty in the separation of the legislative and
executive offices of government; another in the being governed by
_law_; that is, by known, preconstituted, inflexible rules of
action and adjudication; a fifth, in the exclusive right of the
people to tax themselves by their own representatives; a sixth, in
freedom and purity of elections of representatives; a seventh, in
the control which the democratic part of the constitution
possesses over the military establishment."
MONTESQUIEU on Liberty:
"There is no word that has admitted of more various
significations, and has made more different impressions on human
minds, than that of _liberty_. Some have taken it for a faculty of
deposing a person on whom they had conferred a tyrannical
authority; others, for the power of choosing a person whom they
are obliged to obey; others, for the right of bearing arms, and of
being thereby enabled to use violence; others, for the privilege
of being governed by a native of their own country, or by their
own laws. A certain nation for a long time thought that liberty
consisted in the privilege of wearing a long beard.
Some have annexed this name to one form of government, in
exclusion of others; those who had a republican taste applied it
to this government; those who liked a monarchical state, gave it
to monarchies. Thus, they all have applied the name of liberty to
the government most conformable to their own customs and
inclinations; and as in a republic, people have not so constant
and so present a view of the institutions they complain of, and
likewise as the laws there seem to speak more, and the executors
of the laws least, it is generally attributed to republics, and
denied to monarchies. In fine, as in democracies, the people seem
to do very near whatever they please, liberty has been placed in
this sort of government, and the power of the people has been
confounded with their liberty.
It is true, that in democracies the people seem to do what they
please; but political liberty does not consist in an unrestrained
freedom. In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws,
liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to
will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to
will.
We must have continually present to our minds the difference
between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing
whatever the laws permit; and if a citizen could do what they
forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because all
his fellow citizens would have the same power."
BLACKSTONE on Liberty:
"The absolute right of man, considered as a free agent, endowed
with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of
choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable,
are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated
the natural liberty of mankind.
This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one
thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of
nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the
gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the
faculty of free will. But every man, when he enters into society,
gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the
advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to
those laws which the community has thought proper to establish.
And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely
more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is
sacrificed to obtain it. For, no man that considers a moment,
would wish to retain the absolute, uncontrolled power of doing
what he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man
would also have the same power; and then there would be no
security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life.
Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member
of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by
human laws, (and no farther,) as is necessary and expedient for
the general advantage of the public. Hence, we may collect that
the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow
citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil
liberty of mankind; but that every wanton and causeless restraint
of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, a
nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny: nay, that
even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if
they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere
indifference, without any good end in view, are regulations
destructive of liberty; whereas, if any public advantage can arise
from observing such precepts, the control of our private
inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to
preserve our general freedom in others of more importance, by
supporting that state of society which can alone secure our
independence. Thus the statute of King Edward IV, which forbade
the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree of a lord) to
wear pikes upon their shoes or boots of more than two inches in
length, was a law that savored of oppression; because, however
ridiculous the fashion then in use might appear, the restraining
it by pecuniary penalties, could serve no purpose of common
utility. But the statute of King Charles II, which prescribes a
thing seemingly as indifferent, (a dress for the dead, who are all
ordered to be buried in woollen,) is a law consistent with public
liberty; for it encourages the staple trade, on which, in great
measure, depends the universal good of the nation. So that laws,
when prudently framed, are by no means subversive, but rather
introductive of liberty; for, (as Mr. Locke has well observed,)
where there is no law, there is no freedom. But then, on the other
hand, that constitution or frame of government--that system of
laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves
the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those
points wherein the public good requires some direction or
restraint.
The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty, flourish
in their highest vigor in those kingdoms where it falls little
short of perfection, and can only be lost or destroyed by the
folly or demerits of its owner: the legislature, and of course the
laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of
this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject.
Very different from the modern constitutions of other States on
the continent of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law,
which, in general, are calculated to vest an arbitrary and
despotic power of controlling the actions of the subject, in the
prince or in a few grandees. And this spirit of liberty is so
deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very
soil, that a slave, or a negro, the moment he lands in England,
falls under the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a
freeman, though the master's right to his service may possibly
still continue.
Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts and
preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal
liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing
situation, or removing one's person to whatever place one's
inclinations may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless
by due course of law. Concerning which, we may make the same
observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right
strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it
without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom, it can never
be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the
explicit permission of the laws."
Now, let the reader examine and study these definitions of Liberty by
Paley, Montesquieu and Blackstone, and he will see that they are in
pursuit of an ignis fatuus that eludes their grasp. He will see more,
that their liberty is a mere modification of slavery. That each of them
proposes that degree of restraint, restriction and control, that will
redound to the general good. That each is in pursuit of good government,
not liberty. Government pre-supposes that liberty is surrendered as the
price of security. The degree of government must depend on the moral
and intellectual condition of those to be governed. Take, for instance,
Blackstone's definition of civil liberty, and our negro slaves enjoy
liberty, because the restrictions on their free will and free agency not
only redound to public good, but are really necessary to the protection
and government of themselves. We mean to involve ourselves in no such
absurdities. Negroes, according to Blackstone, Paley and Montesquieu,
although slaves, are free, because their liberty is only so far
restricted as the public interest and their own good require. Our theory
is, that they are not free, because God and nature, and the general good
and their own good, intended them for slaves. They enjoy all the rights
calculated to promote their own interests, or the public good. They are,
at the South, well governed and well protected. These are the aims of
all social institutions, and of all governments. There can be no liberty
where there is government; but there may be security for good
government. This the slave has in the selfish interest of the master and
in his domestic affection. The free laborer has no such securities. It
is the interest of employers to kill them off as fast as possible; and
they never fail to do it.
We do not mean to say that the negro slave enjoys liberty. But we do say
that he is well and properly governed, so as best to promote his own
good and that of society. We do mean to say further, that what we have
quoted from these great authors, is all fudge and nonsense. Liberty is
unattainable; and if attainable, not desirable.
Liberty of locomotion, which Blackstone boasts of as one of the rights
of Englishmen, belongs to the mass of them less than to other people.
For five hundred years the poor laws have confined the poor to their
parishes, denied them the right to bargain for their own wages, and as
late as 1725, set them up in stalls and shambles for hire, like cattle.
Liberty in England, as in Rome and Greece, has been, and is now, the
privilege of the few--not the right of the many. But in Rome, Greece,
and the Southern States of America, the many have gained in protection
what they lost in liberty. In England, the masses have neither liberty
nor protection. They are slaves without masters. This right of
locomotion, of choosing or changing their domicil, is not only denied to
the mass of the poor, but in all countries as well as in England, to
wives, to children, to wards, apprentices, soldiers, sailors, convicts,
lunatics and idiots. Take, then, this test of liberty, and how little of
it is there in England! But, in fact, there is a very large nomadic
class of beggars, rogues, and journeymen workmen, who are always
wandering, and yet, who are the most wretched members of society and its
greatest pests. So much for locomotion.
Great as the difficulty is to determine what is Liberty, to ascertain
and agree on what constitutes Slavery is still greater. Slavery, in its
technical form, has been almost universal, yet not exactly alike in all
its circumstances and all its regulations in any two ages, or in any two
countries. In very many ancient States, the power of life and death was
vested in the master. In most countries, the slave cannot acquire or
hold property legally. In all, he holds more or less by the permission.
In many, his legal right to separate property is protected by law. Even
in Cuba, he can compel his master to emancipate him, upon offering an
adequate price; and in some cases of irreconcilable disagreement, force
his master to sell him to another master. It is remarkable at first
view, that in Cuba, where the law attempts to secure mild treatment to
the slave, he is inhumanly treated; and in Virginia, where there is
scarce any law to protect him, he is very humanely governed and provided
for. In Cuba, many of the slaves are savages, and do not elicit the
domestic affection of the master, who sees in them little more than
brutes. The master is, besides, often an absentee, and tho' overseers be
far more humane than Irish rent-collectors, they have neither the
interests nor feelings of resident masters. But the most efficient cause
of cruelty and neglect, is the African slave trade, which makes it
cheaper to buy than to rear slaves. In Virginia, the slaves have
advanced much in morality, religion and intelligence, and their masters
and mistresses, living on the farm with them, naturally become attached
to them. Self-interest, however, is everywhere the strongest motive to
human conduct. Negroes are immensely valuable, and increase rapidly in
value and in numbers when well treated. The law of self-interest secures
kind and humane treatment to Southern slaves. All the legislative
ingenuity in the world will never enact so efficient a law in behalf of
free laborers.
During the decline of the Roman Empire, slavery became colonial or
praedial. The slaves occupied the place of tenants or serfs, were
"adscripti soli," and could only be sold with the farm. Many
antiquarians consider the colonial slavery of the Romans as the true
origin of the feudal system. This kind of slavery was universal in
Europe till a few centuries since, and now prevails to a great extent.
The serfs of Russia, Poland, Turkey, and Hungary, are happier and better
provided for than the free laborers of Western Europe. They have homes,
and lands to cultivate. They work but little, because their wants are
few and simple. They are not over-worked and under-fed, as are the free
laborers of Western Europe. Hence, they never rise in riots and
insurrections, burn houses, commit strikes,--nor do they emigrate.
This form of slavery, however, makes the master an idle absentee,
depriving the slaves of his guardianship, his government, and his
protection. By throwing large masses of the ignorant into exclusive
association with each other, it promotes and increases ignorance,
negligence and idleness. Men will not improve their condition who have
no examples to emulate and no teachers to instruct. Were their farms
conducted as ours of the South, the wealthy would have ample employment,
and the slaves or serfs find in their masters examples, governors,
teachers and protectors.
The right to sell one's children, or one's self, into slavery has been
very common, and is now practiced in China. The ancient Germans used to
even stake their liberty at games of hazard. This would never have been
done, nor would the laws have permitted it, if the situation of the
slave had been greatly inferior to that of the free. But how shall we
class wives, children, wards, apprentices, prisoners, soldiers and
sailors? They are not free, because their personal liberty is controlled
by the will of a superior; not by mere law. They are liable to
confinement and punishment by their superiors, whose will stands in
place of law as to them. They have no right of locomotion like that
enjoyed by the free. They have no liberty secured by law;--they are not
free. Are they, therefore, slaves?
Paley defines slavery to be, "An obligation to labor for the benefit of
the master, without the contract or consent of the servant." The sick,
the superannuated, the infirm, and the infant slaves are under no such
obligation in theory or practice. The master is under an obligation,
legally, theoretically and practically, to labor for them. Therefore,
the master of twenty slaves is always a slave himself. If he be a good
man, he is the happier for performing his duties as slave to those
classes of his slaves. But what becomes of that slavery of the ancients
and of China, where the slave, by actual contract, sells himself? This
is not slavery according to Paley.
The great and glaring defect, however, of Paley's definition is, that he
omits the obligation on the master to provide for and protect the slave.
'Tis but half of a definition, and that half false. It does often happen
that the _obligations_ of the master are more onerous than those of the
slave. Yet Paley omits those obligations altogether. The slave, when
capable to do so, must work for the master; but the master, at all
times, must provide for the slave. If incapable of doing so, the law
gives the slave a new master and protector. His situation is less
honorable, but far more secure than that of the master. Definitions are
perilous attempts. We never read one that a seventy-four with all sail
set might not drive through. We shall define nothing ourselves, for we
know that this is the business of Omnipotence, that alone knows "all
things in heaven and on earth."
We proceed to examine the attempted definitions of Montesquieu and
Blackstone. Blackstone objects to the right to sell one's self, that the
consideration enures to the buyer. This may or may not be so, according
to the laws of the State where the contract is made. It is not a
necessary feature of slavery, and cannot fairly be employed as an
objection to it. In fact, the slaves of the South, in their houses,
gardens, fruit, vegetables, pigs and fowls, hold more property than the
peasantry of Europe, and are far better secured in its possession by
their masters, than that peasantry is by the law. He further objects,
that in case of absolute slavery, not only the liberty, but the life of
the slave is at the master's disposal. This objection is false and
puerile. In no civilized country has the master the right to kill his
slave.
The protection or support to which the slave is entitled, would be an
ample consideration of itself for the sale of his liberty. A much larger
one than the capitalists of Europe would be willing to give; for they
all say that free labor is cheapest.
Montesquieu thus defines slavery:--"Slavery, properly so called, is the
establishment of a right which gives to one man such a power over
another, as renders him absolute master of his life and fortune." This
is French liberty under the rule of the republican Bonapartes, and
English liberty under Cromwell--not Southern slavery. France is always
happy and prosperous with a master, and the masses in England look back
to the Protectorate with fond regret. These despots played the part of
Southern masters. They forced the strong to support the weak, the rich
to take care of the poor. The nations became two farms or families.
Western Europe will soon have to choose between domestic slavery and
universal slavery.
Democracy and liberty are antagonistic; for liberty permits and
encourages the weak to oppress the strong, whilst democracy proposes, so
far as possible, to equalize advantages, by fairly dividing the burdens
of life, and rigidly enforcing the performance of every social duty by
every member of society, according to his capacity and ability.